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FOREWORD 
Specific performance while being but one of numerous equitable remedies 
is a broad and many sided equitable doctrine. The nature of this paper 
does not allow an exhaustive examination of performance. Instead 
one is seeking to peruse selected aspects of specific performance. Hence 
damages and a cross section of equitable discretionary defences to 
performance have been selected. Such discretionary defences form various 
loose classes and several defences have been selected from each class. 
For example under the class of "Traditional defences" the paper considers 
(a) Mutuality and (b) Impossibility; whereas other traditional defences 
such as Laches and Acquiescence are left unconsidered. Moreover, "fairness", 
"hardship" and "clean hands" are investigated from the category of purely 
equitable defences. Further a hybrid class of defence is explored, which 
while being relevant from an equitable point of view, also may vitiate the 
entire contract at common law. Such class incorporates inter alia Mistake, 
Misrepresentation and Illegality. 
Finally performance with regard to testamentary dispositions and the 
of third parties in relation to performance are viewed as a 
special class. 
In the aspects of performance including the history 
of the remedy, the fact that this area of equity was undergoing a 
restructuring became evident. Was performance altering to 
keep apace with changing commercial and social attitudes - equity being 
based squarely on morals and conscience both parameters 
in terms of the accepted standards of society as a whole? 
measured 
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Do the recent spate of statutes which prima facia attempt to codify 
the common-law of contract enlarge the discretion to refuse specific 
performance? 
This paper looks towards a re-emergence of the concept of conscience} 
the basis of all matters equitable} a concept that has been swathed 
in case law for at least a century. Hence Fry's or work on 
specific performance} is considered sparingly given its pUblication 
date of 1926. Further Spry's Third Edition Remedies" 
(1984) came to hand at a time which allowed only for brief reference 
to the same in footnotes. 
It should be kept in mind when considering the New Zealand case law 
on performance as opposed to} say the English} that the 
New Zealand High Court is asked to be both the strict common lawyer 
and still be able to have regard to the of the chancellors 
foot - the latter measurement holding sway in instances of conflict. 
It is ventured that this dual task causes principles, particularly 
in the damages field, to become confused. 
The writer has attempted accurately to state the law as to the 
selected aspects of Performance as at January 1985. 
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BRIEF HISTORY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Only in the United States and the British Commonwealth is it permitted 
to invade the liberty of the individual so as to compel him specifically 
to perform his contracts. 
Nemo potest proecise cogi ad factum was the maxim in Roman Law which 
gave title to damages as the sole right resulting from default in 
performance. 
The slow growth of attempts to enforce contracts, was accelerated by 
an increase in commercial However the stimulation of commerce 
also brought in the notion that money is the equivalent of everything, 
and therefore damages, it was assumed, would suffice in all cases of 
a breached contract. When the enforcement of contracts came into 
where was it initially administered? 
Legal historians are divided as to whether the Royal Courts or the 
Ecclesiastical Courts, including the Court of Chancery, could 
claim to initiating the relief. 
Hazeltine in his essays on "Early English EqUity,,1 ventures that 
specific performance was originally administered as part of the common 
law in the royal courts. The author points to a number of judgements 
during the 
1. 
2. 
of Henry I and Henry II to support his 2 
Hazeltine, "Early English Equity", Essays (1913) 
@ P. 261 
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Ames3 is of a similar view to Hazeltine. He takes several other 
leading legal historians4 to task for suggesting that specific 
performance is one of the earliest forms of equitable relief. Ames 
proceeds to point out that Dyer J. in Wingfield v Littleton5 expressly 
states that no subpoena would lie to compel specific performance of 
a contract, because there was an action of covenant at common law, 
and that most of the cases for which specific performance might have 
been sought had in the preceding century been brought within the purview 
of the action of case. 
Ames cites a number of cases reported during the reign of Elizabeth I 
where specific performance of contracts was decreased by the royal 
6 
courts. 
The stance adopted by Ames is underlined by the hostility of the 
common-law judges to the jurisdiction of equity over contracts. 
Such hostility was inflamed by the conflict between Coke and 
Ellesmere. As illustrations of this rift Ames addresses himself 
to two cases. The first was Gollen v Bacon7 in which the comment 
was made that "there are too many causes drawn into chancery to 
be relieved there, which are more fit to be determined by trial 
at common law ••.. ". h d G . 8 T e secon was Bromage v em1ng in which 
3. "Specific Performance", Lectures p.248 
4. Spence and Fry L.J. 
5. Dy l62a 
6. Pope v Mason (1560) Toth 3; Hungerford v Hutton (1569) Toth62i 
Foster v Eltonhead (1582) Toth4i Kemper v Palmer (1594) Toth14; 
King v Reynolds (1597) Ch Cas Ch42; Beeston v Langford (1598) Toth 14. 
7. 1 BuIst. 112 
8. 1 Rolle R 368. 
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Lord Coke and the other common law Judges granted a prohibition to 
prevent a suit for specific performance on the ground that such a 
remedy ought not to be allowed to be given by the court of equity 
"for then to what purpose is the action on the case and covenant". 
Undoubtedly the royal courts did not confine themselves as rigidly 
as they did in their latter days to the remedy of damages. On the 
contrary they gave various kinds of specific relief which, in later 
law, came to be associated with the Chancellor. Hazeltine emphasises 
that this relief they gave both to enforce obligations connected with 
property and contract and to prevent various kinds of wrong to 
property. Fry, while not going so far as to say that the Common Law 
Courts specifically enforced contracts, does recognise that there 
were certain cases in which they made near approaches to it. He 
outlines four such situations the fourth being of particular relevance, 
in light of Hazeltine's statement. 
The fourth instance concerns cases arising on covenants real. According 
to common law a covenant by A to transfer land to B (called a covenant 
could be enforced by writ of covenant which was in the nature 
of a specific performance of that covenant. The writ was to the Sheriff 
to command A that he keep his covenant with B. The relief for non-
performance was not in damages but by means of a pracipe quod reddat 
of the land in question. 
It is submitted that it is misleading to speak of performance 
as we know it in modern times, as the specific relief given by the 
royal courts in the later medieval period was not based upon the 
same principle as that used by Chancery. 
- 6 -
The Royal Courts did not start as Chancery did from the principle 
that Chancery did that it was just and equitable for a man to perform 
what he had promised to do - as the common law courts in Bractons 
day did not make a practice of enforcing promises. 9 
The common law courts started from a basis of real actions. The 
distinguishing character of real actions was the specific relief 
that could be obtained from them. If an action was personal, damages 
only could be obtained. But if the action was a real action specific 
relief could be obtained. The very nature of the action presupposed 
and demanded it. However these principles are only analogous to 
later equitable rules, as specific relief at common law was not based 
on the conscience of a person, but upon the general ground that a 
wrong was committed if the particular interest in land was used in 
such a way. 
If every breach of faith was cognizable in the church, it would follow 
that to pledge the faith was to create an obligation cognizable in the 
spiritual courts. 
Fry appears to have extricated the foundation of specific performance, 
a foundation which, if specific performance is looked at in its modern 
sense, places its origin in the Court of Chancery. He alludes to 
contracts in which there was an oath or Pidei interpositio. 
9. Holdsworth "A History of English Law" Vol.V. 321. 
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During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries certain principles are 
discernable from the opinions by the Chancellors. One such 
principle is that the Chancellor would interfere to enforce contracts 
on very different grounds than those used by the common law. 10 
As stated above the common law could only "enforce a contract" by 
way of Action of Covenant (this only avoidable if the contract 
was in writing and under seal). Having no 11 remedy, Holdsworth 
explains that the common law courts developed no adequate theory of 
consideration. They had not grasped the idea that the essence of 
contract was consent, and under certain circumstances this gave rise 
to actionable obligations. Chancery was always of the view that breach 
of such obligations were a breach of faith and therefore a sin. These 
breaches were matters of conscience, and as the common law courts were 
reminded "you must not allow conscience to your doing law". 
The Common Law vehemently opposed the granting of performance 
by the complaining that the Chancery were meddling with the 
12 English land system of free hold titles (Heath v and that there 
would be no need for the action on the case if specific performance could 
be granted by the Chancery (Bromage v Gemingi 3 Holdsworth14 is of the 
opinion that the whole of the law of contract would have eventually fallen 
under the jurisdiction of the Chancery if the conflict between the 
1 0 .• Note: Cuddee v Rutter (1720) 2WPT 368; 
Somerset v Cookson (1735) 2WPT 404; 
v 
--"-
(1684) 1 Vern 273. 
11. Holdsworth of English Law Vol. V 322-3 
12. 10 Ch.22. 
13. Supra. 
14. Supra. 
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common law Judges and the Chancellors had not roused the former to 
action. From the middle of the fourteenth century they developed an 
action of trespass on the case and through this theory the common law 
theory that simple contract is an agreement based upon consideration 
was developed. In consequence of this development the interference 
of was tendered less necessary ; but it was not rendered 
wholly unnecessary, as the only remedy the common law courts could 
was damages. 
It was during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the 
modern rules relating to specific performance as we know it were 
formulated. For Examples Lord Selborne L.C in Wilson v Northampton 
b .,. 15 and Ban ury Junct10n Ra11way Co "The Court gives specific 
performance instead of damages only when it can by that means do 
more perfect and complete justice". And further in Penn v Lord 
Baltimore 16 it was established that in relation to specific 
performance equity always acts in personam. 
Hence having risen from the conscience of the chancer~ specific 
performance is special and extraordinary in its character, and the 
court has a discretion either to it, or to leave the parties 
17 
to their rights at common law . However the discretion is not 
an arbitrary or capricous discretion; it is to be exercised according 
to equitable principles and previous authority given the facts of 
18 
each case. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
(1874) 9Ch App 279 
(1750) Ves Sen 444 
Re Scott & Alvarex's Contract, Scott v Alvarex (1895) 2Ch603 
Knatchbull v Hallet (1880) 13 ChD 699 @ 710 i 
Bennet v Smith (1852) 1b Jur 431 
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A INHERENT JURISDICTION TO AWARD EQUITABLE DAMAGES 
It is a widely held belief that prior to the passing of Lord Cairn's 
1 Act equity could not award damages as such. If specific performance 
was refused, by the Chancery, the plaintiff had to proceed in the Courts 
of Common Law, and by writ there seek his damages if he was entitled 
1a to them • There was before the passing of Lord Cairn's Act a notion, 
alluded to by Goff. J in Grant v Dawkins2 , that a court of equity, if 
it refused specific performance, might give compensation for breach 
of contract. 
It was established from the earliest of times that Chancery would not 
entertain an action for damages where damages were the principal relief 
3 
sought. But the position was not so clear where damages were sought 
in addition to or in substitution for specific performance. This 
concept was initially expounded in Cleaton v Gower4 . 
1 • See Souster v Epsom Plumbing per McMullin J [1974] 2 NZLR 515 @ 519. 
Snell Principles of Equity 28th Ed @ 572 Bosaid v Andry 
[1963J VR 465 @ 484 Pettit "Equity & the Law of Trusts" 
3rd Ed @ 408 
1a. Generally as to Equitable Damages see : Guroroow Meagher & 
Lehane "Equity, Doctrines & Remedies" 2nd Ed Para 2301 ffi 
Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 541 
2. [1973] 3 ALLER 897 @ 899 
3. RJoker v Arthur (1671) 2 ChR 62 
4. (1674) Cas + F 164 
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This case clearly illustrates that at an early time the court of Chancery 
did not disclaim jurisdiction in respect of damages, where they were 
incident to the subject matter already in contention before the court. 
4a In Cleaton v Gower Lord Nottingham L.C. tried a suit seeking specific 
performance of an agreement concerning a mining lease and also 
damages for the defendant's failure to execute the lease. 
Kenyon M.R. reaffirmed this principle one hundred years later, after 
specific performance for an agreement for the sale of a cottage was 
refused because of the conveyance of the cottage to a bona fide third 
party purchaser for value. His Lordship was of the opinion that there 
was such a part performance of the agreement on the part of the plaintiff 
(such as furnishing and repairing) as would entitle her to specific 
performance, however because of the conveyance to the third party there 
was no decree for specific performance possible therefore his Lordship 
5 
referred the matter to the Master for an enquiry as to damages. 
Herein lies one of the reasons for the inherent power to award 
damages, that being, where the inability of the party to perform grows 
out of an act done by that party, after the contract has been entered into. 
A case in point which expressly refers to and follows the reasoning of 
Sa Kenyon M.R. is Greenaway v Adams . The Master of the Rolls recognised 
Sb that Denton v Stewart allowed the Chancery in certain circumstances to 
award damages. This was a case involving a breach after the contract had 
4a Supra n.4 
5 (1786) 17 Ves 276 
Sa Denton v Stewart (1806) 12 Ves 395 
5b Supra n.5 
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been entered into. His Lordship was unsure how far Kenyon M.R. meant 
the principle to extend. 
If the Chancery had this jurisdiction to award damages before Lord 
Cairn's Act it is submitted that they found it ordinarily undesirable, 
since this was a remedy which was available at common law, common law 
possessing more adept procedures for quantifying the amount of damage 
6 6a 
suffered. Noticeably there were shades of the modern trend towards 
Banco Civil trials, when the Master of the Rolls commented, with 
7 
respect to Chancery's quantifying of damages, "I think the Master 
just as competent to decide this as a jury,,8 
It appears from the cases that the second reason for the development 
of the inherent jurisdiction was the desirability of having all 
matters heard in the one court. In the course of his judgment in 
1 'd 9 Ne son v Brl ges the Master noted "that it is not necessary for 
the Court when it has once entertained jurisdiction in a case to 
t t th t ' , t d f " l' f " 9 a resor 0 a CIrCUI ous rna e a gIvIng re Ie .••• 
Such rationale was repeated some three years before the enactment of 
Lord Cairn's Act. 10 The case was Phelps v Prothero and it is ventured 
6 Such as determination by jury. 
6a NB New Zealand and the diminution of the jury system. 
7 Before Lord Cairns Act. 
8 Greenaway v Adams (Supra) @ 402 
9 (1839) 2 Beav. 239 @ 243 
9a Also City of London v Nash (1747) 3 Atk. 512, 
Cha1ic v Pickering (1836) IKE 749 
10 (1855) 7 De GMPG 722. 
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that the views of the Lord Justices in this case may well have 
. . t t d 1 . th th Th' d Rtf th Ch C·· 11 preclpl a e , a ong Wl e lr epor 0 e ancery ornmlSSloners , 
the eventual passing and substance of Lord Cairn's Act. 12 Turner L.J. 
was adamant that a plaintiff, who has legal rights, and who comes to a 
court of equity is bound to put his legal rights under the Control of 
the Court of equity. In the case at hand the plaintiff, having sued 
in equity for specific performance was bound to submit his claim for 
damages to the judgment of the Chancery and was not entitled to proceed 
at law otherwise than by leave of the Court. His Lordship not only went 
on and stated that a court of equity could give damages in addition to 
13 
specific performance , but also that a plaintiff ought not to seek 
11 (1856) Parliamentary Papers Vol. 22 
12 Phelps v Prothero Supra @ 734. 
Note Oakacre Ltd v Claire Cleaners Ltd [1981] 3 WLR 
761 @ 764 per Mervyn Davies J. 
13 "That it was competent to this Court to have ascertained 
the damages, I feel no doubt. It is the constant course 
of the Court, in cases between vendor and purchaser, upon 
a sufficient case being made for the purpose, to direct 
an inquiry as to the deterioration of the estate pending 
the contract, and in so doing the Court is in truth giving 
damages to the purchaser for the loss which he has 
sustained by the contract not having been literally performed. 
This Court, when it entertains jurisdiction, deals as far as 
it can with the whole case, and not with part of it only; and 
it is well settled by authority that a Defendant cannot be 
allowed, without the leave of the Court, to proceed at law 
on the subject-matter of the suit, whilst proceedings in this 
Court are pending. " Supra n.12 @ 734. 
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relief in equity by way of specific performance and damages at law, as 
to proceed at law while matters were before the Chancery seems to have 
14 been considered a contempt • 
15 In fairness one must consider Todd v Gee ,in which Lord Eldon L.C. 
15a declared that Denton v Stewart "went against the whole course of 
previous authority,,16 
Care must be taken with these cases involving the inherent jurisdiction 
of Chancery to award damages, as these cases could easily be treated as 
possible instances, where, as a condition of decreeing specific 
performance equity required an abatement in the purchase price by 
reason of, for example, a defective title. This was an example of 
the equitable power to impose terms on relief and, as Lord Eldon L.C. 
17 17a 
emphasised in Todd v Gee ,was "very different" from an award of damages 
14 v Basnett (1835) 2 Myl & K 618 
Bell v O'Reilly (1805) 2 Sch & Lef 430 
15 (1810) 17 Ves 273 @ 278 
15a (1806) 12 Ves 395 
16 The severity is lessened by the following @ 278 
"The Plaintiff must take that remedy, if he chooses it, 
at Law; generally I do not say universally, he cannot 
have it in Equity; and this is not a case of exception". 
17 Supra n. 16 
17a Gummow Meagher & Lehane "Equity, Doctrines & Remedies" 2nd Ed 
@ Para 2304. 
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The last mentioned case, with its adverse comments upon the granting 
of damages at equity18, sets up a broad distinction between 
compensation and damages, the extent and measure of the one being 
regarded as different from that of the other. So that if "A" 
contracted to sell to "B" a property titlefree, and "B" contracted 
to sell the same unemcumbered land to "C". Subsequently if it was 
found that "A" could not convey the property entirely titlefree, "A" 
might be compelled by the court to make compensation for the amount 
of land that was not titlefree, but not for the damages sustained 
by "B" arising from him being unable to complete his contract with "C". 
Subsequent to the enactment of Lord Cairn's Act, the High Court of 
. . 19 d h . . Austra11a on two occaS10ns state t e1r preference for the 1nherent 
jurisdiction to award damages. The court considered that the 
jurisdiction to award damages was exerciseable in equity because 
"the court has possession of the cause, and not because it first 
h d . ,,20 a possess10n Moreover the court considered that all this 
demonstrated that in such matters equity "regards not technicality 
b . . ,,21 ut ]Ust1ce • Further one of the leading reasons for such a 
18 Before the passing of Lord Cairn's Act. 
19 Fuller Theatres' v Musgrove (1923) 31 CLR 524 
King v Piggiolo (1923) 32 CLR 222 
20 Supra n. 19 Fullers Theatres v Musgrove @ 547 
per Isaacs J. & Rich J. 
21 Supra n. 20 @ 247 per Isaacs J. & Rich J. 
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jurisdiction was to avoid a multiplicity of actions. One of the 
fundamental reasons for the enactment of Lord Cairn's Act. 
In summary of the instances where this jurisdiction may be used 
21a 
one has , cases of delay ,instances where the alleged damage 
is intimately connected with the proceedings in respect of which 
21b principal relief is sought by way of specific performance 
occasions where the defendant by his wrongful act after the 
t f d . d . f . f . . bl 2lc commencemen 0 procee 1ngs ren ers spec1 1C per ormance 1mposs1 e 
cases where for some reason it is found undesirable to force the 
plaintiff to resort to his remedy at law and instances where the 
2ld defendant has acted in disobedience to an order of the court 
Moreover to summarise the overall position as to the granting of 
equitable damages before 1858 it is submitted that (a) Chancery 
had no jurisdiction to award damages on their own account, however 
(b) depending on the length Kenyon M.R.'s comments are taken in 
21e . .. 22 Denton v Stewart damages, 1n certa1n C1rcumstances , could be 
awarded in lieu of or in addition to specific performance. 
21a Phelps v Prothero [1855] Ch 722 
2lb Supra. 
21c Todd v Gee Supra 
21d King v Pigiolli (1923) 32 CLR 222. 
21e (1806) 12 Ves 395 
22 See the preceding paragraph. 
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section 5 of the Supreme Court Act 1860 ensures that the High Court of 
23 New Zealand has all the equitable and common-law jurisdiction of 
the Lord High Chancellor of England, the Court of Chancery, or any 
other superior court of equity has in England. Hence, it is 
submitted, that the High Court of New Zealand retains an inherent 
. . d' . d d . . 23a Jurls lctlon to awar amages ln equlty 
Given the ever increasing jurisdiction of the District Court, one 
wonders whether this also has an inherent jurisdiction to award 
damages when it decrees specific performance under Section 34 (1) (b) 
of the District Courts Act 1947 or uses its Ancillary Jurisdiction24 
or Equity and Good Conscience jurisdiction25 
23 By reason of the Supreme Court Act 1882 Section 16 
and the Judicature Amendment Act. [1972] 
23a Notwithstanding that New Zealand is subject to a 
Judicature Act System (i.e. a fused system of 
common law and equity). Submitted that such a 
system reinforces the inherent jurisdiction. 
24 Section 41 District Courts Act 1947. 
25. Section 59 District Courts Act 1947. The monetary 
limit on this section, in practical terms, precludes 
a grant of specific performance i.e. very few 
properties may be purchased for under $12,000 
nowdays. 
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While. there is scope for a District Court to award damages under Lord 
.• 25a . h . 41 f h . t . CaIrn s Act and g1ven t at Sect10n 0 t e D1S r1ct Courts Act 
says that when granting equitable relief under this section the 
District Court shall give such relief "as ought to be granted or 
given in the like case by the High Court and in as full and as ample 
a manner", it is submitted that the District Court does not entertain 
this inherent jurisdiction. For the District Court is a creature of 
statute and does not possess the power to assimilate an inherent 
. . d' . 26 h h' d' bl d . h' d Jur1s 1ct1on. T e aut or1ty to awar equ1ta e amages W1t 1n Lor 
Cairn's Act remains vested in the District Court, but this is by 
1 f · d' 27 reason on y 0 1ts statutory groun 1ng • 
What is the moment of the inherent jurisdiction nowdaYE? 
Because the High Court has both legal and equitable jurisdiction under 
the Judicature Act the inherent jurisdiction has fallen into disuse. 
25a Section 41 District Court Act 1947 (Ancillary Jurisdiction) . 
26 Section 3 District Courts Act 1947 
27 Wiley & Crutchleys' "District Court Practice" 5th ed @ 40. 
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However there 28 are instances, particularly on the floor of the court , 
when the inherent jurisdiction can be coerced into action. Particularly, 
where the court has no "jurisdiction,,29 in the material sense, to 
grant specific performance and therefore it is inappropriate to grant 
statutory damages under Lord Cairn's Act. The inherent power is 
unfettered by the prerequisites necessary to invoke Lord Cairn's Act. 
It is submitted that unconsciously Parliament has embodied this 
inherent jurisdiction, to a lesser extent, in statute, by the 
enactment of those statutes which seek to begin to codify the 
30 law of contract • The reaching discretions that these Acts 
clothe a court with, in light of the freedom and flexibility of 
the discretions contained in these acts, can be seen to be a printed 
f f · h .. d' t' 31 orm 0 In erent Jurls lC lon • Such sections contemplate the award 
of undisturbed damages or compensation by a court, if the court thinks 
fit or just. 
28 As it is submitted that in the prayer for relief such use 
of the court's inherent powers need not be expressly 
pleaded; they falling under the clause in the prayer for 
relief "such further or other relief as this Honourable 
Court thinks just". 
29 As to a court of equity not having jurisdiction to grant 
equitable damages see Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 58. 
30 Contractual Mistakes Act 1976. 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979. 
Contracts Privity Act 1983. 
31 Section 7 Contractual Remedies Act 1979 
Section 7 Contractual Mistakes Act 1976 
Section 4 Contracts Privity Act 1983 
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B THE CHANCERY AMENDMENT ACT 1858 
section 2 of Lord Cairn's Act provides" In all cases in which the 
Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to entertain an application 
for an injunction against a breach of any covenant, contract or 
agreement, or against the commission or continuance of any wrongful 
act, or for the specific performance of any covenant, contract, or 
agreement, it shall be lawful for the same court, if it shall think 
fit, to award damges to the party injured, either in addition to 
or in substitution for such injunction or specific performance, 
and such damages may be assessed in such manner as the court shall 
. 32 direct". 
33 Although Lord Cairn's Act has been repealed , the jurisdiction has 
been preserved, as explained by the House of Lords in Leeds Industrial 
Co-operative Society v Slack34 . The present position is that the 
High Court of New Zealand now has both this equitable jurisdiction, 
and under the Judicature Act, the jurisdiction which the common law 
courts had before 1875 to award damages. The distinction between 
these two types of damages is becoming less pronounced with the 
35 
onset of cases like Johnson v Agnew . 
32 21 & 22 Vict., C 27 , S 2. 
33 By the Statute Law Revision Act 1883, S.3. 
34 [1924] Ac 855 @ 861-2 
Also Sayers v Collyer (1884) 28 Ch.D103 
35 [1979] 2WLR 487 
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The main object of Lord Cairn's Act was to enable the Court of 
Chancery to do "complete justice" between parties by awarding 
damages in those cases in which it had formerly refused equitable 
relief in respect of a legal right and left the plaintiff to sue 
for damages at common law. This is the most recent view ascribed 
to the objects of Lord Cairn's Act~6 Earlier in Ferguson v Wilson37 
the object of the Act was said to be to prevent a litigant being 
bandied about from one court to another and to enable the Court of 
Chancery to do complete justice. Since Lord Cairn himself was a 
member of the court in this case, the above explanation is 
presumably accurate. 38 Moreover Goff L.J. in Price v Strange 
considered that the purpose of the Act was "to prevent parties 
39 from being so sent from one court to another n. In other words 
the cases appear to indicate that the object of the 1858 Act was 
a purely procedural one. It was not intended to alter the 
settled principles on which specific performance and injunction were 
40 
awarded. 
. 41 
eqUl.ty. 
36 
37 
38 
39. 
40 
41 
Its effect was, in a limited fashion to fuse law and 
Wentworth v Woollhara Municipal Council (1982) 56 ALR 745 
(1866) 2 Ch App 77. 
[1977] 3 WLR 943 
Supra n. 38 @ 957 
Rock Portland Cement Co Ltd v Wilson (1882) 52 L J Ch 214 1 
Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] , Ch.287 (C.A.) 
See Jolowicz [1975] CLJ 224, 225 
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In hindsight it appears that the actual effect of Lord Cairn's Act 
was different from its limited procedural purpose. Because of its 
increased jurisdiction the Chancery attracted a great number of 
cases which would ordinarily have gone to the Common Law Courts. 
This has become pronounced with the onset of inflationary times 
42 
and the difference in assessment of equitable and common law damages. 
42 However this point is no longer of significance 
with the decision of the House of Lords in 
Johnson v Agnew (Supra) fusing the assessment 
of the quantum of damages at common law and 
equity. 
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LORD CAIRN'S ACT IN NEW ZEALAND 
Both Lord Cairn's Act and Sir John Rolt's Act were in operation in 
England when the Supreme Court Act 1882 came into operation in New 
Zealand, they not having been repealed until 1883. Prior to that 
date similar but enlarged provisions had been incorporated in the 
Judicature Act 1875. 
Section 5 of the Supreme Court Act 1860 enacted that "The Court 
shall also have within the colony all such equitable and common-law 
jurisdiction as the Lord High Chancellor of England, the Court of 
Chancery or any other Superior Court of Equity hath in England". 
The Supreme Court Act 1882, repealed the Act of 1860, but section 
16 of the 1882 Act provided that the Supreme Court shall continue 
to have all the jurisdiction which it had at the time of the 
commencement of the 1882 Act. 
Given this legislative grounding the Court of Appeal had no doubt 
1 in Ryder v Hall that the Supreme Court had full power to award 
damages either in lieu of or in addition to an injunction as the 
2 Court of Chancery in England possessed under Lord Cairn's Act. 
This decision has received approval and damages have been considered 
in 3 4 v Beasley , Attorney General v Birkenhead Borough , Souster 
v Epsom Plumbing Ltd 5 . 
1. (1905) 27 NZLR 385 @ 394 
2. See also Dillon v MacDonald (1902) 11 NZLR 375 @ 388 
3. [1959] NZLR 89 
4. [1968] NZLR 383 
5. [1974] 2NZLR 515 
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More recently the Judicature Amendment Act 1979 has transferred 
this jurisdiction from the Supreme Court to the High Court. 
It is submitted that New Zealand is one of the few cornmon-law 
countries still relying on the express words of the original 
Chancery Amendment Act 1858. As even though this Act was 
repealed in England, by virtue of Section 5 of the Supreme Court 
Act 1882, it was assimilated into the statute law of New Zealand, 
where it has yet to be altered. In the Australian States the 
provisions of Lord Cairn's Act have been incorporated with some 
6 7 
minor changes into concrete statutory form. 
All the sections and references to Lord Cairn's Act do not vary 
in any material particular from their English source. Therefore 
the construction given in anyone cornmon-law country to the Act 
is of "considerable moment" in New Zealand8 . 
6. New Zealand's provision not being concrete, in that 
it is not contained expressly in a statute but is 
ascertainable by reference to previous statute law. 
7. Supreme Court Act 1958 (Vic) 5.62 
Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) 5.30 
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) 5.25 
Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) 5.11 
Judicature Act 1876 (Qld) 5.4 
8. Per McMullin J. Souster v Epsom Plumbing Ltd [1974] 2 NZLR 
515 @ 519. 
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While there is an undoubted need for a District Court to be able to 
award damages in addition to or in lieu of an order for specific 
performance, it is submitted that there is no statutory or common 
law authority to do so. 
Wi4yand Crutchley in their invaluable text on District Court 
practice believe that such a jurisdiction lies with the District 
Court but are unable to support their proposition with any authorities~ 
By virtue of Section 34 (1) (b) of the District Courts Act 1947 
specific performance may be granted in this court if the purchase 
price is under $12,000. There is no mention of damages. The only 
section which adds a gloss to Section 34 is Section 41 of the same Act. 
This section being directory and not adding any express authority 
as to damages. 
9. Wiley & Crutchley "District Courts Practice" 5th Ed @ 40. 
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THE JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES 
Per Brett L.J. Tamplin v Jones (1880) 15 ChD 215 @ 221 
"It would be dangerous to attempt an exhaustive definition of the 
cases in which the Court will refuse specific performance. The 
jurisdiction is a delicate one, and the more so since the fusion 
of Law and Equity, for if the Court refuses specific performance 
it must now, in my opinion, consider the question of damages." 
Before an award of damages is made, there are two threshold questions 
(1) whether the court has jurisdiction to award damges, and secondly 
(2) if it has jurisdiction Whether it will exercise its jurisdiction 
and award the damages. 
B (2) (i) THE FIRST THRESHOLD QUESTION 
The Act was enacted on the recommendations of the Chancery Commission. 
The Commission preferred that the award of damages be made as of 
right rather than being discretionary as Section 2 provided for. 
On the face of it the Acts primary limitation was that for the 
jurisdiction to be invoked, a plaintiff had to demonstrate that 
at the time of the commencement of his suit the plaintiff could 
make out the ingredients of a case for specific performance. l 
1. Boyns v Lackey (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 395. 
J.C. Williamson Ltd v Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282. 
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However there is a divergence of authority on this aspect. ..Another 
view would have us believe that it is not necessary to prove, that a 
court of equity would, in the absence of a special power to award 
damages, have exercised its discretion in such a manner as to grant 
specific performance. In short this approach is that the statutory 
power of awarding damages sUbsists whenever at the material time the 
contract in question is susceptible of specific performance, whether 
or not specific performance might be declined on a discretionary 
2 ground 
3 Such an approach was averted to in The Millstream pty Ltd v Shultz, 
where McLelland J felt that the section "confers a power to award 
damages only where, at the time of the commencement of the proceedings, 
the facts were such that the court could have properly ordered specific 
performance, sub; ect perhaps to discretionary defences,,4. Very 
recently such a view has been accepted in the High Court of Australia 
in Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal council~ 
2. Spry "Equity as a Remedy" 2nd Ed @ 545 fn. 15 in addition 
• 
to the cases of Dell v Beasley [1959] NZLR 89 
ASA Construction Pty Ltd v Iwanou [1975] 1 NSWLR 512, 
Edwards Street Properties v Collins [1977] QB 399 
3. [1980] I NSWLR 547 
4. Ibid @ 552 
5. (1982) 42 ALR 69. 
- 27 -
The cases which support the former view6 claim that Lord Cairn's Act 
does not extend the jurisdiction of the Court, and damages will not 
therefore be given in cases where, previously to the Act, the Court 
7 
would not have decreed specific performance. 
This stance is supported by Starke. J in King v Poggiolio~a a case 
in which the vendor agreed to sell the purchaser a pastoral property. 
Possession did not pass on settlement date. However, it was held that 
the vendor was not entitled to a decree of specific performance, because 
he had failed to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his 
6. Boyns v Lackey Supra n.l 
King v Piggiolo (1923) 32 CLR 222 
J.C. Williamson Ltd v Lukey and Mulholland Supra n.l 
7. Daniel's Chancery Practice 5th Ed Vol. 1 946: 
Also see Sefton v Tophams Ltd [1965] Ch 1140. 
This case asserts that Lord Cairn's Act did not 
revolutionise the principles upon which the 
equitable jurisdiction was to be exercised and 
that some special case must be shown before the court 
should exercise the jurisdiction to award damages under 
the Act. 
7a. (1923) 32 CLR 222. 
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part of the contract. It was further held that, although damages 
for delay were recoverable at common law, because no decree of 
specific performance would issue,the vendor was not entitled to 
damages at equity. 
The difference between the two approaches can be shortly summarised 
8 by saying that in the former statutory equitable damages will not 
be awarded if a court cannot award specific performance because 
there is an absolute jurisdictional bar to it9 or if there is an 
. bl d . . d f 10 . d equ~ta e ~scret~onary e ence ra~se. As to the latter, 
statutory equitable damages may be awarded if specific performance 
might have been denied on discretionary grounds, however as with 
the former approach no damages will lie if there is a 
8. Boyns v Luckey (Supra) Approach. 
9. Absolute jurisdictional bars to specific performance 
being; Illegality of the contract, Impossibility of 
performance; Frustration of the Contract; See Spry 
(Supra) @ 82 as to "Conclusive Defences as opposed 
to Discretionary Defences". 
10. i.e. Hardship, Clean hands, Unfairness, Third parties, 
Mistake, Personal Services, Continuing Contracts. 
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l ' , 'd' , 1 b 11 conc us~ve Jur~s ~ct~ona ar. 
12 Buckley L.J. in Price v Strange further adhered to the 
jurisdiction - discretion concept and put his support behind 
the modern trend when noting that "the court had at all relevant 
times jurisdiction to entertain a claim for specific performance 
of the contract between the parties, and consequently had at all 
relevant times a discretion under the section to award damages 
l3 in addition to, or in substitution for, specific performance. 
Isaac's J in Goldsborough Mort & Co v Quinnl4 averts to this 
approach as an afterthought. the High Court of Australia holding 
that if the discretionary defence of mistake had been made out, 
this would have been an appropriate case to award damages under 
Lord Cairn's Act. 
11. Graham J in ~~~ v Spence [1975] 2 All ER 528 
alluded to this distinction between jurisdictional 
and discretionary defences. The case was not a 
proper one for the decree of specific performance 
(jurisdiction) and, even if it had been, it would 
have been unreasonable to order it on the facts 
(discretion) . 
12. [1978] ch 337 @ 345 
l3. Ibid per Buckley L.J. @ 510 " It is clear that 
the Act gives no entitlement to damages; it confers 
a discretion on the Court to award damages. " 
14. (1910) 10 CLR 674. 
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15 Cairn's L.J. seems to have considered that the power to award 
damages conferred by the 1858 Act could be exercised if the plaintiff 
made out as at the commencement of the suit the ingredients of the 
case for equitable relief, notwithstanding that ultimately he failed 
to obtain relief on discretionary grounds. A passage from the judgment 
. th . 16 1S wor not1ng "That, of course, means where there are, at least 
at the time of bill filed, all those ingredients which would enable 
the court, if it thought fit, to exercise its powers and decree 
specific performance - among other things where there is the subject 
matter whereon the decree of the Court can act - in a case of that 
kind, the Court has a discretionary power to award, under certain 
circumstances, damages in substitution for, or in addition to, the 
decree for specific performance. The object obviously was to allow 
Chancery to do complete justice, as it was called, a phrase which 
assumed that there was power in the Court of Chancery to make a 
decree to the whole extent which the case required".17 
15. Later Lord Cairns. 
16. Ferguson v Wilson (1866) L R 2Ch 77 
17. Subsequently in Sayers v (1884) 28 Ch D 103 
it was held that even though the plaintiff's case 
for an injunction was defeated by acquiesence, nominal 
damages could still be awarded. 
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THE TIMING OF THE FIRST THRESHOLD QUESTION 
At what time must a plaintiff seeking damages under Lord Cairn's Act 
demonstrate that the court has the requisite jurisdiction to award 
them? It would seem that the plaintiff is entitled to claim damages 
if at the time he instituted his suit for relief he could have 
obtained specific performance but his right to that relief has 
been lost to him in between the institution of the suit and the 
h . 1 earlng. For instance where the sale of which specific performance 
was sought was completed between institution of the suit and its 
2 hearing, as in Cory v Thames Ironworks and Shipping Co Ltd. 
Equitable damages were awarded in this case. 
If a plaintiff commences a suit at a time when he has no right to 
specific performance, he may still maintain the claim to the Court 
having jurisdiction if such a right had accrued to him before the 
hearing of the suit. 
The latest authority on this point is Oakacre Ltd v Claire Cleaners 
In this case a block of flats was in issue. On the presumed 
settlement date the vendors failed to perform, so with great zeal, 
the purchaser's solicitors had a writ for specific performance filed 
on the same day. It was later found that settlement date was some 
four days later. The writ had been issued prematurely. Judge 
1. Gummow, Meagher & Lehane "Equity, Doctrines & Remedies 
2nd Ed @ 2309. 
2. (1863) 8 LT 237. Also Fritz v Hobson (1880) 14 Ch D 542 
3. [1981J 3 W L R 761 
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Mervyn Davies held that within the framework of a specific performance 
action the Court may award damages for delay in completion despite 
the fact that the action was instituted before the contractual date 
f 1 · 4 o comp etJ.on. 
The latter case is to be contrasted with The Millstream pty Ltd v 
5 Shultz where MCLelland. J held that the Court has no power to award 
6 damages pursuant to Section 68(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 , 
where at the time of the commencement of the proceedings, the right 
to specific performance was not present although it became available 
7 later. This case is criticised in Australia's leading Equitable 
8 text book, and with respect to McLelland. J, the case does go heavily 
against previous authorities and with little substance to support it. 
4. Per Judge Mervyn Davies Supra n.3 @ 765. 
Also see on this point Phelps v Prothero (1855)7 De GM &G 722, 
Davenport v Rylands (1865) L R 1 Eq 302 
Bosaid v Andry [1963] V R 465 
Ferguson v Wilson (1866) LR 2 Ch 77 
5. [1980] 1 NSWLR 547 
6. The New South Wales Equivalent of Section 2 of Lord 
Cairn I s Act. 
7. In The Millstream Pty Ltd v Shultz a quantity of deer were 
not present at the date of the commencement of proceedings 
for specific performance at their sale, however they did 
become ascertainable at a later date. 
8. Gummow, Meagher & Lehane "Equity, Doctrines & Remedies" 
2nd Ed @ 2309 n. 7 
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If, because of an argument as to time, there is no jurisdiction to 
make an award under Lord Cairn's Act, it may be found to be appropriate 
to award damages under the inherent powers of the court. For example 
where a plaintiff is absolutely barred from obtaining specific 
performance on the grounds of laches or acquiesence. 
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THE SECOND THRESHOLD QUESTION 
with regard to the second of the threshold questions there has 
appeared from time to time a tendency to formulate as a series 
of inflexible rules some general principles which are applied by 
the courts in determining whether they should use their discretion 
to award damages or otherwise. 
The judgment of A.L. Smith. J in ~~~~ v ~=~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Light col is foremost in this quest for rigidity. His Honour 
stated that it was a "good working rule" that "(1) if the injury 
to the plaintiff's legal rights is small, (2) and is one which is 
capable of being estimated in money, (3) and is one which can be 
adequately compensated by a small money payment (4) and the case 
is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant 
an injunction : - then damages in substitution for an injunction 
should be given:' This statement of principle has been criticised 
unduly tending to confine the jurisdiction of the 2 as court. The 
authors of "Equity Doctrines and Remedies"3 go so far as to say 
that in cases where the court has an alternative in awarding 
specific performance or damages, it is probably safe to say that 
1. [1895] 1 Ch 287 pp 322 323 
2. Lord Hanworth MR in Fisenden v Higgs and Hill Ltd (1935) 
153 LT 128 
Jolowicz (1975) CLJ 224. Spry "Equitable Remedies" 
2nd Ed @ 558. 
3. Gummow Meagher & Lehane 2nd Ed @ Para 2310. 
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specific relief ought always be awarded unless the court considers 
that in the particular circumstances of the case it is unreasonable 
to do so. Possibly the guidelines of A.L. Smith L.J. should be 
treated as relevant factors which are to be used to formulate a 
question as to the desirability of damages but whicp are not wholly 
determinative of the matter. 
Before turning to an examination of the use of the discretion, 
it is necessary to differentiate between three distinct situations. 
In the first place, the circumstances of the case may dictate that 
equitable damages be awarded in sUbstitution for specific relief. 
Secondly, because of the circumstances the discretion may be used 
to award damages in addition to specific performance. Finally it 
may appear that neither specific performance nor equitable damages 
should be awarded. 
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B (2) (ii) (a) 
DAMAGES IN SUBSTITUTION FOR OR IN LIEU OF SPECIFIC RELIEF 
AS already noted the High Court of New Zealand has a jurisdiction to 
award both equitable and common law damages. Hence the power to 
award equitable damages becomes less significant, as a court may 
inter-change between its dual jurisdiction with freedoml • 
Spry is prepared to state a general principle as regards substitution 
" ... substitution ordinarily occurs only when the hardship caused to 
the defendant through specific enforcement would so far outweigh the 
inconvenience caused to the plaintiff if specific enforcement is 
denied that it would be highly unreasonable in all the circumstances 
2 to do more than award damages". 
This "general rule" is to be read in light of the statement of the 
3 High Court of Australia in Norton v Angus , who expressly adopted 
the rule laid down by Selborne L.C. in Wilson v Northampton and 
Banbury Junction Railway co~ that being, that in a case in which 
the Court cannot satisfactorily do justice by means of a decree of 
specific performance and the best justice of which the case is 
1. In some instances particularly in the District Court 
it is to be queried whether the Court knows which of 
the two jurisdictions it is acting under, and even 
that there are two distinct forms of damages. 
2. Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed 558. 
3. Norton v Angus (1926) 38 CLR 523 
4. (1874) LR 9 Ch 279 @ 285. 
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capable can be done by giving damages, damages should be given in 
lieu of specific performance. 
What matters have been considered relevant in persuading a court 
to exercise its discretionS and award damages in substitution? 
One such matter is the laches or acquiesence of the plaintiff. 
Depending on the delay involved and the hardship and prejudice 
inflicted upon the defendant the court may award damages in 
substitution. For example, if a delay of some ten months between 
a refusal to complete a settlement and the subsequent filing of 
a writ caused Quilliam. J to set aside a decree of specific 
performance due to laches in Hickey v Bruhns. 6 However His· 
Honour, without stating any reasons, immediately progressed to 
awarding the plaintiff damages in substitution. Souster v Epsom 
Plumbing Ltd7 provides a similar example of substitution, also in 
this case the court gave no reason why damages were awarded and 
additionally the reasons for the refusal of the decree were not 
reported. Further Cook. J had no hesitation in finding that a 
decree should not issue in Crofts v GUS properties8 , as not only 
was there delay, 
5. Once again the discretion of the court is called into 
play, and hence all the relevant discretionary 
considerations must be canvassed by the court. 
6. [1977] 2 NZLR 71 
7. [1974] 2 NZLR 515 
8. 1 NZCPR 332 
- 38 -
but the plaintiffs had stood by and taken no action when the defendant 
commenced building upon the land in question. Cook. J moves from 
this observation directly to "accordingly the remedy must be in 
9 damages". One may wonder whether this comment is with reference 
to common law or equitable damages. In short, only the trial judge 
can answer this question and he elected not to do so in his 
judgment. Herein lies one of the "advantages" of a fused 
Judicature Act system - not having to nominate. Moreover if the 
plaintiff has delayed in seeking relief or, if by his actions or 
representations, he has shown himself prepared, at a prior time, 
to accept damages, this tends to demonstrate that the substitution 
of damages for specific relief would not create too great a 
hardship to the plaintiffl ? 
It must be remembered that it is the defendant who is ex hypothesi 
at fault and should not be for the plaintiff to accept unsought 
lOa damages to apease a defendant. Therefore it is only if the 
9. 1 NZCPR 332 @ 341 
10. Senior v Pawson (1866) L R 3 Eq 330 
lOa. Leeds Industrial v Slack [1924] AL 851 per Lord Sumner 
" For my part I doubt ••• whether it is complete justice 
to allow the big man, with his big building, and his 
enhanced rateable value, and his improvement to the 
neighbourhood to have his way, and to solace the little 
man for his dark and stuffy little house by giving him 
a cheque that he does not ask for". 
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granting of an order for specific performance "would inflict damage 
upon the defendant out of all proportion" to the relief which the 
plaintiff will thereby obtain, that damages will be awarded in 
substitution for specific performance~l Illustrative of this point 
12 is Eyre v Todd. This early New Zealand case concerned a farmer 
who agreed to exchange his farm for some land in town. The farmer 
was not overly conversant with business matters and his grasp of 
plans and boundaries was even less well informed; Unfortunately 
the land in town which he had acquired had no street frontage, a 
factor on which he was reliant. Stout C.J. found that to decree 
specific performance would mean the loss of the defendant's farm 
and the defendant would be saddled with a mortgaged property which 
-
he had no use for. On the other hand, the only damage that the 
plaintiff had suffered was the commission he would have to pay to 
his agent, and the expenses he may have been put to because of the 
contract. Given this balance, The Chief Justice refused specific 
performance and granted damages in substitution. 
11. Sharp v Harrison [1922) 1 Ch 502 @ 515 
12. [1917] GLR 225. 
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B(2) (ii) (b) NEITHER SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE NOR EQUITABLE DAMAGES 
In some instances the court should refuse both damages and specific 
relief, as the grant of equitable damages is as much a discretionary 
matter as the grant of specific performance, and therefore the 
discretion to award damages is subject to the same equitable defences 
h · h b .. . fl w ~c may ar spec~f~c rel~e . 
If a decree is refused onthe grounds that to compel performance 
would result in hardship, then nonetheless the plaintiff ordinarily 
retains his remedy at common law for damages. Therefore if the 
defendant is obliged to pay damages at law it is "no special 
hardship upon him to pay damages at equity"~ 
Assuming there is no personal bar to relief3 , damages will ~ormally 
be awarded in these circumstances. 4 
1. Discussed post pp 78ff. 
2. Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 561 
3. i.e. fraud, an absence of clean hands. 
4. For Example Goldsborough Mort v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674. 
In this case the court refused a decree of specific 
performance on the ground that the defendant had entered 
into the contract under a mistake as to its meaning. 
Isaac's J observed that if specific performance had 
been refused on the ground of non-essential mistake 
damages should have been awarded. However in the case 
at hand the mistake was essential. 
Also : McKenna v Richey [1950] VLR 360 
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If the plaintiff is unable to do equity in that his action be tainted 
by fraud, non-disclosure, unfairness, lack of clean hands; and even 
where the plaintiff has a right to damages at law, there may 
nonetheless be also a refusal of equitable damages, since the view 
may be taken that the behaviour of the plaintiff has been unconscionable 
in such a way that it is unjust that he should be awarded, not simply 
specific performance, but also equitable damages. Hence if there is 
an over-reaching, or a taking advantage of a defendant, all equitable 
relief, including damages, will be refused. Illustrative of this 
point is Weily v Williams. 5 The defendant who was a widow and a 
paralytic entered into a contract with the plaintiff to purchase his 
hotel at a great overvalue. The defendant, being unable to make 
personal enquiries, was dependent for information upon what others 
had told her. There was, however, no evidence of misrepresentation 
or undue influence on the plaintiff's part. In a suit by the 
plaintiff for specific performance, the court, under the circumstances 
declined a decree for specific performance, but granted an inquiry as 
to damages. However the court noted that if undue influence had 
been found no form of relief would be granted. 
Where considerations such as laches and equitable estoppel are 
present the exercise of the discretion depends upon the manner in 
which the stance of the defendant has been affected by the conduct 
. . 6 1n quest10n. In 
5. (1895) 16 L. R. (NSW) Eq 190 
6. Soyers v Collyer (1884) 28 Ch D 103 per Fry J @ 110 
II Acquiesence may either be an entire bar to all relief, 
or it may be a ground for inducing the court to act 
under the powers of Lord Cairn's Act. .. 
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McKenna v Richey7, for example, there was unreasonable delay on the 
part of McKenna, the plaintiff, with regard to the enforcing of an 
order for specific performance on the sale of a business. However 
the position of the defendant was worsened only in so far as the 
grant of specific relief against him was concerned, and hence there 
was no sufficient reason to refuse equitable damages. 
However since a defendant's position may be worsened in so far as 
a subsequent grant of damages are concerned, it may be apposite 
to refuse equitable damages or else to allow them only subject to 
terms or conditions or a reduction in amount. Hence in Malhotra 
8 
v Choudhury , as there had been a delay by the plaintiff Doctor for 
almost two years in bringing the proceedings to a conclusion, the 
date for valuing the property for the purpose of awarding damages 
was moved back one year from the date of judgment~ 
7. [1950] VLR 360. 
8. [1979] 1 A11_ER 186. 
9. See also Hickey v Bruhns [1977] 2 NZLR 71 i 
Crofts v GUS Properties [1982] 1 NZCPR 332 
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B(2) (ii) (c) DAMAGES IN ADDITION TO SPECIFIC RELIEF 
Damages will not be granted in such a manner as to give rise to double 
relief, that is an order will not be made which both requires specific 
performance of an obligation and also avoids damages in respect of 
10 
non-performance. But, in certain circumstances a plaintiff may be 
entitled to damages for breach of contract as well as to an order for 
specific relief. An agreement may be specifically enforced in part, 
leaving the plaintiff to his claim for damages for breach of the 
. d 11 rema~n er. 
Damages may be awarded for delay in completion. 12 In Easton v Brown 
a defendant contracted to sell a house and land with vacant 
possession. To summarise matters, specific performance was ordered 
but the plaintiff stayed enforcing the order as the wife of the 
defendant and her nine children remained in the house. It was found 
that the plaintiff's required fuehouse for a development scheme. The 
defendant applied to have the order for specific performance set 
aside on the ground that it had not been exercised for an inordinately 
long period of time. Goulding. J sitting in the Chancery Division 
held that the order for specific performance would stand and there 
10. ~~~~ v Agnew [1979] 2 WLR 487 
11. v Edge (1860) John 669, 
London Corporation v Southgate (1868) 17 WR 197. 
Cooper v Morgan [1909] lCh 261. 
Griffin v Mercantile Bank (1890) 11 LR (NSW) Eq 231 
12. [1981] 3 A 11 ER 278 
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would also be an inquiry as to damages because of the defendant's 
, 13 
delay in completing the contract • 
The power to award damages in addition is clearly of much assistance 
in cases where specific performance is sought of a contract which 
contains some provisions in respect of which no decree could be 
l3a 
made • If such "illegal" or inequitable provisions of the contract. 
have been performed at the time relief is sought, or if such terms 
have been waived, damages will lie under Lord Cairn's Act even though 
no court of equity would have decreed specific performance of the 
14 
contract in toto . 
It has been held to be possible for a court to decree specific 
enforcement of a contract in so far as the provisions of an 
agreement are not objectionable and to award damages under the 
Act in respect of the remainder of the 15 agreement. Difficulties 
13. Ford Hunt v Raghbir Singh [1973] 2 A 11 ER 700 applied. 
Also see Raineri v Miles (Wiejski, Third Party) [1980J 
2 A 11 ER 145 ; Jones v Gardner [1962] 1 CL 191; 
Phillips v Lamdin [1949]2 KB 33; Jacques v Millar (1877) 
6 Ch D 153. 
l3a. As to this generally see Spry "Equitable Remedies" 
2nd Ed PP 100 - 104. 
14. Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed 548 - 9. Norris v Jackson 
(1860) 1 J & H 319; London Corporation v Southgate (1868) 
17 WR 197. 
15. See cases in footnote 11 supra, and add Middleton v Greenwood 
(1864) 2 De GJ & S 142; Key v Johnson (1864) 2 H & H 118; 
Wright v Carter (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 555. Compare Ryan v 
Mutual Tontine Westminister [1893] 1 Ch 116. 
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arise if it is accepted that a grant of equitable damages will 
only be awarded if a plaintiff could have obtained a decree for 
16 
specific performance 1 because it on agreement is not susceptible 
of specific performance because some of its provisions are void 
no damages will lie. However the underlying assumption behind this 
17 
argument has, it is submitted, been put to rest. 
It is to be stressed that these difficulties will not arise as 
prevalently in New Zealand because there are Judicature Act 
provisions in force, for the Jurisdiction of the court to award 
legal damages is not limited in the same way as under Lord Cairn's 
Act provisions. 
A further consideration as to damages in addition to specific 
relief arose from the judgment of Goff. J in Grant v Dawkinsl~ 
His Honour felt that where a court of equity awards damages under 
Lord Cairn's Act in addition to decreeing specific performance, 
the amount of damages can never exceed the difference between the 
purchase price payable under the contract and the value of the 
property at the date of the decree. 19 It is argued that this 
principle will lead to injustice. For example assume a property 
has a contract price of $5,000, and assume the value of the property 
at the time of the decree is $6,000. Further, assume the purchaser 
has to payoff mortgages amounting to $4,000. By reason of Goff. J' S 
16. See Supra: 3l£f 
17. See Supra: 31££ 
18. ~973] 3 A 11 ER 897. 
19. Pettit (1974) 90 CQR 297 - 301. 
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argument the purchaser could obtain no more than $1,000 in 
damages. Provided this decision is not overturned, the inherent 
jurisdiction of equity to award damages may be pressed into 
action in this instance, to alleviate any hardship created by such 
20 fact situations, though they may be unusual . 
20. Note compensation may be awarded along with 
specific performance in certain instances. 
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SIGNIFICANCE OF EQUITABLE DAMAGES 
1 Although Lord Cairn's Act has a limited procedural purpose, it 
would seem that its actual effect was to create a novel jurisdiction 
to award damages in some situations where the common law was 
powerless. Notwithstanding that New Zealand is subject to a 
Judicature Act System, there is still a need today to discriminate 
between equitable and common law damages. First, damages may be 
awarded under the equitable jurisdiction in respect of purely 
. 1 la prospect1ve oss . No common law court could award damages for 
such threatened or apprehended injury yet it was decided in 
Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack2 that such 
damages were admissible under Lord Cairn's Act. There seems to 
be no reason in principle why equitable damages should not be 
awarded in substitution for a decree of specific performance 
where, as yet, there has only been an anticipatory breach of 
3 
contract. 
Secondly, equitable damages may be ordered where, in the 
circumstances of the case, the plaintiff has no cause of action 
at law~ For instance where a contract is rendered unenforceable 
1. HorsIer v Zorro [1975] Ch 302. 
---
lao In substitution for a quia timet injunction 
Hooper v Rogers [1975] Ch 43. 
2. [1924] AC 85. 
3. See Hasham v Zenab [1960] AC 316 
Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch 30, 60. 
4. Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch 30, 59 per McGarry J 1 
Price v Strange [1977] 3 WLR 943 957 per Goff. J 1 
Johnson v Agnew [1979] 1 All ER 883 895 per Lord Wilberforce. 
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5 by non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds, but which has been 
sufficiently part performed by the plaintiff so as to support an 
6 
award of damages in lieu of specific performance. Thirdly, before 
the decision in Johnson v Agnew7 it was thought possible, even 
where a Judicature Act system operated, that the measure of 
damages in equity may be greater than that at law. This was 
8 
emphasised by McGarry J. in wroth v Tyler as such 
" ••. damages assessed under [Lord Cairn's Act] are to be ascertained 
in accordance with that Act on a basis which is not identical 
with that of the common law II Such a distinction is fueled by 
the notion that the measure of discretionary damages under the 
Act may have been more favourable to the successful plaintiff 
in a period of high inflation than that which the common law 
provided him as of right. However this is not now the case as 
was conclusively proved by Johnson v Agnew, where it was held 
that there was little or no difference between the assessment of 
d 1 d . 9 amages at common aw an equ1ty. 
5. Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 in New Zealand. 
6. Domb v Isoz [1980] 1 A 11 ER 942; The Deputy Judge 
dismissed the action for specific performance on the 
ground that there was no concluded contract. Damages 
were awarded in substitution by the English Court of 
Appeal. See also Lavery v Pursell (1888) 39 Ch 508 
J.C. williamson Ltd v Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282. 
7. Supra n.4 
8. Supra n.4 @ 57. 
9. Ferguson v Wilson (1866) L R Ch App 77 
Malhotrg v Choudhury [1978] 3, WLR 1406. 
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Lord Wilberforce noted that the jurisdiction to award damages in 
lieu of specific performance was wider than that at common law. 
With respect such an observation is closely supported by the 
foregoing discussion. 
To aid further study of Johnson v Agnew the facts of that case 
were in brief, that the plaintiff, vendors of land, after failure 
by the purchaser to complete and a notice making time of the 
essence, obtained an order for specific performance with which 
the purchaser failed to comply and which thereafter became 
unenforceable because the vendors' mortgagees exercised their 
sale of state; the question was whether the vendors (held not 
to be at fault) could seek damages and if so, at what date these 
should be assessed. 
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THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES 
A distinction may exist between the quantum of damages awarded at 
common-law and under the Act, because damages under Lord Cairn's 
Act are to be assessed at a different time from those at common law. 
In Bosaid v Andryl Sholl. J held that both at common law and under 
Lord Cairn's Act damages were awarded "at the time when the contract 
goes or is deemed to be gone".2 Such is the beginning of the modern 
law concerned with the quantum of damages. By virtue of the 
reasoning of Sholl. J, where a plaintiff has been insisting on 
the continuance of the contract up to the date of actual decree 
of the specific performance action3 , the contract will come to an 
end by the act of the court refusing specific performance, and 
thereby impliedly declaring that the contract is no longer 
enforceable and hence at an end. The plaintiff is not required to 
take any further action to determine the contract. Thus damages 
in both instances would be assessed at the time the contract was 
1. 
2. 
3. 
[1963] v R 465. 
Supra n.1 @ 490. 
Assuming that the plaintiff has not elected to 
determine the contract for breach and seek redress 
at common-law. 
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3a 
at an end. The termination of the contract could occur at different 
times given different circumstances, therefore quantum might vary. 
It appears to have been accepted in Wroth v ~4 that the normal 
rule is that general common law damages to which a purchaser is 
entitled for breach of a contract for the sale of land are measured 
by the difference between the contract price and the market value 
of the property at the date of breach, normally the date fixed for 
completion. McGarry, J continued and noted that the jurisdiction 
conferred by Lord Cairn's Act required the court to assess damages 
as the difference between the market value at the date of the 
contract and the date of the hearing. In the above case, a cottage 
was subject to a contract for sale for the price of f 6,000. At the 
date on which the vendor breached by refusing to settle, the market 
value of the cottage was L 7,500. At the date of the hearing its 
market value was £. 11,500. By applying the "general damages rule" 
i 1,500 would have been payable. However McGarry, J awarded L 5,500 
3a. Submitted that the approach taken by Sholl J. cannot be 
countenanced unless one accepts the proposition that 
common law (and hence equitable damages) must be 
assessable as at the date of the plaintiff's acceptance 
of the defendant's breach, not necessarily as at the 
date of the initial breach. An alternative approach 
would be to argue that damages are measured as at 
the date of breach only the defendant is in breach. And 
if the plaintiff terminates the contract he should be 
required to mitigate his loss by going forthwith into 
the market to find another vendor. 
4. [1974] Ch 30. 
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stating that the Act required the damages to be a "true substitute" 
for the land which would have been the subject of the decree for 
specific enforcement, and hence the value of the substitute had to 
be assessed at the date of the hearing. 
In short wroth v Tyler alludes to the proposition that on the 
statutory wording of the Act, equitable damages afford a different 
5 
measure than those at common-law. possibly it was this schism 
that lead to the recent revival of interest in equitable damages, 
as it was seen that the measure of damages under the Act may have 
been more favourable to the successful plaintiff in periods of 
high inflation than those at common law provided~ 
The reasoning of both MsGarry, J. and Sholl, J may produce the 
same results, but it must be understood that they base their 
theories on different grounds. McGarry, J stresses that damages 
are a substitute for specific performance and as such this assumes 
the contract is still on foot. On the other hand Sholl, J treats 
the jurisdiction under the Act to award damages as only arising 
when the contract is determined. 
In reaching his conclusion McGarry, J applied the equitable maxim 
that "Equity follows the Law"? Hence equity would normally apply 
5. wroth v Tyler per McGarry J @ 56 
" damages assessed under Lord Cairn's Act are to 
be ascertained in accordance with the Act on the basis 
which is not identical to that of common law ••• " 
6. Supra n.5 per McGarry J @ 55. 
7. Generally see Meagher, Gummow & Lehane "Equity Doctrines 
and Remedies" 2nd Ed 62 - 64. 
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the corrunon law rules for assessing the quantum of damages. But this 
maxim was subject to the overbearing statutory requirement that 
damages shall be in substitution for specific relief. 
It is ventured that McGarry's judgment should be read subject to 
the following. First, that a court has no jurisdiction to decree 
specific performance, and accordingly cannot apply Lord Cairn's Act, 
8 
unless damages are an inadequate remedy. since an inadequate 
remedy cannot literally be a true substitute for an adequate 
remedy, it would appear that McGarry J's principle would need to 
be broadened somewhat. Possibly it could provide for the court 
to award the closest possibly money substitute for specific 
performance rather than a true substitute. 
The undue rigidity of McGarry J's test is further highlighted by 
the inference that Lord Cairn's Act should not be read as imposing 
a statutory requirement that the damages awarded be a true or close 
substitute for specific relief. The section rendered it "lawful" 
for the court, "if it shall think fit", to award damages, and provided 
that "such damages may be assessed in a manner as the court shall 
direct". It is submitted that these words suggest that the Legislature 
did not intend to impose a statutory directive as to the measure of 
8. " The Court gives specific performance instead of damages 
only when it can by that means do more perfect and complete 
justice". 
Per Lord Selbourne L.C. in Wilson v Northampton and Banbury 
Junction pty Ltd (1874) 9 Ch App 279, 284 ; 
Flint v Brandon (1803) 18 Yes 159. 
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damages. To interpret the section as imposing such a direction 
would be unduly fettering the courts discretion. 
Some months after the delivery of the judgment in Wroth v Tyler, 
Goff. J in Grant v Dawkins 9 attempted to apply the reasoning of 
the earlier case. In the latter case the defendant agreed to 
sell free from encumbrances a house. However this house was 
subject to two mortgages, which secured sums exceeded in aggregate 
the purchase price. The plaintiff obtained specific performance 
for the conveyance of the property subject to the mortgages. In 
addition the purchase price was extinguished as compensation for 
the liability assumed with the mortgages and damages from the 
defendant in respect of the amount by which the moneys secured 
exceeded the purchase price, but so as not to be greater than the 
difference between the value of the property, and the purchase 
price. 
Goff. J cited Wroth v Tyler and pointed out that the case concerned 
damages in substitution for specific performance. His Honour felt 
it would be "quite illogical" to allow the plaintiff damages on a 
more limited scale simply because the court was awarding them in 
addition to, rather than in substitution for specific relief. Hence 
Goff. J valued the property at the date for completion, rather than 
the date of breach, thus giving the plaintiff the benefit of the 
appreciation in value between those dates. with respect, the 
reasoning of Goff. J must be called into question. In Grant v Dawkins 
because damages were awarded in addition to specific performance 
there was no over-riding statutory criteria, as was the cornerstone 
9. [1973] 3 A 11 ER 897 
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for McGarry's reasoning in Wroth v Tyler. Therefore even given 
wroth v Tyler is correct in principle, the reasoning in Grant v 
Dawkins could not be sustained, as McGarry J acknowledged that the 
only reason that equity departed from the common law on the 
assessment of damages was the statutory necessity for the damages 
to be a "true substitute". 
Oliver. J was the next reported English Judge to consider the law 
in this area, in Radford v De Frobervillel ? In this case it was 
held that damages were measurable as at the date of hearing rather 
than at the date of the defendant's breach, unless the plaintiff 
ought reasonably to have mitigated the breach at an earlier date. 
It is submitted that this approach was the foundation for the later 
11 
case of Johnson v Agnew , which confirmed that common law damages 
and equitable damages were to be assessed in the same manner. 
Murmurs of what was to appear in Johnson v Agnew were felt in 
12 Malhotra v Choudhury • Counsel for the defendant argued that 
if damages in sUbstitution were assessed at the date of judgment, 
then in periods of inflation, equitable damages would be higher 
than damages that were attainable at common-law. He went on to 
say that equity should have regard to the common-law rules when 
fixing a date for the assessment. However Cumming Bruce L.J 
would have none of this and stated that he was satisfied that equity 
was following the law by awarding damages assessed at the date of 
judgment and not the date of breach, because of the principles 
surrounding the common-law remedy of specific restitution in detinue. 
10. [1977J 1 WLR 1262 
11. [1980] Ac 367 
12. [1979J 1 A 11 ER 186 
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His Lordship followed Wroth v Tyler, but assessed the damages as 
at one year from the date of judgment, to take account of the 
plaintiff's delay. 
McMullin. J opens the New Zealand consideration of the quantum 
question with the following remark ; II in times of stability in 
land prices such a point would not have been likely to arise for 
'd ,"13 conS1 erat10n • In this case the purchaser had entered into 
an agreement to purchase a property from the vendor. The vendor 
purported to rescind the contract on the ground that the plaintiff 
had failed to settle on the date on which time became of the 
essence. The sale price was to be $53,000. The vendor claimed 
that after the rescission approximately $15,000 was spent on the 
property by way of further improvements. Having carried these 
improvements out the vendor once again placed the property on the 
market, but this time for a price of $120,000. It was found at 
the initial hearing that there would have been a substantial 
increase in the value of the property between the date fixed for 
settlement and the date on which an order for an inquiry into 
damages was made. It had been the purchaser that had sought the 
decree of specific performance in light of the vendor's purported 
repudiation. 
In holding that the damages in lieu of specific performance were 
to be assessed at the date of the order for the inquiry as to 
14a damages, McMullin. J dealt at length with Wroth v Tyler and 
13. Souster v Epsom Plumbing Ltd [1974] 2 NZLR 515 @ 521. 
14a. Supra n. 4 
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l4b Bosaid v Andry • His Honour felt that where a plaintiff seeks 
a decree of specific performance he is approbating the contract 
and seeking damages as an alternative remedy. Therefore with 
consistency such a plaintiff is entitled to maintain at the hearing 
of the action that the contract is still on foot (and it remains on 
foot until the court refuses specific performance). Hence 
McMullin. J considered that if damages are to be regarded as damages 
for the loss of bargain, brought to an end by the action of the 
court in refusing specific performance, there is only one time at 
which they should be determined, and that is when the bargain for 
which they are intended as compensation is brought to an end. 
A variation of this theme occurred in a subsequent New Zealand 
. k l4c Supreme Court case, H1C ey v Bruhns . In this instance the 
purchaser sought specific performance of an agreement bearing the 
date October 1972. The purchase price was $3,500 payable as to 
$1,000 on the signing of the agreement and the balance in October 
of 1974. The purchaser did not settle on this date, but offered 
to settle at a later date after time had been made of the essence. 
The purchaser was refused his decree of specific performance by 
reason of laches, however the vendor was ordered to pay $4,900 
damages by Quilliam. J. 
His Honour examined the rule enunciated by McMullin. J in Souster 
v Epsom Plumbing Ltd14d and reasoned that if it applied to the 
l4b. Supra n. 1 
l4c. [1977] 2 NZLR 71 
l4d. Supra n. 13 
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present case the measure of damages must be $6,500, which price 
is the difference between the contract price of $3,500 and the 
value of the land at the date of the hearing. Quilliam. J then 
proceeded to distinguish the case at hand from Souster's case 
and Wroth v Tyler saying that the reasoning of McMullin. J is 
not to be faulted, but that in the present case His Honour was 
faced with inordinate delay in a time of sharp inflationary increases. 
After fully considering Souster's case Quilliam. J touches on a 
matter which was to be emphasised some two years later by the 
f d · h 14e h . d House 0 Lor s ~n Jo nson v Agnew ,t at ~s, amages represent 
an attempt to adhere to the general principle that a party sustaining 
a loss by reason of breach of contract is, so far as money can do it, 
to be placed in the same situation with respect to damages as if 
the contract had been performed. By applying the principles set 
out in Souster v Epsom Plumbing Ltd and Wroth v ~ler, His Honour 
reasoned that the longer the plaintiff delayed the greater his 
damages. This was not to be countenanced. However, His Honour 
did not go so far as to formulate a new approach. He simply 
assessed the damages upon the principle in Souster's case, but 
14e. [1979] 2 WLR 487 
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diminished them by an appropriate amount to allow for the plaintiff's 
15 delay. 
Prior to Johnson v Agnew, the question of quantum in Australia came 
dh ' . d 16. before Nee am. J ln ASA Constructlons pty Lt v Iwanor. HlS 
Honour, whilst conceding the general correctness of Wroth v 
departed from it in the particular circumstances of that case and 
awarded damages as at the date of breach. 
wroth v Tyler was to remain the law for seven years. Its tenure 
was halted by the decision of the House of Lords in Johnson v Agnew. 17 
In that case the general principle established is that the innocent 
party is entitled to be so far as money can do so, in the 
same position as if the contract had been performed. Hence there 
was no difference, either in terms of the basis of assessment or 
in terms of the date of assessment, between the measure of damages 
at common law and equity. Lord wilberforce, with whose opinion 
all the other Law Lords agreed, was adamant that there was no 
warrant for a court to award equitable damages any differently from 
common law damages. 
15. See Also Grocott v Ayson [1975] 2 NZLR 586 
Damages in lieu of an injunction. Held by Cooke. J 
that the measure of damages is to cover the area which 
would have been covered by an order for 
performance, and in assessing damages in lieu of a 
quia timet injunction for apprehended harm a somewhat 
similar principle may be invoked. 
16. [1975] 1 NSWLR 512. 
17. Supra n. l4e. 
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AS a matter of general contract law the general principle applicable 
to the basis of the assessment of damages is the "reinstatement 
. . 1 ,,18 prJ.nclp e • 
There is a strong argument in favour of the view that damages under 
Lord Cairn's Act should be assessed in accordance with the 
reinstatement principle. That is a sum should be awarded as 
would enable the plaintiff to achieve exactly what was promised 
to be done by the defendant. The argument is as such; that an award 
of damages representing the cost of performing that which the defendant 
had promised to· perform would seem to correspond most accurately with 
the formulation of section 2 of the Act - that equitable damages 
are awarded "in substitution for". Nevertheless, despite the 
desireability of the statutory goal, it does not follow inexorably 
that an award of damages under the Act will produce a result 
d · f h l8a lfferent rom t at at Common Law. Indeed in Radford v De Froberville;9 
18. i.e. damages are compensatory and intended to put the 
plaintiff in as good a position as if the contract had 
been performed. 
l8a. "In cases where a breach of contract for sale has 
occurred, and the innocent party reasonably continues 
to try to have the contract completed, it would to me 
appear more logical and just rather than tie him to the 
date of the original breach, to assess damages as at 
the date when (otherwise than by default) the contract 
is lost. " 
per Lord Wilberforce Johnson v Agnew [1979] 1 A 11 ER 883 
@ 896 
19. [1978] 1 A 11 ER 33 
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Oliver. J said he saw "nothing particularly alarming" in the 
proposition that there may be cases in which damages under the 
Act and damages at common law were the same. Lord Wilberforce20 
21 
commented favourably on McGarry. J' S notion that the "breach 
date" rule was only a general rule and was not inflexible~2 
His Lordship went on to hold that, since the general principle of 
damages is compensatory, the court is not bound to adhere to the 
date of breach where that may lead to injustice. This reasoning 
disposes of the problem of linking obedience to Section 2 of the 
Act with the general principle that equity follows the law, by 
showing that in an appropriate case damages at common law can be 
aasessed at a date later than the breach. 
Inter Alia Johnson v Agnew asserted that (i) damages at common 
law should be assessed at the date of judgment i (ii) that damages 
should be assessed ( presumably both at common law and in equity ) 
not at the date of breach but at the date "the contract is lost". 
The judgment of the House of Lords, while stating that Wroth v Tyler 
was incorrect in holding that there was a difference between law 
and equity as to the dates on which damages should be assessed, 
makes no attempt to explain why this reasoning is wrong. A second 
criticism of the judgment is that proposition (i) above is hardly 
20. [1979] 1 A 11 ER 883 @ 896. 
21. Wroth v ~ Supra @ 
22. McGarry. J also made this comment in Horsler v Zorro 
[1975] Ch 302. 
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consistent with proposition (ii)~3 Hence a plaintiff seeking common 
law damages for a breach of a contract of sale consisting of a failure 
23a 
to deliver the property sold has presumably "lost" his contract 
before the institution of litigation, and should therefore have 
damages assessed at a date earlier than judgment. In this case the 
24 two propositions yield entirely different results. 
It is ventured that Johnson v Agnew marks a major step in the 
evolution of equity. 
It is submitted that it is the singularly most important case 
decided with regard to specific performance since Leeds Industrial 
24{a) 
v Slack . Not only does the case examine the quantum of 
damages but also the availability of damages and the timing of the 
24{b) 
award • It is ventured that the evolutionary process is marked 
by a series of peaks and troughs. That is,a simple principle is 
developed which is ideally to be exercised according to the facts 
of each case before a court. However over a period of time the case 
law builds upon the principle and eventually covers it from sight 
completely. Such is the case with specific performance. During 
23. Gummow Meagher &. Lehane "Equity Doctrines &. Remedies" 
2nd Ed @ 2313. 
23a. Possibly this concept of loss may include cancellation 
under the Contractual Remedies Act 1979. 
24.- Moreover, in equity, at least in those cases where the 
plaintiff persists until judgment in his request for 
specific performance, the contract is not "lost" until 
specific performance is denied him. 
24 (a) [1924] AC 851. 
24 (b) Also there is an authoritative discussion on rescission. 
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the eighteenth century the Chancellors developed the fundamental 
rules which relate to specific performance. These principles, as 
with all matters equitable, were to be administered according to 
the courts conscience. Two hundred years on and notions of fairness 
and justice while still being averted to have been "straightjacketed" 
by volumes of case law attempting to set precedents for all 
conceivable situations. The House of Lords in Johnson v Agnew 
has clarified, developed and yet simplified the law in this area 
by stripping back the veneer that has been glossing the long 
established ethics of this remedy. 
The New Zealand position has been reviewed by Cook. J who has given 
the most recent opinion on the time of assessing damage in Crofts 
d . 25 an Matsas v GUS Propert1es. Here the plaintiffs agreed to sell 
their land for $21,000 and also receive a comparable piece of land 
worth $1,000. Two contracts were drawn up. Settlement of the $21,000 
contract was carried out promptly. The plaintiffs made other 
arrangements as to the purchase of the land. The defendant treated 
this as a breach of contract. After further delays the plaintiffs 
sued for specific performance and damages. 
Cook. J first cites Lord Wilberforce in Johnson v Agnew, where His 
Lordship concluded that Lord Cairn's Act is not a warrant for the 
court to award damages differently from common law damages and His 
Lordship expressly says that the question as to the date of awarding 
25. 1 NZCPR [1982] 332 
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such damages is left open. Not surprisingly, Cook. J then proceeds 
to say that if there had been no delay on the part of the plaintiffs, 
the date in question would have been the date at which specific 
performance was refused, that is the date of the hearing. By pointing 
25a to the delay aspect Cook. J was able to follow Hickey v Bruhns 
and so brought forward the date at which damages should be assessed 
by three years because of the delay in commencing proceedings. 
In Australia the most recent commentary on the situation is undertaken 
26 by Helsham C.J. in the Equity Division of the New South Wales Supreme Court. 
His Honour reached the conclusion that the court could fix the date 
for assessment of damages as at any date that may be appropriate 
in the circumstances, including the date when the contract is lost. 
In this case the contract was lost at the date of Helsham C.J's initial 
judgment (this present case being an enquiry as to damages). Damages 
at that date amounted to the difference between the purchase price of 
$33,500 and the value of the property at the date of judgment - $55,000. 
His Honour then went on to express some strong views on the principle 
"In my view the law in this area is in such a mess that it is time 
th t t th "t t" d " " ,,27 a some cour gave an au orl a lve eC1Slon. In his opinion 
there is no date which can be said to be the date at which damages 
should be assessed. They should be assessed so as to do that which 
is just as between the parties in the particular circumstances of each 
case. 
25a. [1972] 2 NZLR 71 
26. Madden v Kevereski (1983) 1 NSWLR 305 
27. Supra n. 26 @ 306. 
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Helsham C.J. also averted to the problem created by the inflationary 
nature of the property market. The learned judge followed the House 
of Lords in Johnson v Agnew to the effect that the appropriate date 
for assessment, provided that the innocent plaintiff has reasonably 
continued to endeavour to have the contract completed, is not the 
date of breach, but the date when the contract is lost. As to His 
Honour's reasoning, with regard to the concept of justice and the 
particular circumstances of the case, it gives effect to the word 
"may" in the phrase "the court may award damages" in Section 68. 
This is consonant with the rationale adopted by Sholl. J in 
28 Bosaid v Andry. 
It is submitted that this case continues the discretionary nature 
of the judgment of Lord Wilberforce. It is ventured that, as to 
the ascertaining of the correct time to assess, the principles are 
returning to a form in keeping with the established ideas of the 
Court of Chancery. A court is once again being asked to look at 
the general fairness or justice of the situation, an appeal is being 
made to the conscience of the court. As with many areas of the law 
a general discretion has been created to facilitate this pursuit of 
fairness. No doubt in time this discretion will be regimented by 
cases decided under it and these cases will in turn provide more 
unmanageable rules which will in turn be cast aside in favour of 
d . . 29 new 1scret1ons. 
28. [1963] VR 465 
29. The Millstream v Shultz (1980) 1 NSWLR 547 
MCLelland. J followed Johnson v Agnew, noting that 
the circumstances of the case could determine the 
date of assessment. 
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Subsequent to Johnson v the question as to the date of assessment 
of damages has only been seriously considered by a court of higher 
30 jurisdiction on one occasion, that being in Domb v Isoz by the English 
Court of Appeal. In this case their Lordships followed the principles 
expounded by Johnson v Agnew. In the former case a judge at first 
instance dismissed an application for specific performance of a 
contract to buy a house. The purchasers appealed. Between the date 
of the trial and the hearing of the appeal they bought another house 
and at the hearing of the appeal elected to claim damages in lieu of 
specific performance. Hence by applying the principles in Johnson v 
Agnew the date at which the damages should be assessed was held to be 
the day on which the plaintiffs elected to pursue the remedy of 
damages. Buckley L.J supported this view by explaining that the fact 
that between trial and the hearing of the appeal another house was 
bought, does not mean that at the date of that purchase they elected 
to abandon their right to specific performance. The plaintiffs could 
still have insisted on performance of the contract, this would merely 
mean that they would own two houses. 
30. [1980] 1 A 11 ER 9A2. 
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B(4) (i) 
SECTION 9 DAMAGES UNDER THE CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES ACT 1979 
After "cancellation" ~l) a court can in its discretion "subject to 
Section 6 of this Act, direct any party to the proceedings to pay 
to any other such party such sum as the court thinks just"!2) 
As Section 9 (2) (b) is expressed to be subject to Section 6, a party 
who has been induced to enter into a contract by misrepresentation 
may still secure damages. Such proviso is further reinforced by 
Section 10 of the Act which also preserves the right to recover 
damagesP) While this distinction between Section 9 "just sums" 
and Section 6 damages is of interest, for the purposes of this paper 
one must consider whether the "just sums" equate to or derigate from 
equitable damages. For instance, if a decree is refused due to the 
failure of the contract being brought about by cancellation under 
the Contractual Remedies Act ; a court would appear to have a power 
to award a just sum after cancellation (Section 9) ; however because 
the contract is fundamentally at an end Lord Cairn's Act damages 
may not be awarded in substitution for the failure of the contract 
and hence the failure of the plaintiffs' specific performance action. 
Herein lies the difference between the two forms of monetary relief. 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
Sections 7 and 8 of The Contractual Remedies Act 1979 
provided for the cancellation of contractual obligations. 
Section 10 Contractual Remedies Act 1979. 
Section 10 Contractual Remedies Act 1979. 
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The "just sums" may be awarded where a court lacks the primary 
jurisdiction to award damages in equity. However it is to be noted 
that in fixing such "just sums" the court is required to have regard 
to a number of factors including inter alia "such matters as it 
(4) thinks proper" and any order may be made by the court according 
to the terms "that it thinks fit,,~5) Therefore, it is submitted 
that the awarding of "just sums", as with other relief provided 
for in the various contractual statutes, is a matter of conscience. 
It will only cease to be so, when the vaguaries of law reporting 
submerge the initial statutory intention. 
(4 ) Section 9 (4) (f) 
(5 ) Section 9 (2) (c) 
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C SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH COMPENSATION 
Where the land which is the subject-matter of the contract differs 
from the description of that land in the contract itself, the 
purchaser is entitled to be compensated by the vendor even in the 
1 
absence from the agreement of a compensation clause. At cornmon-law 
any difference, however trivial, between the land described in the 
contract and the land conveyed, constituted a defect which enabled 
the purchaser to rescind. When there was only a slight defect, the 
Courts of Equity interfered, and to ameliorate hardship, granted 
specific performance with compensation. The Cornmon Law principle 
is based on the idea that a purchaser cannot be forced to take a 
property which is substantially different from its description in 
the contract, and permeates the whole area of the law relating to 
compensation and amounts to a fundamental principle (The rule in 
Flight v Booth2) • 
The right to compensation is confined to errors, misdescriptions 
and the like in the contract itself. A purchaser cannot claim 
compensation with specific performance for breach of any collateral 
contract or representation which is not a terms of the sale and 
3 purchase agreement. However the distinction is no longer of great 
1. As to compensation clauses see post. P75ff 
2. (1834) 1 Bing N.C. 370. 
3. Rutherford v Acton-Adams [1915] AC 866 
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significance now that the Contractual Remedies Act 19794 allows 
an action for damages for innocent misrepresentation regardless 
of whether the representation constituted a term of the contract 
or not. So where the purchaser cannot claim compensation he may 
be able to obtain damages. 4a However he cannot have both. 
T.he equitable jurisdiction to grant a purchaser specific performance 
with compensation is based upon estoppel. For this reason the 
purchaser cannot succeed if he knew the true state of the title4b 
or subject matter when he signed the contract, or if he knew then 
that the vendor entered into the contract in ignorance of the 
5 true facts. It is different where the purchasers claim is based 
upon a clause in the agreement, for then no question of estoppel 
arises. 
4. Section 6 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979. 
4a. Smith v 
-_ .... 
[1941] NZLR 147 
4b. Where a purchaser knowing of a defect acts in a 
manner implying a waiver of his right to compensation 
for that defect, the vendor may insist on completion 
of the purchase without compensation 
Burnell v Brown 1 Jac & W 168. 
5. Rudd v [1900] lCL 815. 
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with regard to compensation, a number of questions arise. Is there 
a distinction between specific performance with compensation and 
specific performance with damages in addition? Moreover is equitable 
compensation just another form of damages granted under the inherent 
jurisdiction of a court of equity? Finally, what is equitable compensation? 
Where a vendor is able to perform the contract in its substance, 
but unable to perform it literally in all parts, he may yet sue the 
purchaser for its specific performance. On the other hand, where a 
vendor has not substantially all that he has contracted to sell, 
he cannot sue for specific performance, but the purchaser may 
generally insist on taking what the vendor has. 
From these principles arises a right in the purchaser to 
compensation in respect of the difference between the thing which 
the vendor insists that he shall take, or he himself insists on 
taking, and the expressed subject-matter of the contract. 
6 Spry notes that the purchaser's right to specific performance with 
compensation is only in respect of deficiency in the subject-matter 
described in the contract and does not apply to a claim to make 
good a representation about that subject-matter made not in the 
b 11 . 6a contract ut co aterally to 1t. 
7 Viscount Haldane in Rutherford v Acton Adams, an appeal from the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal, deals at length with the respective 
6. Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed. 274ff 
6a. Nor will compensation be awarded for non-disclosure 
of something which is not an encumbrance on the title 
Greenhalgh v Brindley [1901] 2 Ch 324. 
7. [1915] A C 866. 
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rights of the vendor and purchaser to specific performance and 
compensation. His Lordship be~nsby stating that in exercising 
its jurisdiction over specific performance a Court of Equity looks 
at the substance rather than the letter of the contract. Hence, 
if a vendor sues and is in a position to convey substantially what 
the purchaser has contracted to get, the court will decree specific 
performance with compensation for any small and immaterial deficiency, 
provided that the vendor has not, by misrepresentation or otherwise, 
disentitled himself to his remedy. His Lordship then averted 
to another situation i that is where a vendor claims specific 
performance and where the court refuses it unless the purchaser is 
willing to consent to a decree on terms that the vendor will make 
compensation to the purchaser, who agrees to such a decree on 
condition that he is compensated. If it is the purchaser that 
is suing the court holds him to have an even larger right. But 
his right applies only to a deficiency in the subject-matter 
described in the contract. 
Such principles were confirmed by the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia in Willison v Van Ryswyk~ Upon a sale of a suburban 
business the vendor guaranteed that the said business had shown a 
net profit of 50 per week. The net weekly profit was in fact 
49 Is 4d. The purchaser refused to complete because of the 
di9crepancy. The vendor, in a suit for specific performance of 
the contract, neither alleged nor claimed damages in lieu. The 
trial judge held that the vendor had not breached the contract, 
8. [1961] WAR 87 
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but on other grounds, declined to give a decree, but in lieu thereof 
awarded damages of i 485. 
It was held by the Supreme Court that in exercising its discretion 
to decree specific performance with compensation it considers 
the substance and intent rather than the form of the contract, 
and will decree specific performance with compensation for any small 
and immaterial deficiency provided that the vendor has not otherwise 
disentitled himself from the remedy and provided that the difference 
in value can be fairly computed. In this case the deficiency was 
not such as to preclude this rule and the difference in value could 
be fairly computed. 
To put the entire matter simply, where a misdescription is insignificant, 
so that the purchaser gets substantially though not precisely what 
he bargained for, the court will enforce the contract even at the 
suit of the vendor, compelling him to make compensation to the 
purchaser. 
The court will not apply this principle at the suit of either par 
if the proper amount of compensation cannot be fairly ascertained~ 
9. Lord Brooker v Rounthwaite (1846) 5 Hare 298. 
where the amount of timber to be included in the sale 
was not defined by the contract; Rudd v Lascelles [1900] 
1 CL 815 compensation for restrictive covenants held to be 
incapable of assessment; Also Halkett v Lord Dudley [1907] 
1 Ch 590. 
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Moreover where a material part of the subject matter of the contract 
is wanting and hence leads third persons having their rights 
prejudiced to the property in question, the same will apply.9a 
Many contracts for the sale of land commonly contain a condition 
to the effect that the lots are believed to be correctly described, 
but that errors shall not annul the contract and that no compensation 
shall be paid for or in respect of any misdescription. Notwithstanding 
such a condition, the purchaser may repudiate the contract if the 
misdescription is fraudulent or is of such a material nature that 
it induced the purchaser to enter the contract. lO But, more 
importantly from this paper's point of view, such a clause prevents 
the purchaser from obtaining specific performance with compensation. ll 
9a. 
10. 
11. 
Peers v Lambert (1844) 7 Beau 546; Shackleton v Sutcliffe 
(1847) 1 De G & Sm 609. 
Lipmans Wallpaper Ltd v Mason and Hodghton [1969] 1 Ch 20 
Whittemore v Whittemore (1869) LR 8 Eq 603; 
Watson v Burton [1956] 3 All ER 929. 
Note: In earlier times conditions providing for 
compensation in contracts were the norm. The 
reverse now appears to be the standard. See 
generally Halsbury's "Laws of England" 4th Ed Vol. 42 
Para 117. 
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Specific performance with compensation will not be granted if it 
will work great hardship upon the vendor; conversly, a vendor 
cannot invoke the rule in Flight v Booth by arguing that the 
misdescription is so substantial that he cannot be required to 
12 
convey the property and allow compensation to the purchaser. 
In an open contract, the purchaser cannot claim compensation after 
he has settled the purchase, unless he actually obtains the vendors 
agreement that he settles with reservation of the rights which he 
possessed before settlement, for in the absence of a compensation 
clause his right to claim compensation is an incident of specific 
performance and lapses as soon as the contract has been performed 
h h 'bl d' 1 'I b 12a so t at t e equlta e reme y lS no onger aval a Ie. However 
if the contract provides for compensation for any error or 
mis-statement in the contract, the purchaser's right to compensation 
is not lost by completion if he was not then aware of the defect:-2b 
The Auckland Law Society Standard Agreement for the sale and 
purchase of land contains a compensation clause couched in the 
following terms 
Clause 5.3 
II Except as otherwise expressly set forth in this agreement, no 
error, omission or misdescription shall annul the sale but compensation, 
if demanded in writing before settlement but not otherwise, shall 
be made or given as the case may require." 
12. Drummoyne MC v Beard [1970] 1 NSWLR 432 
12a. Jollife v Baker (1883) 11 QB 255 
12b. Cann v Cann (1830) 3 Simm 447 
Palmer v Johnson (1884) 13 P B D 351 
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This clause makes it quite clear that compensation must be demanded 
in writing before settlement. A claim after settlement is too late. 
A compensation clause has the effect of reducing the purchaser's 
ability to withdraw from the cOntract upon finding a misdescription, 
because the court will, unless the error is sufficiently substantial 
to bring into play the rule in Flight v be more ready by 
reason of an express agreement to require the purchaser to accept 
the property with compensation than it will under an open contract. 
In summary, within the tolerance permitted by the rule in Flight v 
Booth, a compensation clause may be used to require a purchaser to 
accept quite a large deficiency in the area of the subject property. 
It is not fatal to a vendors action for specific performance with 
compensation that the vendor had knowledge of the defect when he 
entered into the contractl~ nor will such knowledge on the part of 
14 the purchaser preclude his claim under the clause. However, 
note that such knowledge does preclude a claim under an open contract. 
As to the questions posed earlier in the text, the following answers 
are proffered. There is a distinction between compensation and 
damages awarded in addition to specific performance. While in most 
instances the distinction is undetectable, there is always the 
qualification that there may not be "jurisdiction" in the material 
sense to award damages in addition to specific performance. However 
13. Re Belcham & Gawleys Contract [1930J 1 Ch 56 
14. Lett v Randall (1883) 49 LT 71. 
Corbett v Locke King (1900) 16 TLR 379 
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there is no such jurisdictional criteria imposed on the award 
of compensation. On the other hand one must keep in mind the 
recent trend towards considering equitable damages to be 
"compensation" for the loss suffered. Such trend brings damages 
in addition and equitable compensation closer still. The House 
of Lords in Johnson v Agnew added their support to this proposition 
by noting that the general principle of damages is compensatory. 
So ends the section of this paper on damages. An area complicated 
by numerous principles and alternative courses of action. 
Henceforth follows a consideration of a number of the defences 
which may be raised in support of the refusal of a decree. 
Intermingled with these aspects are sections dealing with the 
Election of Remedies and the Enforcement of Testamentary 
Dispositions. 
The transition from the examination of the entity of damages to 
an appraisal of numerous loosely linked concepts, it is ventured t 
is to be seen as illustrating on the one hand the maxim that 
"equity follows the law" and that equitable damages have become 
regulated by principle, and on the other hand the many sided 
nature of equity is illuminated by the multiplicity of defences. 
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A NON DISCLOSURE 
II Any inequality between the parties, for whatever reason ••• 
and any taking advantage of one party by another, will be 
given due weight by a court of equity. " 
Spry"Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 168. 
The deeply entrenched common law principle of caveat emptor negates 
to a large extent the common law and equitable defence of non-
disclosure. In recent times there has been some movement away 
from a strict application of the doctrine, but the general 
principle still applies, save where special circumstances arise~ 
Silence on a material aspect of an agreement on which a vendor 
has no special duty to disclose wll not prevent a vendor from 
2 
obtaining specific performance. The abovementioned special duty 
to disclose arises where the vendor is in a relationship with the 
purchaser which results in the contract being classed as a 
1. McKey v Rorison (1953) NZLR 498; 
Chitty on Contracts, General principles 25th Ed 
@ para 353; Gabolinsky v Hamilton City Corporation 
(1975) 1 NZLR 150. 
2. Turner v Green 2 Ch 205 
Greenhalgh v Brindley 2 Ch 324. 
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b " f"d" 3 contract u err1mae 1 e1. There is an academic dispute as to where 
the duty, in such instances, arises out of an implied term that 
disclosure will be made, or that it depends simply upon general 
"bl "" 1 f f " 4 equ1ta e pr1nc1p es 0 a1rness. Where this duty is breached a 
right of rescission arises; in such circumstances specific 
performance is refused afortiori, that is there will no longer be 
a valid contract to perform. The most frequent illustration of 
the breach of the duty is seen with regard to contracts of 
insurance. In some instances an insured will seek specific 
performance of the insurance policy rather than an order for the 
5 funds. On numerous occasions a non-disclosure as to say inter 
alia previous insurance, claims history, subject matter of the 
insurance or material considerations will prevent an insured from 
obtaining specific performance of the policy. 
There is one other special relationship which yields up a right 
of rescission, that of fiducary. The extent of this duty and the 
nature of the information required to be disclosed depend upon the 
3. A contract of utmost good faith. Contracts between 
family members and contracts of insurance are two 
examples of such contracts. The duty to disclose 
required each party involved in the contract to 
disclose all material facts that they ought to have 
known would effect the other party. 
Avon House v Cornhill Insurance Co Ltd (1980) 1 ANZIR 60 429 
4. See Tarr "The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contracts" 
(1981) NZLJ 
5. i.e. where reinstatement is in issue. 
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particular equitable incidents or characteristics of the fiduciary 
relationship in question, no general rule can be laid down. 6 
with regard to disclosure and contracts for the sale of land, a 
purchaser can obtain specific performance even if he did not 
disclose facts known to him but not to the vendor which materially 
increased the value of the property. 
Further a purchaser who conceals his identity by buying through 
an agent can compel specific performance even if he knew that the 
vendor would not have sold the property to him if his identity 
has been disclosed, unless the possession by the purchaser of some 
personal quality is a material ingredient of the contract. However 
where there is a title defect a vendor of land is obliged to 
. h 7 dlsclose t e same. If the title defect is not disclosed the purchaser 
has a remedy, not for a failure by the vendor to disclose its existence, 
but for the vendor's breach of contract in being unable to give 
the purchaser a good title. 8 Every contract for the sale of land 
6. Tate v Williamson (1866) L R Z Ch 55 
Note: Davies v London & Provincial Marine Ins. Co 
(1878) 8 Ch D 469 @ 474 -
" if there be a pre-existing relationsh between the 
parties, such as that of agent and principal, solicitor 
and client, guardian and ward, trustee and cestui que 
trust, then, if the parties can contract at all, they 
can only contract after the most ample disclosure of 
everything by the agent, by the solicitor, by the 
guardian, or by the trustee". 
7. Dyster v Randall & Sons [1926] Ch 932 
8. Battersby, Williams' Contract for Sale of Land and Title 
(4th Ed) 947 Harris v Weaver [1980] 2 NZLR 437 
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contains an implied term that the vendor will give a good title, 
and the existence of a defect is a breach of that implied term. 
The function of a pre-contract disclosure by the vendor is to fix 
the purchaser with knowledge of the existence of the defect when 
he entered into the contract and, if he also knew that the defect 
was one whose removal the vendor was not in a position to effect, 
9 to deprive him of remedy in respect of the defect. 
9. Paterson v Long (1843) 6 Beav 589; 49 ER 954; 
Smith v Capron (1849) 7 Hare 185; 68 ER 75 i 
Nicoll v Chambers (1852) 11 CB 996: 138 ER 770 
Morley v C1avering (1860) 29 Beav 84; 54 ER 558 ; 
Henderson v Hudson (1867) 25 WR 860 ; 
Castle v Wilkinson (1870) LR 5 Ch App 534 
English v Murray (18B3) 49 LT 35 ; 
Re Gloag and Miller's Contract (1883) 23 Ch D 320 at 327, 
per Fry J (obiter) i Larnach v Irving (1893) 12 NZLR 212 
Hopcraft v Hopcraft (1897) 76 LT 341; Meehan v 
New Zealand Agricultural Co Ltd (1907) 26 NZLR 766 
Wisley v McGruer (1909) 28 NZLR 481 (a decision which, 
it is suggested, is incorrect because of the effect of 
the Property Law Act 1908, s 81(2), but which remains 
a valid authority on this point) ; Radium Hill Co No Liability 
v Moreland Metal Co (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 631 at 635, per 
Harvey J: McGrory v A1derda1e Estate Co Ltd [1918] 
AC 503 at 508, per Lord Finlay: Redapple v He1y (1931) 
45 CLR 452 at 471, per Dixon CJ Re Roe and Eddy's 
Contract [1933) VLR 427 at 431, per McFarlan J (orbiter); 
Timmins v Moreland Street Property Co Ltd [1958]1 Ch 110. 
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This rule as to defects of title was examined and broadened by 
, k' 'I 10 d 'd d' 1 1984 Henry. J ln Wat ln v Wl son a case eCl e ln ate • In 
this case the court acknowledged that non disclosure of defects 
is not fatal to the validity of a contract. However when Henry 
J examined the Land Transfer Act 1952 and the requirement of 
passing good title, he noted that in the present case that the 
building in question was erected without a Council permit. His 
Honour concluded that this amounted to a latent defect in title 
in respect of part of the subject matter of the contract. This 
'd' b d h ' 11 , conSl eratl0n was ase on tree Australlan cases and lt was 
, d f ' I' 12 not dlrected at e ects ln qua lty . Although the effect of 
Watkin v Wilson is not to exaggerate markedly the rule, however 
it does represent an extension, an extension in line with the 
recent enlightened trend in negligence.13 
There are other cases of non disclosure, however, where there is 
10. High Court Auckland A12/81. 
11. Vutelic v Sadit-Quinlan & Associates [1976] 13 ALTR 3; 
Maxwell v Pinheiro (1979) 46 LGRA 310; 
Borthwick v Walsh (1980) 41 LGRA 144. 
12. Dell v Beasley [1959] NZLR 89 Town Planning Restrictions 
Harris v Weaver [1980] 2 NZLR 437. 
13. See: Cadenhead. J (1984) NZLJ 253 
(1983) 2 CANT LR 25 
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no ground for rescission because, for example, there is no definite 
duty of disclosure, but the non disclosure may have the effect of 
bringing to bear a discretionary defence barring ic performance. 
For instance the failure to disclose certain facts or matters, 
may result in hardship or unfairness if performance of the contract 
were decreed. This position will be emphasised where at the material 
time the plaintiff knew of the ignorance or misapprehension of the 
defendant but nonetheless did not take steps to provide information 
h ' 1 13a or to correct t e mater~a error. 
There will be other incidences where the plaintiff either negligently 
or carelessly assumes that the defendant knows the material information. 
Hence any non disclosure resulting in an inequality arising between 
the parties will be given due weight by a court in exercising its 
d ' . 14 ~scret~on. 
13a. Summers v Cocks (1929) 40 CLR 321 
Fletcher v Manton (1940) 64 CLR 37 @ 50 
14. Halsbury 3rd Ed Vol 34 Para 357. 
Carl ish v Salt (1906) 1 Ch 337 
Vukelic v Sad inlan (1976) 13 ACTR 3; 
---=----
v Lodge (1925) Ch 350 7 
Hope v Walter (1900) 1 Ch 257 
Summers v Cocks (1928) 40 CLR 321 
Laurence v Lexcourt Hold Ltd [1978] 2 AllER 810 @ 817, 819. 
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Of a similar class to the consideration of non disclosure is that 
consideration comprising sharp practice and public policy. For 
instance the fact that the public would be misled as to the 
authorship of a literary work if the contract, which provided 
for the naming as author of a person who had not written the work, 
were performed has been held to be a good ground for refusing 
specific performance, for this would be fraud on the public~5 
The same principle applies if the plaintiff is guilty of practice 
. f d 1 . 16 amountlng to rau u ent suppresslon. Also as earlier noted a 
decree will be refused to a plaintiff who was aware that the 
defendant did not appreciate the effect of the contract~7 
15. Post v Mar (1880) 16 Ch D 395, 
(1887) 37 Ch D 51 
16. =~="- v Stratton (1785) 1 Bro CC 440. 
17. Pateman v Pay (1974) 232 EG 457. 
Contrast Harrop v ~~~~ [1975] 1 WLR 545 
where specific performance was granted to a 
plaintiff who obtained the property cheaply at 
auction following a bidding agreement. 
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, 11 G h h '118 'f' Moreover ln Verra v reat Yarmout ~oroug Councl specl lC 
performance was granted even though there was risk of public 
disorder as a contract to grant a licence to use a public building 
was enforced against local consensus. The particular facts of 
this case reqired that the decree be granted despite the public 
attitude. Against the protection of public ideals must be 
weighed an individual's right to retain a sensible amount of 
19 freedom of speech and assembly. 
In summary the aforementioned equitable considerations all are 
based on the concept of conscience. This is particularly evident 
where, for instance, a non disclosure, which would normally have 
no significance, offends the conscience and inner being of the 
court. Unfortunately there have been few recent cases in this 
area so one is at a loss to discern whether there has been a 
change in the operation of this conscience principle. However 
it is ventured that the conscience of the court changes with respect 
to the social dictates in which it is exercised. Hence the morals 
which prompted Lord Eldon to dispense relief would now be regarded 
as unduly prohibitive in today's social climate. Therefore, it 
can be seen that while matters of conscience are not regulated by 
rules, they are dependent upon the standards of each individual 
judge in light of the acceptable standards of public morality. 
18. [1980] 1 A 11 ER 839 
19. ~~~ v Jackson [1977] 3 A 11 ER 338; 
v Thompson [1980] 3 A 11 ER 329 
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B IMPOSSIBILITY 
" Assuming the defendants to be entirely in the wrong, doing everything 
in contravention of the agreement, still when the court is asked to 
restrain them from acting under the award, it is impossible for me 
to do so, since the defendants have not the power of doing that which 
it is said they ought to do " 
Per Kindersky VC Seawell v Webster (1859) 29 LJ Ch 71 @ 73 
A contract may become frustrated and impossible to perform because 
of the occurrence of an unexpected event which destroys the foundation 
of the contract. The contract is then discharged and specific 
performance is out of the question. At law it is no defence to an 
action for damages that the contract has become impossible of 
performance through the defendant's own acts, but in equity specific 
performance will be denied~ Underlying this reasoning is the maxim 
2 that "equity will not specifically enforce what cannot be done". 
1. v Smith (1738) 1 Atk 572 
Denton v Stewart (1786) 1 Cox Cas 258 
Smith v Morris (1788) 2 Bro CC 311 ; 
Ferguson v Wilson (1866) 2 Ch App 77 
Wycomb Pty Co v Denington Hospital (1866) 1 Ch App 268 
v Wilkenson (1870) 5 Ch App 534 
v Agnew [1979] 1 A 11 ER 883 
2. Ferguson v Wilson (1866) LR 2 Ch 77. 
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It is of no consequence that the impossibility may be entirely due 
to default on the part of the defendant, if, for whatever reason 
the defendant cannot possibly perform his obligation, specific 
f "11 t b d d ' h' 3 per ormance W1 no e ecree aga1nst 1m. For instance in 
4 Day v Hammet a purchaser claimed specific performance of an 
agreement to sell a hotel and transfer the licence, however 
Provincial Ordinances from which the licence was granted were 
found to have expired. The court refused to grant the decree 
and left the purchaser to his remedy at law. 
Of course the mere anticipation of difficulties will not be 
enough to move a court. If at the time of the application to the 
court there is the likelihood that performance may become impossible, 
a court may make a conditional order or order the proceedings 
adjourned. Such a situation has caused considerable litigation4a 
in Australia with regard to the Closer Settlement Acts of New 
South Wales. This act provides that a transfer or other dealing 
with a settlement purchase lease shall not be valid unless the 
consent of the Minister is obtained. Windyer. J in Brown v Heffer 5 
succinctly examines the principle with regard to these conditional 
orders by noting that the specific performance which will be granted 
before the Minister's consent is obtained is not specific 
performance of the obligation to transfer, for that obligation has 
3. Seawell v Webster (1859) 29 LJ Ch 21. 
4. (1873) 1 NZ JUR 64 
4a. Kennedy v Vercoe (1960) 105 CLR 521 
Brown v Heffer (1967) 116 CLR 344. 
5. (1967) 116 CLR 344. 
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not yet arisen. The decree that will be made, according to His 
Honour, will go no further than directing that the proper steps 
be taken for the purpose of obtaining the Minister's consent~ 
Hence if approval were refused, it would be impossible to comply 
with an unconditional order: A different analysis is appropriate8 
where the contractual obligation in question is absolute and not 
conditional so that there will be a breach of contract if it is 
not performed even though the failure to perform has arisen only 
because a necessary consent has not been obtained~ 
A slight derivative of the above theme is illustrated by Meech v 
10 Johnson. In this case a plaintiff obtained a judgment ordering 
the defendant specifically to perform an agreement to lease 
300 acres to the plaintiff. A portion of the land - 130 acres -
was leasehold, and the local Land Board refused to give its 
consent to the proposed sub-lease. The Plaintiff applied for 
the judgment to be enforced with respect to the 170 acres. 
Demonstrating the application of equitable principles the court 
divided the contract and decreed that the defendant should perform 
the contract as far as was possible. 
6. per Windyer J @ 350. 
7. Gasiunas v Meinhold (1964) 6 FLR 182. 
8. Such analysis being based on the general principle 
that equity will not require that to be done which 
cannot be done. 
9. Dillon v Nash (1950] VLR 293 i 
Warmington v Miller (1973] QB 877. 
10. [1921] NZLR 310. 
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If it is established that the required consent can be obtained it 
may be found to be convenient that the material order be made 
1 th h d " III abso ute ra er t an con 1t10na . 
As stated before12 even given that a defendant is entirely 
responsible for the wrong which prevents performance, such obstacle 
may still be set up to avoid a decree. Commonly in such a case 
the plaintiff is found to have acquired a remedy in damages. 
Moreover, depending on the fact situation, performance may be 
ordered with suitable compensation being assessed to remedy the 
defect. 
11. Dillon v Nash [1950] VLR 293. 
12. Note Seawell v Webster [1859] 29 LJ Ch 71 
per Kindersley V.C. @ 73 : 
» Assuming the defendants to be entirely in the wrong, 
doing everything in contravention of the agreement, 
still, when the court is asked to restrain them from 
acting under the award, it is impossible for me to 
do so, since the defendants have not the power of 
doing that which it is said they ought to do. But 
the extreme case of a vendor burning a title deed 
the court can not make a decree that he should 
deliver it up » 
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TIME AT WHICH IMPOSSIBILITY IS JUDGED 
At what time must the possibility of performance be determined? 
There is some suggestion that it is the time of commencement of 
proceedings which should primarily be looked at~3 However the 
better view is that the time at which impossibility is judged is 
the proper time for performance of the contract, not the date of 
the contract. Thus, a person may contract to convey an estate 
on a future day even though he is not the owner of the estate 
at the date of the contract, or similarly may contract to sell 
goods which are not then his property. Such contracts would be 
14 
enforced if the vendor has become possessed of the land or goods. 
Similarly where contracts dealing with property require the 
subsequent consent of third persons for their performance, the 
court, as observed before, will protect the property until the 
. . b . d15 sanct~on ~s 0 ta~ne • Accordingly a court looks at whether 
13. Ferguson v Wilson (1866) LR 2 Ch 77 
14. Browne v Warner (1808) 14 Ves 409~ 
Carne v Mitchell (1846) 10 Jur 909~ 
Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HL Cas 191 
15. Kennedy v Vercoe (1960) 105 CLR 521~ 
Frederick v Coxwell (1829) 3 Y & J 514 
Great Western Rly Co v Birmingham and Oxford Rly Co (1848) 
Z ph 597 Hawkes v Eastern Counties Rly Co (1852) 1 DeGM&G 737~ 
Devenish v Brown (1856) 26 LJ Ch 23 
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performance is possible as at the time the order is granted. 
As previously noted, in certain circumstances where a vendor is 
unable to convey the precise interest in land in which he had 
agreed to convey, specific performance may be decreed along 
with the payment of compensation. Hence, if the impossibility 
consumes part only of the contract, enforcement with compensation 
. d h f . . 16 IS a way aroun t at act sItuatIon. 
16. Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Ed Vol 44 Para 492. 
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B (E) FUTILITY OF PERFORMANCE 
A court of equity will not make any order in vain~ Prima facia 
a party to an agreement is entitled to performance of its terms, 
and he should not be denied relief on the ground of futility unless 
damages are adequate or a special discretionary consideration 
arises. 
The defence of futility differs from that of impossibility in that 
it may well be possible for the defendant to perform his obligations, 
but such performance may be futile and of no consequence. Generally 
2 it is considered by Spry that it is difficult to envisage a case 
where relief is refused on the ground of futility when it could be 
said that specific performance would afford more complete and 
perfect justice than damages. In other words, it is perhaps 
unnecessarily confusing to maintain that there is such a defence 
f '1" 3 as ut1 1ty. 
1. per Kindersley V.C. New Brunswick Co v Muggeridge 
(1859) 4 Drew 689 @ 699. 
2. Equitable Remedies 2nd Ed @ 123 
3. Nesbitt v Meyer (1818) 1 Swanst 223; 
Lever v Koffler [1901]1 Ch 543; 
western v Pim (1814) 3 Ves & B 197; 
Walters v Northern Coal Mining Co (1855) 5 DeGM&G 629; 
De Brassac v Martyn (1863) 9 LT 287. 
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However there are circumstances where the lack of substantial 
benefits arising out of a proposed enforcement has led to damages 
being preferred to specific enforcement. Thus a decree has been 
refused to enforce an agreement to enter into a partnership at will, 
4 
which could be determined immediately afterwards, to enforce an 
agreement to grant a deputation of an office which was clearly 
5 
revocable, and to enforce an agreement to grant a lease for a 
short period of time 60r of a lease which term has already expired? 
4. Hercy v Birch (1804) 9 Ves 357; 
Sheffield Gas Consumers Co v Harrison (1853) 17 Beav 294; 
Renowden v Hurley [1951] VLR 13; 
Suttor v Gundowda pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418 
5. Wheeler v Trotter (1737) 3 Swan 174 
6. Lever v Koffler [1901] 1 Ch 543; 
Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901]2 Ch 608 @ 616; 
Lavery v Pursell (1888) 39 Ch D 508 
7. De Brassac v Martyn (1863) 9 LT 287; 
Turner v Clowes (1869) 20 LT 219; 
Western v Pim (1814) 3 Ves & B 197 
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To conclude matters ; impossibility and futility as bars to 
specific performance have remained unchallenged and unchanged 
in their complexion since their significance was first 
appreciated. Suffice to close with the following citation 
7a from Hall v Vernon per Dent P. "equity never does a vain 
thing, or enforces a void or impossible contract. Men may 
divide the moon by imaginary lines, but equity will not enforce 
their contract"~ 
7a. (1899) 34 SE 764 
8. (1899) 34 SE 764 @ 765. 
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C THIRD PARTIES AND PERFORMANCE 
" Time alone will tell whether this more liberal approach will 
be applied to other, and more usual. asoects of the law of 
soecific oerformance. " 
Hanbury and Maudsley "Modern Eauity" 10th Ed @ 66. 
Generally speaking it is only the parties to the contract or their 
representatives who should be made plaintiffs and defendants 
respectively in an action for specific performance. For instance, 
1 the case of Tasker v Small involved a mortgagor who had sold his 
property. It was held that the mortgagee was not a necessary 
1. (1837) 3 Mr & Cr 63. 
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2 defendant to the purchaser's action for specific performance. 
This rule was further applied in Howard v Miller 3 by 
2. Supra n.l per Lord Cottenham L.C. states the rule 
and its justification, as follows: 
" It is not disputed that, generally, to a bill for 
specific performance of a contract of sale, the parties 
to the contract only are the proper parties; and, when 
the ground of the jurisdiction of the Courts of Equity 
in suits of that kind is considered it could not properly 
be otherwise. The court assumes jurisdiction in such 
cases, because a court of law, giving damages only for 
the non performance of the contract, in many cases does 
not afford an adequate remedy. But, in equity, as 
well as at law, the contract constitutes the right, and 
regulates the liabilities of the parties; and the 
object of both proceedings is to place the party 
complaining as nearly as possible in the same situation 
as the Defendant had agreed that he should be placed in. 
It is obvious that persons, strangers to the contract, 
and, therefore, neither entitled to the right, nor subject 
to the liabilities which arise out of it, are as much 
strangers to a proceedings to enforce the execution of 
it as they are to a proceeding to recover damages for 
the breach of it. " 
3. [1915] AC 318. 
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Lord Parker who stated : "There is no equitable principle by virtue 
of which land can be taken away from the true owner under colour 
of specific performance of a contract to which he was not a party 
and which he did not authorise to be made on his behalf. The action 
should have been dismissed with costs so far as the supposed true 
4 
owner was concerned." 
However it is easy to see the inconvenience that such an approach 
can cause. For instance, where a vendor has contracted to sell 
land twice over, neither purchaser may be made a party to a suit 
for specific performance of the other's contract~ yet questions 
of priority will inevitably arise which can only be successfully 
litigated in concurrent proceedings. If a judge knows that an 
order for specific performance of one of the two contracts has 
already been awarded, a judge will be bound to refuse a decree with 
5 
regard to the second. 
4. Supra n.3 @ 323. Also see Hood v Cullen (1885)6 NSWLR 22~ 
Thomson v Richardson (1928) 29SR (NSW) 221 
5. It is no solution to say that the suits should be 
concurrently heard, as either party or the court may 
not agreed to this ASA Construction Pty Ltd v Iwanou 
[1975] 1 NSWLR 512. 
Also see: Casey v Irish Intercontinental Bank Ltd [1979] 
1 IR 364 @ 371 
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There are two general classes of instance involving third parties 
and the decree of specific performance. First, there are the cases 
where the third party has a separate contract with the defendant. 
In these situations specific performance has been refused where if 
the agreement was to be performed in specie there would take place 
a breach of an agreement entered into previously between the 
6 defendant and a third person. 
There are two classes of case under this head. In the first place, 
the prior contract may be one which has given rise to an equitable 
interest in land or to other rights which are apt to be protected 
by injunction or specific performance or any other such equitable 
relief. The second instance occurs where there is a prior agreement 
with a third person which is valid at law, but which is such that 
its obligations will not be enforced in equity. Here whether a later 
inconsistent agreement which is otherwise specifically enforceable 
6. Manchester Ship Canal Co v Manchester Race Course Co 
[1901] 2 Ch 37; Weatherall v Geering (1806) 12 Ves 504; 
Wilmot v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96; Sefton v Tophams [ 1965 
Ch 1140 Contrast Hogan v Regional Centres pty Ltd 
(1963) 81 WN (NSW) 59. 
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should or should not be enforced probably depends largely on more 
general considerations, such as questions of hardship7 and fairness 8 
to the defendant or the third party. 
Special consideration as to the possibility that specific performance 
will involve a breach of contract with a third person will, on 
grounds of policy, often convince a court against making an order 
9 
which will have such an effect, unless there are found opposing 
circumstances which justify the grant of relief~O 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Watts v Spence [1976] Ch 165: Cedar Holdings Ltd v 
Green [1981] Ch 129 Williams & Glyns Bank v 
Boland [1981] AL 487; Hutchinson v Payne [1975] 
VR 175. 
Thomas v Dering (1837) lKeen 729; McKewan v Sanderson 
(1875) LR20 Eq65 ; ~yrne v Acton (1721) 1 Bro Par 1 Cas 186 
Briggs v Parsole [1937] 3 A 11 ER 831 
Willmot v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96 
Delves v Gray [1902] 2 Ch 606. 
Warmington v Miller [1933] QB 877. 
For example; if it appears that the 
contract with the third person will not be performed. 
THE UBRARY 
UN!VERS!lY OF CANTER BUR', 
CHRISTCHURCH, N.Z. 
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The second general class of case concerns third parties who have 
no contractual relationship to the defendant or plaintiff. An 
example of such class is in contracts for the sale of land where 
a purchaser has sought specific performance against a vendor who 
is unable to give a good title without the consent of some third 
person, or where he has contracted to give possession and some 
third party is in possession. McGarry. J recently summarised the 
11 position as relates to third parties in this area in wroth v Tyler. 
In that case the learned Judge refused to decree specific 
performance which would compel the defendant to take legal 
proceedings against his wife, who had, after the contract and 
without his knowledge, registered rights of occupation under the 
11. [1973] 1 A 11 ER 897. 
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" 1967' h h 'II I' , 12 Matr1mon1al Home Act , and w1th w om e was st1 1v1ng. 
The prevalent difficulty underlying this area is the usual privity 
rule, which states that third party cannot enforce a contract 
himself. A gloss on this principle is whether a plaintiff may 
obtain specific performance on behalf of a third party. 
12. Supra n. 11 per McGarry~ J @ 913. 
" A vendor must do his best to obtain any 
necessary consent to the sale; if he has 
sold with vacant possession he must, if 
necessary, take proceedings to obtain 
possession from any person in possession 
who has no right to be there or whose 
right is determinable by the vendor, at 
all events if the vendor's right to possession 
is reasonably clear; but I do not think that 
the vendor will usually be required to embark 
on difficult or uncertain litigation in order 
to secure any requisite consent or obtain 
vacant possession. Where the outcome of any 
litigation depends on disputed facts, difficult 
questions of law or the exercise of a discretionary 
jurisdiction, then I think the court would be slow 
to make a decree of specific performance against the 
vendor which would require him to undertake litigation. " 
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Prior to the enactment of the Contracts Privity Act 1982 the 
. . 1 'h' h . k . k13 pr1nc1pa case 1n t 1S sp ere was BeSW1C v BeSW1C • In 
that case one Peter Beswick made an arrangement with his nephew 
under which a family business was transferred to the nephew, and 
the nephew promised to employ Peter as a consultant for a weekly 
wage, and after his death to pay to Peter's widow 5 per week for 
her life. Payments were made to Beswick Senior during his life, 
but soon after his death ceased to be paid to his widow. The 
widow took out letters of administration of Peter's estate and 
sued both as administratrix and in her own right under the 
contract. The House of Lords held that she was entitled as 
administratrix to specific performance of the promise to make the 
weekly payments. However, she was unable to sue in her own right 
because of the rule of privity. 
. h ... 14 Desp1te t e cr1t1c1sm which has been directed at the reasoning 
used in Beswick the House of Lords should be applauded for taking 
a broad equitable view, a view in line with the overall liberalising 
trend within the equitable jurisdiction the last few years. In 
Beswick there was an unconscionable breach of faith and the 
equitable remedy sought was apt. with regard to the extending of 
this equitable principle Lords Pearce and Upjohn15 in Beswick both 
approved the dictum of windyer. J in Coulls v Bagots Executor and 
Trustee Co Ltd16 in which he stated 
13. [1968] AC 58. 
14. Hanbury. "Modern Equity" lOth Ed @ 63. 
15. Ibid @ 102. 
16. (1967) 119 CLR 460. 
- 103 -
.. It seems to me that contracts to pay money or transfer property 
to third persons are always, or at all events very often, contracts 
for breach of which damages would be an inadequate remedy - all 
the more so if it be right (I do not think it is) that damages 
recovered by the promisee are nominal ... I see no reason why 
specific performance should not be had in such cases .•• but of 
course not where the promisee was to render some personal services. 
There is no reason today for limiting by particular categories, 
rather than by general principle, the cases in which orders for 
specific performance will be made." 
The decision in Beswick v Beswick has since been applied in Gurtner 
, ,17 . l' f h l'f' d v C1rcu1t a case 1nvo v1ng one 0 t e most pro 1 1C mo ern 
exponents of equitable principles, who oddly enough is not a 
Chancery Judge, that being Lord Denning. The above stated case 
concerned the Motor Insurers' Bureau's contract with the Minister 
of Transport. By virtue of this contract, if an injured person's 
judgment against a motorist is not satisfied within seven days, the 
Bureau will pay the injured person. While the injured person 
cannot sue, the Minister can obtain specific performance in his 
favour. The Court of Appeal was unanimous in the view that if 
the Minister obtained specific performance, the injured person 
could enforce the order for specific performance for his own benefit. 
Lord Denning M.R. went so far as to say that if the Minister of 
Transport should hesitate to sue, he thought that it may be open 
to the plaintiff (i.e. the injured person) to make him a defendant 
and thus compel performance. The majority view, however, was that 
the Minister was the only person entitled to bring an action. 
17. [1968] 2 QB 587 
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It is noted that one of the exception~8to the privity rule is that 
the promisee can sue on behalf of the beneficiary. However the 
overriding cannon is that the promisee cannot recover damages on 
behalf of the beneficiary. Lord Denning attempted to reverse this 
'k ' I'd 19 rule 1n Jac son v Hor1zon Ho 1 ays , but the House of Lords has 
since in Woodar v wimpey20 restored the earlier law. However since 
damages cannot be an adequate remedy, it may be that much easier 
for the promisee to obtain specific performance of the promise to 
, h b f" 21 benef1t t e ene 1c1ary. Therefore prior to the Contracts Privity 
Act 1982 a promisee wanting to assist a beneficiary could do so by 
obtaining specific performance against the promisor. 
18. Exceptions to the rule being inter alia 
(a) Express or Implied Trust Re S Chebsman [1944J Ch 83 
(b) Deeds and S. 7 Property Law Act 1952 Re Wilsons Settlements 
[1972J NZLR 13. 
(c) Agency and collateral contract NZ Shipping Co v Satterthwaite 
[1975J AC 154. 
19. [1975J 1 WLR 1468. 
20. [1980J 1 A 11 ER 571 
21 Beswick v Beswick [1969J AC 58 
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THE CONTRACTS PRIVITY ACT 1982 
Section 8 of the Contracts Privity Act 1982 states as follows 
" The obligation imposed on a promisor by section 4 of this 
Act may be enforced at the suit of the beneficiary as if he 
were a party to the deed or contract, and relief in respect 
of the promise, including relief by way of damages, specific 
performance, or injunction, shall not be refused on the ground 
that the beneficiary is not a party to the deed or contract in 
which the promise is contained or that, as against the promisor, 
the beneficiary is a volunteer. " 
Hence a beneficiary need no longer rely on the intervention of the 
promisee in order to force specific performance of the contract 
conferring the benefit. 
The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee wanted to enable 
the beneficiary himself to enforce the contract made for his benefit 
unless the parties had intended otherwise. 
Section 4 of the Act is the section which provides that promises for 
the benefit of a third person can be enforced by that person. It 
ends with the proviso that the section shall not apply to a promise 
which, on the proper construction of the contract, is not intended 
to create, in respect of a benefit, an obligation enforceable at 
the suit of the beneficiary. Accordingly, if the parties wish to 
escape the application of the Act, all they have to do is to declare 
in their contract, in a manner clear enough to be proof against 
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interpretation contra proferentum, their intention that the third 
party beneficiary be not entitled to sue. 
It is submitted that, initially, the Contracts Privity Act has 
molified the law relating to the rights of third parties. Hence the 
legislature has expressly directed the courts attention to third 
parties. Therefore it is ventured that the interests of third 
parties, whether this involves the breach of contract, hardship or 
fairness or other related discretionary defences with regard to 
third parties, will be examined more closely and will tender 
themselves more readily to defeating an application for a decree. 
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D ILLEGALITY AND PERFORMANCE 
There is in my view a further principle of equity that 
even though a transaction be tainted with illegality 
on the ground that its performance is contrary to public 
policy, equity will interfere if on the same grounds of 
public policy the transaction ought not to be allowed to 
stand. » 
Per Jacobs J Money v Money [1966] 1 NSWLR 348 @ 351 
A court will not interfere directly to enforce an illegal contract 
1 by granting specific performance. On the face of it illegality 
will invalidate the contract as a whole and hence there will be 
nothing to enforce. 
1. Briggs v Parsloe (1937] 3 AllER 831. 
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Such illegality is normally an absolute bar to specific relief, 
as is shown by numerous authorities~ 
2. Trimble v Brisbane Municipal Council (1894) B.C. (Nes). Q.Sup C.; 
O'Carroll v Potter (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 393 ; 
Roseville Extended Ltd v Lucas (1926) 26 SR NSW 402 
Shannon v Crowe (1922) 6 LGR 91 ; 
Gasiunas v Meinhold (1964) 6 FLR 182 
Benbow v Leonard [1975J 1 NSWLR 122 ; 
Walsh v Alexander (1913) 16 CLR 293 
Robertson v Admans (1922) 31 CLR 250 
Egan v Ross (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 382; 
~ang v Castle [1924] 5 ASR 255; 
Norton v Angus (1926) 38 CLR 523; 
Paterson v Murray (1897) 15 NZLR 487; 
Gilmer v Crawford (1906) 26 NZLR 657; 
Williams v Harley (1899) 18 NZLR 174; 
Caldwell v Kirby [1948J GLR 335i 
Nicholls v Nicholson [1944] GLR 252; 
Exton v Grenville [1952J NZLR 484. 
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Where a statutory provision brings to an end a contract, obviously, 
specific performance a fortiori will not be possible. There are 
however situations where an action at law for damages will succeed, 
but a decree will be denied in equity in view of a possible subsequent 
illegality. If a court of equity deems it necessary to take this 
course of action it is submitted that it will be based upon grounds 
of hardship and policy. This position was considered in Pottinger v 
3 George where a contract for the sale of land was sought to be 
specifically performed. The vendors failed to complete on the due 
date and further, the existing use of the land did not conform with 
the Town Plan of the City of Brisbane, as consent to the existing 
use had not been obtained. The High Court of Australia considered 
that given the circumstances the initial question was whether it could 
be proved that the use to which the land was being put when the 
contract was executed was unlawful. This matter would be decided 
according to whether an appropriate consent had been given at the 
time. The purchasers did not p~rport to rescind the contract on this 
ground but raised it, by way of defence to a claim for specific 
4 performance. It was acknowledged by the court that it would not 
be proper to decree specific performance if the result would be to 
expose the purchasers to risk of prosecution. After balancing the 
counterveiling factors the court held that the contract should be 
specifically performed, the risk of subsequent illegality being offset 
5 by other factors. 
3. (1967) 116 CLR 328. 
4. Supra n. 3 @ 337. 
5. Supra n. 3 @ 338-9. 
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If the contract remains enforceable, a further discretionary equitable 
consideration comes into play - that being that a plaintiff seeking 
enforcement of a contract must come to equity with "clean hands". 
There are instances where even though the plaintiff has caused the 
illegality, he will be able to avoid the defence of clean hands as 
set up by the defendant by showing that the illegality is not causative 
with relation to the performance of the contract. That is the 
illegality in question cannot be said to be "directly resulting from 
the crime"? Such a result can be obtained by severing an illegal 
part of a transaction from the untainted components. Moreover pleading 
may be framed in such a way that the cause of action does not depend 
on the illegality in question. 
At first blush it was felt that such principles were not in keeping 
with the true canons of equitable relief. However after examining 
7 Thomas Brown and Sons Ltd v Fazal Deen the principles applied 
do now not seem so "inequitable~ In that case a plaintiff deposited 
gold and gems in a safe with H. The National Security Regulations 
in force at the time required every person having gold in his 
possession or control to deliver it to the Commonwealth Bank within 
one month after it had come into his possession. The gold was not 
delivered up. The plaintiff demanded return of his gold and gems. 
6. Ewing v Osbaldiston (1837) 2 My & Cr 53. 
7. (1962) 108 CLR 391. 
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The plaintiff claimed the return of the chattels or their value and 
damages for breach of the contract of bailment. It was held that the 
performance of the contract of bailment was illegal. The terms of 
the bailment relating to the gold, however, were severable from those 
relating to the gems in the safe, which did not contravene the statute 
and were not illegal~ 
Further, certain collateral transactions may be specifically enforced, 
even though they concern an original transaction tainted with illegality. 
For example, a beneficiary can enforce performance of a trust against 
the trustee, even though the transaction in respect of which the money 
or property was transferred to the trustee was unlawful and could not 
have been enforced by the beneficiary against the person who so 
9 transferred to the trustee. 
B. Also Bank of Australasia v Breillat (lB47) 6 Moo PC 152; 
9. Powell v Knowler (1741) 2 Atk 224; 
Thomson v Thomson (lB02) 7 Ves 470; 
Tenant v Elliot (1797) 1 Bos & P 3; 
Farmer v Russell (179B) 1 Bos & P 296; 
McCallan v Mortimer (lB42) 9 M&W 636, Ex Ch. 
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In summary, in the absence of any statutory intention to the 
contrary, an illegality in performance that has taken place which 
does not cause the material contract to be void or unenforceable 
at law should not necessarily prevent the granting of specific 
performance, although such circumstances as the fact of a deliberate 
and conscious commission of an illegality should be regarded as 
relevant to the exercise by the court of its discretion~O 
10. Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed 137 
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THE ILLEGAL CONTRACTS ACT 1970 
For many years there had been dissatisfactionll of the law with 
regard to illegality. 
11. In st John Shipping Corporation v Joseph Rank Ltd (1957] 
1 QB 267 @ 289 Devlin J. said: 
"Commercial men who have unwittingly offended against one 
of a multiplicity of regulations may nevertheless feel that 
they have not thereby forfeited all right to justice, and 
may go elsewhere for it if courts of law will not give it 
to them. In the last resort they will, if necessary, set 
up their own machinery for dealing with their own disputes 
in the way that those whom the law puts beyond the pale, 
such as gamblers, have done. " 
McCarthy J. in Carey v Hastie (1968) NZLR 274 @ 282 remarked: 
" There are few areas in the law of contract which cause 
more trouble than that of illegality, and it may be, as 
some writers urge, that the time has come when the Legislature 
might look carefully at this subject and consider doing 
something to remove the over-severe consequences which 
sometimes flow from a breach of one of the less important 
of the very large number of regulations which a managed 
welfare State seems to require. But until that is done, 
we have to apply the law as it is. " 
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In October 1969 the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee 
presented a draft bill which was eventually to become The Illegal 
Contracts Act 1970. The principal reasons advanced by the commission 
for the legislation were : (1) the harshness of the consequences 
that follow from the classification of the contract as illegal 
(2) the operation of the doctrine under which in some cases the 
courts could sever the offending portion of a contract and enforce 
the remainder as a valid contract (3) the difficulty of 
categorisation of contracts which were in breach of common law 
or legislative provisions. While some contracts were seen to fall 
within an express prohibition directed against their formation, 
in which case neither party could enforce the contract or acquire 
rights under it, others might be enforceable by one or both parties 
despite the fact that the performance of the contract was in breach 
of a prohibition. The effect of the Act was not to attempt to 
define "illegal contract". 
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sections 312and 513 combined provided that a contract is illegal 
if it is so classified by the existing law, whether the illegality 
arises from the creation or the performance of the contract, but 
a contract lawfully entered into does not become illegal by reason 
of its performance being in breach of an enactment unless that 
enactment expressly so provides or its object clearly so requires. 
12. 
13. 
"Illegal contract" defined -"Subject to section 5 of this 
Act, for the purposes of this Act the term "illegal 
contract" means any contract that is illegal at law or 
in equity, whether the illegality arises from the creation 
or performance of the contract; and includes a contract 
which contains an illegal provision, whether that provision 
is severable or not." 
Breach of enactment -"A contract lawfully entered into 
shall not become illegal or unenforceable by any party 
by reason of the fact that its performance is in breach 
of any enactment, unless the enactment expressly so 
provides or its object clearly so requires:' 
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The result is that the former categories of contracts illegal as 
contrary to public policy are preserved, but contracts which were 
void on that account are not within the definition. Such 
distinction between contracts which are void or unenforceable 
and those which are illegal, was expressly affirmed by the Court 
14 
of Appeal in Harding v Coburn and it has since received 
1 1 " " 15 genera app lcatlon. 
In both Sections 3 and 6 of the Act the phrase "at law or in 
equity" is used. This, it is submitted, demonstrates the intention 
of the legislature that equitable rules with regard to illegality 
will also be subject to the Act. Unlike the Contractual Remedies 
Act and the Contractual Mistakes Act there is no specific mention 
of how equitable rules and remedies are to interact with the 
Illegal Contracts Act. Moreover, there is no express direction 
as to equitable notions in Section 11 of the Act, the "Savings Section". 
14. [1976] 2 NZLR 577. 
15. v Henderson [1977] 2 NZLR 458. P.c. 
Barsdell v Kerr [1979] 2 NZLR 731. 
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There is no doubt as to the important consequences that the Act 
has upon the remedy of specific performance, particularly given that 
the Act contains, in vogue with the other contractually codifying 
statutes, a wide relief section allowing a court to exercise a 
controlled discretion with regard to the validation and enforcement 
of illegal contracts. 
Section 7 provides inter alia that any party to a contract who is 
disqualified from enforcing it by reason of an illegal act may 
obtain such relief by way of restitution, compensation variation 
of the contract, validation of the contract in whole or part 
or otherwise howsoever as the court in its discretion thinks just. 16 
The section plainly refers to any party enforcing a contract. It 
is submitted these words underline the fact that specific performance 
of contracts is encaptured squarely by the Act. The question 
therefore is, as the Illegal Contracts Act now determines whether an 
illegal contract should be enforced or not, rather than the pre-existing 
equitable rules, how does the position under the Act differ? 
In considering whether to grant relief under Section 7 the court is 
directed to have regard to"(a) the conduct of the parties: and (b) 
in the case of a breach of an enactment, the object of the enactment 
and the gravity of the penalty expressly provided for any breach 
thereof and (c) such other matters as it thinks proper; but shall 
not grant relief if it considers that to do so would not be in the 
public interest."17 
16. Illegal Contracts Act 1970 5.7 (1) (b), 5.7 (1) (c) . 
17. Illegal Contracts Act 1970 5.7 (3) (a) (b) (c) • 
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Moreover Subsection 6 of Section 7 provides " Any order made under 
subsection (1) of this section, or any provision of any such order, 
may be made upon and subject to such terms and conditions as the 
Court thinks fit." Given that normally statutes are seen as inflexible 
instruments to be mollified by the courts it is respectfully submitted 
that as between the Illegal Contracts Act and the law there is a 
reversal of this position. It is ventured that the statute provides 
a wider discretion to grant relief by way of performance than the 
pre-existing equitable rules allowed. A court is not restricted 
by the underlying equitable maxims, and under the act it is released 
to vary the contract if it so desires. It is interesting to note 
the phrases "thinks fit,,18 and "thinks proper,,~9 The legislature 
did not use the phrase "thinks just" or "what is just and reasonable". 
Possibly an indication that justice and fairness are not foremost 
in the rationale behind the section. 
In summary a contract that is illegal within the broad criteria of 
the Act will not be enforceable by decree unless the court desires 
to make it so under Section 7. 
That a court has a wide discretion is in keeping with equitable 
principles. While "conscience" may not be foremost in the mind of 
a court as opposed to the sanctity of a contract, it is submitted 
that the power to validate and enforce an illegal contract will 
often prevent a great injustice and deny a party the opportunity of 
18. Section 7 (6) 
19. Section 7 (3) (b) 
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sheltering behind an Act of Parliament in order to avoid his 
obligations - both contractual and moral. For example in 
20 Hurrell v Townend a contract for the sale and purchase of two 
blocks of farm land was executed. The purchaser was unwilling 
or unable to complete, he was unable to find the purchase moneys. 
The purchaser's solicitors seized upon the fact that the Land 
Settlement Promotion and Land Acquisition Act 1952 had not been 
complied with. That is, the requisite land less declaration had 
not been filed at the Land Transfer Office. The Court of Appeal 
held that the contract was unlawful and of no effect. So at this 
juncture the purchaser had achieved his objective of escaping 
from his bargain. However, the court validated the contract 
21 
under Section 7 of the Act. 
Specific performance and the Illegal Contracts Act 1970 were also 
averted to by the Court of Appeal in the recent case of McLachlan 
22 
v Taylor. As will be 23 noted the purchaser, as in Hurrell v 
Townsend relied on a breach of the Land Settlement Promotion Act 
to avoid performance of a contract on the ground of illegality. 
20. [1982] 1 NZLR 536. 
21. In reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeal reasoned 
that in purchasing the farms the purchaser would not be 
defeating the object of the Land Promotion Act - that 
being the aggregation of land. 
22. Unreported C.A. 59/84. 
23. Page 131 "Election" • 
--------- ----------------------------
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The Court's task was simplified by the fact that the Local Land 
Tribunal had approved the transaction by the time the Appeal Court 
considered the above. Therefore there was no risk that the objects 
of the Land Settlement Promotion Act would be defeated. Delivering 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal Cooke J. validated the contract 
under the Illegal Contracts Act, varied the completion dates in the 
contract, and ordered the contract to be specifically performed. 
A potential problem is highlighted by the above two Court of Appeal 
cases, that being, if it cannot be established categorically that 
validation of the contract will not frustrate the purposes of the 
particular act, then the person seeking to rely on the breach, 
whether he was responsible for it or not, will be able to avoid 
the contract. That is a highly inequitable situation, for a 
person is relying on his own "questionable conduct". However it 
is submitted that the simple way around this position is for the 
court to validate the contract conditional upon the Local Land 
Settlement Board consenting to the transaction:4 
24. Such a course has yet to be adopted by a court 
in a reported decision. 
~~~-~~~-~~------------------
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In summary a court may grant specific performance of a contract 
which, although illegal when made, is subsequently validated by 
a court under the Illegal Contracts Act. Moreover, a court may 
be able to sever the illegal term from the legal terms of the 
contract, which is otherwise enforceable. To facilitate the same, 
the Illegal Contracts Act was enacted and this is in accord with 
the other statutory products of the Contracts and Commercial Law 
Reform Committee which have yielded discretions to be exercised 
on principles of fairness and hence based on the conscience of the 
person exercising them. 
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E ELECTION AND INCONSISTENT COURSES OF ACTION 
Difficulties arise when a plaintiff first commences an action for 
damages at law, and subsequently sues for specific performance. 
If the prior proceedings for damages were directed merely at an 
inessential breach, or to an essential breach which the plaintiff 
has elected to treat as inessential by waiving his right to cancel, 
the agreement is still in tact and the plaintiff may proceed to 
obtain his decree. Therefore if the proceedings for damages involve 
an election to treat the agreement as at an end, the subsequent 
action for specific performance will fail, since there is no 
contract in existence~ Moreover, if the initial action for 
damages was misconceived, this may in some circumstances, be 
found to involve a repudiation on the part of the plaintiff, 
giving the defendant in turn a right to cancel. If this is the 
position then specific performance is impossible, as once again 
2 there is no contract on foot. 
The position as regards the intermingling of causes of action is 
admirably broken down by Lord Wilberforce in Johnson v Agnew. 
First, his Lordship states "in a contract for the sale of land, 
after time has been made or become of the essence of the contract, 
if the purchaser fails to complete, the vendor can either treat 
the purchaser as having repudiated the contract, accept the 
repudiation, and proceed to claim damages for breach of the contract, 
1. Fullers Theatres v Musgrove (1923) 31 CLR 524. 
2. Fennings v Humphrey (1841) 4 Beau. 1 
Johnson v Agnew [1980J AC 367 
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both parties being discharged from further performance of the 
3 
contract" • As an alternative to this first course of action the 
plaintiff "may seek from the court an order for specific performance 
4 
with damages for any loss arising from delay in performance". 
"Secondly, the vendor may proceed by action for the above 
remedies in the alternative i at the trial he will however have 
to elect which he is pursuing. Thirdly, if the vendor treats the 
purchaser as having repudiated the contract and accepts the 
5 
repudiation, he cannot thereafter seek specific performance". 
Therefore in short,unless there can be established an effectual 
election to cancel by one of the parties the mere bringing of an 
inconsistent action for damages will not provide a necessary bar 
to subsequent proceedings for specific performance, although it 
may be taken into account by a court in exercising its discretion. 
It has been said, for example, that the institution of proceedings, 
even where it has no other effect "is still an important element 
6 in the court's exercise of its discretion on the ground of laches". 
3. Johnson v Agnew (Supra n.2) per Lord Wilberforce @392 • 
4. Ibid @ 392 
5. Ibid @ 392 
6. Fullers Theatres Ltd v Musgrove (1923) 31 CLR 524 
But on principle a plaintiff can only fail on these grounds 
only if (i) he or the defendant has brought an end to the 
contract at law or (ii) the conduct of the parties gives 
rise to laches or some other recognised discretionary 
consideration which renders the grant of relief unjust. 
See : Du Sautoy v Symes [1967] Ch 1146. 
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The overriding principle in this area is that if damages have been 
awarded any grant of specific relief will be limited so that the 
plaintiff does not in truth obtain double relief. Hence even in 
the absence of an effective rescision by one of the parties, specific 
performance of a particular obligation is often refused in order 
that duplicate remedies are not allowed in satisfaction of what is 
"one and the same matter". In some cases these principles may be 
relied upon by a plaintiff so as to enable specific performance of 
7 part only of a contract to be obtained and damages as to part. 
The area of controversy arises when an order for specific performance 
has been made and is not complied with by the defendant. Recent 
authority states that such non-compliance (in as much as it amounts 
also to a serious breach of contract) constitutes a fresh ground 
for discharge and damages including damages for loss of bargain~ 
This proposition has not always received such support. Far from it. 
9 Jessel M.R. laid down in Henty v Schroder that a vendor could not 
at the same time obtain an order to have the agreement rescinded and 
claim damages against the defendant for breach of the agreement. 
7. Fullers Theatres v Supra n. 6 
8. Stevter Holdings Ltd v Katra Construction pty Ltd [ 1975 ] 
1 NSWLR 459, 468 
- 9 per Helsham J i 
Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 @ 394 per Lord Wilberforce 
9. (1879) 12 Ch D 666 @ 667 
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Henty v Schroder became the beginning of a well trodden path of 
authority.lO However after noting an ever increasing amount of 
d . 11 . . h' 12 f d adverse aca emlC and judlclal aut orlty the House 0 Lor s 
in Johnson v Agnew firmly ended the idea that damages were not 
recoverable if there was repudiation after a decree by the plaintiff. 
In short, the House of Lords has reconsidered the right of an 
innocent party to a contract for the sale of land to damages on 
the contract being put an end to by accepted repudiation. In 
departing from previous authority their Lordships dispensed with 
a second basis for the denial of damages. This, now redundant 
argument, proposes that by seeking the remedy of specific performance 
the plaintiff has made an election which either is irrevocable or 
which becomes so when the order for specific performance is made. 13 
Lord Wilberforce14 dispenses with this argument by first noting that 
election is a doctrine based on common sense and equity. His Lordship 
continued "A vendor who seeks (and gets) specific performance 
is merely electing a course which mayor may not lead to implementation 
of the contract ; what he elects is not eternal and unconditional 
affirmation, but a continuance of the contract under the control of 
the court, which control involves the power, in certain events, to 
terminate it." 
10. Hutchings v Humphreys (1885) 54 L J Ch 650; Jackson v De Kadich 
[1904] WN 168 ; Barber v Wolfe [1945] Ch 187 ; 
HorsIer v Zorro [1975] Ch 302; and Suburban 
Properties v Swycher [1976] Ch 319 
11. Voumard "Sale of Land in Victoria" @ 499 - 508. 
12. McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457; 
Holland v Wiltshire (1954) 90 CLR 409. 
13. Capital and Suburban properties v Swycher [1976] Ch 319 
such case underlies the estopple argument. 
14. Supra @ 393. 
- 126 -
A further difficulty arises where specific performance and common law 
damages are claimed in the one action. Where in a court of legal 
and equitable jurisdiction a plaintiff seeks specific relief, may he 
recover damages at law. This is another way of expressing the 
difficUltyl~ The view of the courts is that the plaintiff should 
16 have made an express claim for damages, which will ordinarily be 
17 defined as embracing both legal and equitable damages • In New 
Zealand, and it is assumed in England, it is sufficient for the 
purposes of clarity that a plaintiff has included a general claim 
for damages in his prayer for relief. Moreover, a prayer for 
"such further or other relief as this honourable court sees fit" 
is wide enough to encompass the expression of damages required it is 
submitted. 
15. The difficulty arises from the fact that courts 
of equity do not entertain applications for specific 
performance if legal remedies are regarded as adequate; 
See generally Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 58ff. 
16. This is unnecessary in the case of Lord Cairn's Act 
damages. See: Leeds Industrial Co-op Society v Slack 
[1924] A C 851. 
17. McKenna v Richey [1950] VLR 360. 
Johnson v Agnew [1980] A C 367 
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There is a line of casesl proclaiming once proceedings have been 
commenced for specific performance the parties' rights under the 
contract are held in limbo. Therefore an innocent party cannot 
rely on a breach made after proceedings have been filed: In essence 
the contract can no longer be discharged by either party accepting 
the other's repudiation. As a consequence, according to this 
doctrine, if a party not in breach seeks specific performance of 
a contract, and pending the hearing of proceedings the other party 
commits a flagrant repudiation of the contract, the plaintiff is 
unable to exercise his common law right of saying "I put an end to 
this contract". Therefore all legal and contractual rights, it 
would appear, vanish once proceedings are filed~ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Horsler v Zorro [1975] Ch 302; 
Sudagar Singh v Nazeer [1978] 3 A 11 ER 817; 
Capital & Suburban Properties Ltd v Swycher [1976]Ch 319; 
Johnson v Agnew [1978] Ch 176 C.A.; 
Buckland v Farme & Moody [1978] 3 AllER 929. 
This applies even before a decree is granted. 
The same would appear to be true once the court 
has ordered a decree for specific performance. 
- 128 -
The underlying propositions for such remedy would appear to be 
(a) that there can be no such thing as discharge of a contract by 
acceptance of repudiation, which is effective from the date of that 
acceptance, as distinct from rescission ab initio and (b) that by 
commencing proceedings a plaintiff elects to abandon for all time 
his common law rights in respect not only of past breaches but also 
of future breaches. 
As to the first ground, this was rejected soundly by the House of 
4 Lords in Johnson v Agnew. The second ground was also conclusively 
laid to rest in that same case. However there are still two problems 
outstanding. The House of Lords stated the position in England as 
being that a contract of which specific performance is sought can 
be repudiated notwithstanding that the decree has been made or that 
proceedings have been commenced - but only with the court's leave. 
In Australia leave is unnecessary before a decree is made, but once 
5 
an order is sealed leave of the court is necessary. The basis on 
which Lord Wilberforce put the English position in Johnson v Agnew 
is as follows : 
4. [1980] AC 827; Also see McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd 
(1933) 48 CLR 457; Albery (1975) 91 LQR 337; 
Gummow (1976) 92 LQR 5. 
5. Ogle v Comboyuro Investments Pty Ltd (1976) 136 CLR 444; 
Facey v Rawsthorne (1925) 35 CLR 566; 
Stevter Holdings Ltd v Katra Construction Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 459; 
Buckman v Rose (12 November 1980, unreported) 
JAG Investments v Strati [1981] 2 NSWLR 600 
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" Once the matter has been placed in the hands of a court of equity, 
or one exercising equity jurisdiction, the subsequent control of the 
matter will be exercised according to equitable principles. The Court 
would not make an order dissolving the decree of specific performance 
and terminating the contract (with recovery of damages) if to do so 
would be unjust " Sa 
Therefore an innocent party needs some assistance from the court, 
6 
either to set aside the decree and the contract or to give him 
leave to accept the repudiation as discharging him from future 
Obligations7 or to set aside the decree in order to render effective 
the discharge of the contractS, 
Sa. Supra @ 399. 
6. Johnson v Agnew supra per Lord Wilberforce @ 394 
" •.• the vendor ••. may apply to the court to dissolve 
the order and ask the court to put an end to the contract". 
7, Johnson v Agnew [197S] Ch 176 (C.A.) per Buckley L.J @ 190-1; 
Goff L.J. @ 196 " the vendor has not, neither has 
the court, any power to rescind the contract, and the 
true principle is that, notwithstanding, its previous 
order the court allows the vendor to accept the repudiation, 
which he had formerly declined to do " 
8. Stever Holdings Ltd v Katra Construction Pty Ltd Supra 
Austins of East Ham Ltd v Macey [J941] Ch 338. 
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There is no support in principle for an equitable discretionary power 
as is required by the above propositions. Where it is accepted this 
is done as a reluctant concession to established authority. For 
example the Australian High Court in Ogle v Comboyuro Investments 
pty Ltd9 which, while not required to decide the status of a 
purported discharge after decree, decided in a case where a decree 
had been sought and not obtained, but the proceedings were still 
on foot, that the only difficulty lay in the risk of double recovery 
and that risk was eliminated because on the award of damages the 
plaintiff would be precluded from seeking relief in specific 
10 performance • 
Moreover, equitable remedial powers can only be invoked where the 
common law remedy is inadequatel ; hence given the efficacy of the 
contractual process of discharge for breach, there is no room for an 
equitable judicial power to discharge the contract12 • 
9. (1976) 136 CLR 444 
10. Supra n. 9 per Barwick C J @ pp 452-3; 
Gibbs, Mason & Jacobs JJ @ pp 460-1. 
11. Adderley v Dixon (1824) 1 Sim & St 607; 
Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58. 
12. See generally Singh v Nazeer [1979] Ch 474 @ 480-1 
per McGarry V.C. 
Johnson v Agnew [1980] A C 367 @ 394 per Lord Wilberforce. 
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with regard to this entire aspect of specific performance the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal has very recently considered the position 
13 
as to the election of remedies in McLachlan v Taylor • In this 
case the vendors of a piece of land sought to enforce a $135,000 
contract with the purchaser. By oversight a clause making the 
transaction subject to the Land Settlement and Promotion Act 1952 
was not included in that contract. For various reasons the purchaser 
wished to extricate himself from the contract and he took the point 
that the contract was illegal under the 1952 Act. On appeal the 
purchaser argued that by their conduct the vendors elected to forego 
their rights to specific performance and should be limited to their 
remedy in damages. Such contention was based on two letters sent 
by the vendor's solicitors to the purchaser's solicitors. His 
Honour Mr Justice Cooke made it clear that any election requires 
an unequivocal choice between two inconsistent alternatives. The 
letters were found not to amount to an unequivocal election between 
damages and specific performance. The letters referred to a 
subsequent offer which the vendors said they were considering and 
would now follow up. However such negotiations did not result in 
an unconditional contract being formed and this, in Cooke. J's view, 
was the reason the choice was not unequivocal. His Honour summarised 
his view in this way : "A mere attempt by a vendor to mitigate his 
position by reselling, if it proves to be fruitless, does not, we 
think, relieve the purchaser from his ordinary contractual duty or 
14 deprive the vendor of his primary remedy of specific performance". 
13. Unreported Court of Appeal C A 59/84. 
14. Supra n.l3 @ 4. 
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The Court of Appeal validated the contract under the 
Contracts Act 1970 and ordered that it be "specifically 
performed according to its terms as validated"~5 
To conclude matters along with the area of equitable damages 
Johnson v Agnew has crystallised a hitherto complicated area 
with regard to specific performance. Further, the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal, while not expressly alluding to Johnson v 
has shown itself willing to act according to common 
sense and equitable principles as opposed to slavishly following 
an amalgam of precedent which has petrified over a number of 
years. 
15. Supra n. 13 @ 7. 
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F MUTUALITY 
Where equity will decree specific performance in favour of a purchaser 
or lessee, the remedy will be available also in favour of a vendor or 
lessor. A similar principle applies to deny specific performance, on 
grounds of lack of mutuality, where the situation is one in which that 
remedy could not be available to the other party. That is one party 
is not compelled to perform if he would himself be left with only a 
remedy in damages. For example, if by reason of personal incapacity 
or any other matter the defendant cannot obtain specific performance 
against the plaintiff, then the plaintiff will not be granted specific 
relief even though taking the defendant's obligation by itself, this 
1 
would be an appropriate remedy 
According to Kekewich J. it "is a technical doctrine, but like many 
technical doctrines, founded on common sense. It comes simply to this, 
that one party to a bargain shall not be held bound to that bargain 
2 
when he cannot enforce it against the other" . 
1. E.g. Flight v Bollard (1828) 4 Russ 298 per Leach MR : 
" No case of a bill filed by an infant for the specific 
performance of a contract made by him has been found 
in the books. It is not disputed that it is a general 
princ of courts of equity to interpose only where 
the remedy is mutual. II 
2. Wylson v Dunn (1887) 34 ChD 569 
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The description and definition of mutuality initially was first 
3 
attempted by Fry f ' h ,,4 h b Su f1ce to say t at this expos1t1on as een 
heavily criticised4a over the years, such criticism being constructive 
and enabling the following definition to be proffered - the defence 
of mutuality arises if the defendant in proceedings for specific 
performance is able to show that if he were ordered to perform 
specifically his contractual obligations he would not, in all the 
circumstances, be himself sufficiently protected, having regard to 
such unperformed obligations of the plaintiff as might not be 
5 
susceptible of subsequent specific enforcement. This definition 
is consistent with views expressed in a number of other authorities6 . 
3. "Specific Performance" 6th Ed p. 219. 
4. Supra n.3 @ 219 " A contract to be specifically 
enforced by the court must, as a general rule, be 
mutual - that is to say, such that it might, at 
the time it was entered into, have been enforced by 
either of the parties against the other of them. « 
4a. Ashburner. Principles of Equity 2nd Ed 404; 
Cook "The Present Status of the Lack of Mutuality Rule" 
(1927) 36 Yale LJ 897; 
Price v Strange [1978] Ch 337 ; Gummow Meagher & 
Lehane Equity Doctrines & Remedies 2nd Ed @ 2031-2032. 
5. Spry, "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 83. 
6. Williamson Ltd v Lukey & Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 @ 298; 
Kell v Harris (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 473. 
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The importance of the above statement is that it takes account 
of two things : (a) that "mutuality" is not a requirement that the 
defendant, if he, rather than the plaintiff, had started proceedings, 
could have obtained specific performance ; and (b) that the relevant 
date is the date when the decree is made. 
To reach the above crystallised position it was necessary to consider 
the various situations in which mutuality was seen as being a bar to 
relief, the reason for this being that the principles which apply 
to the defence of mutuality would appear to fluctuate given differing 
circumstances. 
The principal situation arises where a defendant infringes one or 
more of the discretionary defences7 and hence could not enforce 
the contract. Therefore if and when the plaintiff attempts to 
seek a decree he is taken to waive the benefit of the discretionary 
defences. Accordingly it will be no longer inequitable to enforce 
his own obligation in specie and so he will not be refused relief on 
the ground of lack of mutualityB. 
7. 
8. 
e.g. Clean Hands, Fairness, Hardship, Laches, Nondisclosure. 
HOQe v Hope (1857) 8 De GM&G 731. 
Note: A similar analysis is appropriate where the 
defendant has committed an essential breach. In this 
instance the plaintiff waives his objection to the 
breach by bringing proceedings for Specific Performance 
Sutherland v Briggs (1841) 1 Ha 26 @ 34. 
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A second situation concerns the position where a defendant might 
have brought an action for specific performance at some earlier 
time but this would have been refused on the ground that damages 
were an adequate remedy. However when comes the time for the 
plaintiff to seek enforcement, damages may not be an adequate remedy. 
The answer to this problem, in short, is that it does not follow 
that merely because the defendant could not formerly have proceeded 
for specific performance, because his remedies at law are adequate, 
the other party should not proceed himself as plaintiff if damages 
are not an adequate remedy to him. In such circumstances the 
defendant's rights will be sufficiently protected, since in 
undertaking the enforcement in specie of one party's contractual 
obligations a court may also enforce the other party's obligations. 
Three exceptions to the requirement of mutuality may be noted. 
9 First, McCarthy and stone Ltd v Julian s. Hodge Ltd is authority 
for the point that the holder of an option to purchase may be able 
to obtain specific performance even though the other party may have 
no such right against him. The rationale for such principle is that 
specific performance could not be obtained prior to the exercise 
of the option, after which there would be mutuality. 
Secondly, an exception arises in connection with the grant of 
specific performance with compensation. When a decree with 
compensation is granted the court, exceptionally, does more than 
simply enforce the agreement between the parties, it enforces an 
agreement somewhat different than that agreed upon, and compels the 
9. [1971] 2 AllER 973 @ 980. 
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acceptance of compensation which the parties never agreed to give 
or receive. Compensation in every case means compensation to the 
purchaser and not to the vendor. If it is impossible to estimate 
the amount of compensation, specific performance will be refused. 
Where the vendor cannot even convey to the purchaser substantially 
what he contracted to get the remedies are not mutual. In such 
case the vendor is not entitled to specific performance at all, 
but the purchaser can elect to take all the vendor is able to 
convey to him, and have a proportionate abatement of the purchase 
10 
money. The crux of the matter is that if the vendor had earlier 
brought proceedings for enforcement, he would not have been able 
to obtain a decree because of the absence of subject matter of 
the contract. 
A third exception arises when a plaintiff seeks specific performance 
of a contract required by statute to be evidenced in writing by a 
person sued upon it. A plaintiff may obtain specific relief even 
though, not having signed any document, it would be impossible for 
specific performance to be ordered against himl: The defendant 
could not himself have brought an action and it is argued that 
there is no mutuality in these circumstancesl~ The explanation 
10. Westmacott v Robins (1862) 4 DeGR&J 390; 
Cato v Thompson (1882). 9 QBD 616. 
11. seton v Slade (1802) 7 Ves 265 i 
Morgan v Holford (1852) 1 SM&G 107. 
12. Western v Russell (1814) 3 V & B 187; 
Boys v Ayerst (1822) 6 Madd 316 ; 
Butler v Powis (1845) 2 Coll 156 
Ronald v Lalour (1872) 3 VR (E) 98 
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for the above is that the terms of the statute have been satisfied 
and that the plaintiff will be treated in equity as having waived 
his right to object to the lack of a memorandum signed by him if 
at a later stage of the proceedings a question arises of the 
enforcement in turn of his own obligations. 
The area of mutuality with regard to specific performance in the 
13 last decade has only been averted to in one major reported case 
It is submitted that while a number of cases had sought to and 
succeeded in eroding the unduly rigorous exposition of mutuality 
14 propounded by Fry, Price v Strange has finally elasticised the 
principle in line with the overall trend evidenced in equity i 
that being away from precedent, and the gloss it has created, and 
towards particular circumstances and a return to conscience. The 
15 
above case is worth considering, as while the appellate Court 
recognised that mutuality was not required at the time of execution 
of the contract, however the judge at first instance16 was of the 
opposite opinion. Clearly the Court of Appeal had to clarify this 
area in this particular case and also in the area in general. 
13. Price v Strange [1978] Ch 337 
14. Supra n. 13. 
15. English Court of Appeal Buckley, Scarman and Goff LJJ. 
16. Thomas J. 
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Buckley L.J. 17 firmly underlines the thoughts of the court towards 
the scope of mutuality when he states "I remain of the opinion 
that considerations of mutuality go to discretion, not to jurisdiction. 
If lack of mutuality at the date of the contract were to deprive the 
court of jurisdiction to decree specific performance, I find it 
difficult to see how subsequent events could confer jurisdiction 
and yet it is clear that a vendor of land, who at the date of the 
contract of sale has a defective title but subsequently perfects 
it before the purchaser has repudiated the contract, can sue the 
purchaser for specific performance". 
17. Supra n. 13 @ 346. 
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THE TIME OF MUTUALITY 
Mutuality at the date of the contract, though possibly sufficient, 
1 is not necessary Dixon J explained the reasoning for this attitude, 
as opposed to the approach espoused by Sir Edward Fry; in the 
following manner - "The doctrine of the Court of Chancery was 
against decreeing one party to perform specifically obligations 
which the contract imposed upon him, if it was unable to secure 
to him the performance by the other contracting party of the 
conditions upon which those obligations depended, and could only 
leave him to his action of damages at law in the event of the 
3 
conditions being unperformed". This statement also suggests 
that it is not even sufficient that mutuality existed at the date 
of the contract, if it no longer exists at the time when the decree 
is made. 
1. South Eastern Rail Co v Knott (1852) 10 Ha 122; 
Woods v Wolsey (1891) 12 LR (NSW) Eq 245 ; 
O'Regan v White (1919) 2 IR 339 ; 
MacAuley v Greater Paramount Theatres Ltd (1921) 22 SR (NSW) 66; 
Dougan v Ley (1946) 71 CLR 142; 
Joseph v National Magazine Co Ltd [1959] Ch 14 @ 20 
2. Fry Specific Performance Hawkes v Eastern Counties Ry Co 
(1852) 1 De G&M&G 737; 
Boyd v Ryan (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 163 
3. Williamson Ltd v Lukey & Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 @ 298. 
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More recently Goff J stated that "the true principle is that one 
judges the defence of want of mutuality on the facts and circumstances 
as they exist at the hearing"~ It follows that often the success 
of a plaintiff seeking specific relief may depend upon his delaying 
the commencement or prosecution of prosecution until he has performed 
such of his obligations as the court will not require to perform 
in specie or until any other such circumstance which might render 
h t f l ' f 'h d ,5 t e gran 0 re 1e unJust as cease to eX1st . 
4. Price v Strange [1978J Ch 337 @ 357. 
5. Spry Equitable Remedies 2nd Ed 94. 
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G ENFORCEMENT OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS 
The remedy for breach of contract to leave property by will is 
normally damages, for any other result would amount to interference 
with testamentary freedom. 1 There are a number of early cases in 
2 this area the most notable being ~ v ~ . In this case the 
defendant promised he would leave a house and land to the plaintiff, 
his wife, in consideration for her marrying him. The defendant 
later conveyed his estate to another person, thereby incapacitating 
himself from keeping the promise. The plaintiff sued for the 
recovery of damages. Kay L.J. nevertheless mentioned the assistance 
which might be sought of a court of equity in such cases -
1. Hammersley v De Biel 12 Cl & Fin 45 per 
Lord Lyndhurst L.C. @ 78 
" The principle of law, at least of equity, is 
that - that if a party holds out inducements 
to another to celebrate a marriage, and holds 
them out deliberately and plainly, and the other 
party consents and celebrates the marriage in 
consequence of them, if he had good reason to 
expect that it was intended that he should have 
the benefit of the proposal which was so held out, 
a Court of Equity will take care that he is not 
disappointed, and will give effect to the proposal. " 
2. 11894] 1 QB 466. 
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" It is argued that Courts of Equity cannot compel a man to make 
a will. But neither can they compel him to execute a deed. They, 
however, can decree the heir or divisee in such a case to convey 
the land to the widow for life, and under the Trustee Act can make 
a vesting order, or direct that someone shall convey for him if he 
3 
refuses". 
456 There are other similar decisions in England , Canada , Australia 
7 
and New Zealand. In summary these cases indicate that fic 
3. Supra n. 2 @ 471. Also see 
Birmingham v Renfrew (1937) 57 CLR 14 
4. Loffus v Maw (1862) 3 Giff 592; 
Maddison v Alderson (1883) 3 App Las 467: 
Coverdale v Eastwood (1872) LR 15 Eq 121; 
Williams v Williams (1868) 37 LJ Ch 854; 
Re Edwards [1958] Ch 168 
Parker v Clark [1960] 1 AllER 93 
5. Legeas v Trusts & Guarantee Co (1912) 5 DLR 389: 
Barnes v Cunningham [1933] 3 DLR 653 
Briese v Dugard [1936] 1 DLR 723 
Coyle v McPherson [1944] 2 DLR 591 . 
6. ______ ~ v Ripely (1951) 515R (NSW) 183; 
v Jopling (1909) 8 CLR 33 ; 
o· National Trustees [1913] VLR 173 
[1933] VLR 282 i Birmingham v Renfrew (1937) 57 CLR 666 
7. Nealon v Public Trustee [1949] NZLR 148: 
Public Trustee v Commissioner of Stamp Duty [1951] NZLR 904; 
Reynolds v Marshall and Sturmer [1952] NZLR 384 
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performance may be granted in respect of a promise to leave property 
by will where the subject matter of the promise is a specific asset8 • 
9 The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Nealon v Public Trustee stated 
the law of New Zealand in such situations, a statement which governed 
testamentary cases for a number of decades. All five judges considered 
that such a claim is enforceable only to the extent that any 
testamentary provision made is not a fulfilment of the promise, and 
that the deceased has not otherwise remunerated this claimant. 
However a claim can only be enforced (il where the testamentary 
provision promised was of a stated amount, by an award to the claimant 
of that amount or of a lesser sum, or (ii) where the testamentary 
provision promised was of no stated amount, or was to devise reality 
(defined or not) or to bequeath personal property other than money 
(and whether described or not), by an award to the claimant of such 
amount as may be reasonable. Moreover when a court is deciding 
whether and to what extent the promise is to be enforced, a court 
should have regard to all the circumstances of the case, and in 
particular the circumstances in which the promise was made and the 
services rendered or the work performed, the value of the services 
or work, the amount of the estate, and the nature and amount of 
competing claims. 
More recently the Privy Council in Schaefer v schuhmannlO reaffirmed 
11 the principles as set out in ~ v ~ by treating it as 
8. Note that specific performance is of greater value to 
the promisee if the promisor is insolvent : Dolerit v 
Rothschild (1824) 1 Sim & st 590. 
9. [1949] NZLR 146 
10. [1972]AC 572 
11. [1894] 1 QB 466. 
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established that where there is a contract to leave specific 
property by will, the plaintiff "can obtain a declaration of his 
right to have it left to him by will and an injunction to restrain 
12 the testator from disposing of it in breach of contract". 
Schaefer v Schuhmann was expressly affirmed by the New Zealand 
f 1 . . h l2a h . d" 1 h' Court 0 Appea 1n Breur v Wr1g t , were 1n a co 1C1 to 1S 
will a testator contracted to forgive a business debt. It was 
found that a valid and enforceable contract existed12~ 
12. [1972] AC 572 per Lord Cross of Chelsea @ 580. 
l2a. [1982] 2 NZLR 77 
l2b. To be noted that the question purtaining to the 
validity of the contract was not in issue on appeal. 
Woodhouse P, McMullin and Ongley JJ concluded with 
respect to Schaefer's case 
" we are satisfied that unless and until the 
Privy Council itself should review its advice in 
Schaefer v Schuhmann that decision must be 
regarded as binding on the Courts of New Zealand. II 
Ibid 86. 
See Generally "Contracts to Make Wills" (1985) 15 VUWLR 164. 
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However it is well established that specific performance will not 
be ordered where the person who entered into the contract was merely 
acting in exercise of a testamentary power of appointment13 
Further an agreement to make ample provision for a person by will 
14 is too vague to be enforced i a definite intention must be proved 
15 in order that relief may be granted. The recent cases of 
Re Goni~6and Wakeham v MCKenzie17 establish that if the property in 
question is land or an interest in land, the contract is unenforceable 
unless there is sufficient memorandum or note in writing or part 
performance. 
13. Re Parkin Hill v Schwarz [1892] 3 Ch 510 
zaiser v Lawley [1902] 2 Ch 799 
Robinson v Ommaney (1882) 21 Ch D 780. 
14. Macphail v Torrance (1909) 25 TLR 810. 
15. Lord Walpole v Lord Oxford (1797) 3 Ves 402 
Re Oldham [1925] Ch 75 i 
Gray v Perpetual Trustee [1928] AC 391 
16. [1979] Ch 16. 
17. [1968] 2 All ER 783. 
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Section 3 18 of the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 places 
an added dimension on enforcement of such contracts in New Zealand. 
18. " Where in the administration of the estate of any 
deceased person a claim is made against the estate 
founded upon the rendering of services to or the 
performance of work for the deceased in his lifetime, 
and the claimant proves an express or implied promise 
by the deceased to reward him for the services or 
work by making some testamentary provision for the 
claimant, whether or not the provision was to be of 
a specified amount or was to relate to specified real 
or personal property, then, subject to the provisions 
of this Act, the claim shall, to the extent to which 
the deceased has failed to make that testamentary 
provision or otherwise remunerate the claimant (whether 
or not a claim for such remuneration could have been 
enforced in the lifetime of the deceased), be 
enforceable against the personal representatives of 
the deceased in the same manner and to the same extent 
as if the promise of the deceased were a promise for 
payment by the deceased in his lifetime of such amount 
as may be reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances 
of the case, including in particular the circumstances 
in which the promise was made and the services were 
rendered or the work was performed, the value of the 
services or work, the value of the testamentary provision 
promised, the amount of the estate, and the nature and 
amounts of the claims of other persons in respect of the 
estate, whether as creditors, beneficiaries, wife, husband, 
children, next-of-kin, or otherwise. /I 
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Such section supplements, but does not displace, the pre-existing 
. . . .. h 19 
remed1es ava11able 1n cases where a contract 1S estab11s ed • This 
principle is succinctly stated by Gresson. J in Nealon v Public 
-----"'-~.::....;;...::...::. 
" A claim well founded in contract may be enforced independently of 
the section." This statement was added to by F.B. Adams. J in 
Reynolds v Marshall and Von sturmer 21 where his Honour held that in 
cases in which the plaintiff is entitled to, and asks for, specific 
performance, the Court has no discretion, such as is given by the 
statute, as to the incidence of its order, and is not concerned with 
its effects on the rights of beneficiaries under the will. 
It would appear that the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 
need only be turned to to enforce a testamentary disposition if the 
same is not expressly stated or contractually quantified. 
19. Nealon v Public Trustee [1949J NZLR 148: 
v Commissioner of Stamp Duty [1951] NZLR 904; 
v Marshall and Sturmer NZLR 384. [1952] 
20. (1949] NZLR 148 @ 166. 
21. (1952] NZLR 384. 
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The above mentioned act is a scheme unique to New Zealand which 
facilitates the enforcement of testamentary promises which, given 
the formal contractual rules, are unenforceable, as they lack several 
of the fundamental elements of a contract. The Act encompasses 
services rendered or work performed for a deceased in his life time 
by the claimant2~ The promise by the deceased to the claimant 
must be one to reward the claimant by making some testamentary 
, , h' 23 prov1s1on for 1m. However unlike the standard rules as pertain 
to the majority of contracts the promise may be made either before 
24 
or after the services were rendered or work performed • 
22. Section 3(1) Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949. 
The services and work cover a multitude of tasks 
e.g. taking maternal grandfather's name Hawkins v 
Public Trustee [1960] NZLR 305 work for deceased's 
company De la Rue v Day (1979) RL 141. 
In short the motive for the services is immaterial 
Jones v Public Trustee [1962] NZLR 363; 
Moore v Hattaway C.A. 51/83 unreported. 
23. Section 3(1) Supra. 
24. Section 3(2) Supra. 
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In this instance past consideration is good consideration. Moreover 
. b' h ' l' d 25 the prom1ses may e e1t er express or 1mp 1e , thereby circumventing 
the principles surrounding certainty of contract. But such a promise 
will not be enforced unless there is a nexus between the promise and 
. 26 the serV1ces . 
27 The Act provides for an award to be made, so strictly speaking the 
"contract" is not specifically enforced. The promise in most 
circumstances does not expressly quantify the consideration and 
hence the award fixes the quantum a function a decree of specific 
28 performance cannot do • 
25. section 3(1) Supra i Allender v Gordon [1959] NZLR 
1026AC "suitably rewarded" were the words held to 
constitute a promise. Also Day v Public Trustee [1977] 
RL 258. 
26. Tucker v Guardian Trust (1961J NZLR 773. 
pickuE v Perpetual Trustees (1981] RL 120 
27. section 3 (1) 
28. In considering the quantum of the award the following 
factors may be considered ; 
(a) the circumstances in which the promises were made 
Wright v Slane (1979) RL 10. (b) The value of the 
services or work Gartery v Smith [1951J NZLR 105 
(c) the amount of the estate Perkins v Mullen CA 115/81 
(d) competing claims of other persons De la Laye v Lowe 
(1976) RL 18. 
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H CLEAN HANDS 
A plaintiff who seeks specific performance must come with clean hands. 
The aforementioned maxim contemplates that when a plaintiff whose 
conduct has been improper in a transaction seeks relief in equity, 
such relief will be refused. The maxim is linked closely in origin 
and in application with the maxim he who comes to equity must do 
equity. It is an historical reflection that courts of equity are 
f . 1 courts 0 conSC1ence. 
With regard to specific performance it is submitted that there are 
two general categories of case pertaining to clean hands. 
As to the first category, a plaintiff is said not to come with 
clean hands if he has not completed all conditions precedent and 
performed, or at least tendered performance, of all the conditions 
of the contract, and the plaintiff seeking equity must be prepared 
to do equity i.e. to perform all his future obligations under the 
contract. In Australian Hardwood v Commissioner for Railways2 
1. Early cases: Cory v Gertcken (1816) 2 Madd 40 
Overton v Banister (1884) 3 Hare 503; 
Cadman v Horner (1810) 18 Ves 10. 
More recently: Harrigan v Brown [1967] 1 NSWLR 342; 
Dewhirst v Edwards [1983J 1 NSWLR 34; 
Dow Securities v Manufacturing Investments (1981) 5 ACLR 501 
2. [1961J 1 All ER 737 
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Lord Radcliffe said, and his remarks are applicable to specific 
performance, that "A plaintiff who asks the court to enforce by 
mandatory order in his favour some stipulation of an agreement which 
itself consists of interdependent undertakings between the plaintiff 
and the defendant cannot succeed in obtaining such relief if he 
is at the time in breach of his own obligations ..• secondly, where 
the agreement is one which involves continuing or future acts to be 
performed by the plaintiff, he must fail unless he can show that he 
is ready and willing on his part to carry out those obligations, 
which are in fact, part of the consideration for the undertaking of the 
defendant that the plaintiff seeks to have enforced"~ 
with regard to this statement it is to be noted that it appears too 
broad in that it does not follow that any breach by a plaintiff 
disentitles him to specific performance. Sydney Consumers'Milk and Ice Co 
v Hawksbury Dairy and Ice C04 is illustrative of the second portion 
of Lord Radcliffe's above statement: the portion relating to the 
principle that a plaintiff must aver and prove that he is ready and 
willing to perform his own obligations under the contract. So if it 
appears that the plaintiff as purchaser is ready and willing to pay 
the purchase price only after making a deduction from it which he is 
not entitled to make, specific performance will be refused: 
3. [1961] 1 AllER 737 @ 742 
4. (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 458. 
5. King v Piggioli (1923) 32 CLR 222. 
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It is established that these principles do not require the plaintiff, 
in order to succeed in his suit for specific performance, to show that 
he has in the past strictly and literally complied with all his 
obligations under the contract, or that he is ready and willing to 
perform strictly and literally his obligations in the future. The 
6 High Court of Australia in Mehmet v Benson explains this principle. 
In this case the plaintiff was a purchaser of land at Wollongong by 
virtue of a contract. Payments due by him under the contract were, 
and had for some years been, substantially in arrears, yet he 
obtained a decree of specific performance. Barwick C.J. noted that 
readiness and willingness was a question of "substance" rather than 
a technical or narrow question. Moreover he must be ready and willing 
to perform the essential terms as opposed to subsidiary terms. 7 
It is not correct to regard a lack of honesty on the part of the 
plaintiff as a necessary bar to specific relief. For example where 
a defendant is shown to have waived a right to rescind which arises 
through the fraud of the plaintiff a court of equity may see fit, 
8 in the exercise of its discretion, to award specific performance. 
6. (1965) 113 CLR 295. 
7. per Barwick C.J. @ 307 - 8. 
8. Nor is it necessarily fatal that the plaintiff asserts 
a wrong view of the contract which he believes to be 
correct, provided that the view is not untenable and that 
the plaintiff is willing to perform the contract according 
to what transpires to be its true tenor. Thus in Green v 
Sommerville (1979) 141 CLR 594, the High Court held the 
principle applied in favour of a plaintiff who had insisted 
on an oral variation of the contract which the Court 
determined against her. 
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Under this general heading of, as we shall call it, "unsavoury behaviour", 
two categories seem to have formed. The first encompasses instances 
where the plaintiff is shown to have materially misled the court or 
to have abused its process or at least to have attempted to do so. In 
the second, it must generally be established that the grant of the relief 
which the plaintiff seeks will enable him to achieve a dishonest purpose 
and that in all the circumstances it appears to the court to be 
inequitable to grant the particular relief in question. 8a 
Armstrong v SheEEard and Short 9 is illustrative of the principle 
that specific performance will be refused if the plaintiff is shown 
to have materially misled the court or to have abused its process. 
For instance, the intentional uttering of a false account to the court, 
especially on a material matter, is a consideration inhibiting the 
decree of specific relief and will be taken into account with such 
other matters as hardship to the parties. 
In the second category of case it can be inferred that the court 
is being called upon to assist "unsavoury conduct" on the part of 
the plaintiff. This could see the court being asked to enforce a 
right already improperly obtained or by furthering the unconscionable 
purpose of the plaintiff. ;t . d . C 10 Hence. was sa~ ~n Meyers v ~ 
" No court of equity will aid a man to derive advantage from his own 
wrong, and this is really the meaning of the maxim". 
8a. Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 232. 
9. [1959] 2 QB 384. 
10. (1913) 17 CLR 90 @ 124 
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11 Argyll v Argyll goes on to stress that the undesirable behaviour 
in question must "involve more than merely a general depravity ~ it 
12 
must be a depravity in a legal as well as a moral sense". 
The immediate and necessary relation (i.e. the causative link), has 
. . d' . t' 13 been 1ns1ste upon 1n numerous S1tua 10ns, the most recent New 
14 Zealand instance being by Beattie. J in Upper Hutt Arcade v Burrell . 
In this case specific performance was sought of an agreement to lease. 
The plaintiff agreed to lease a shop in an arcade to the first 
defendant, who subsequently assigned his rights to a second defendant. 
The plaintiff insisted on a guarantee from the first defendant if the 
lease was to be granted to the second defendant. The lease was 
executed by the second defendant but no guarantee was given. The 
second defendant went into possession of the premises, a shop called 
"Three Coins Gift Shop". The defendants refused to complete on the 
grounds that the plaintiff was in breach of its obligation to keep 
the premises weatherproof, and that there was a misrepresentation of 
the layout of the arcade with particular reference to a fountain, and 
that the plaintiff did not come with "clean hands" seeking an equitable 
remedy. with reference to the defence of "clean hands" his Honour held 
that the damage to the fountain (which was caused by vandals) did not 
refer to something the plaintiff had done or failed to do over the 
letting of the shop, nor was there any breach of an express term of 
the lease. His Honour felt that for the maxim to operate the breach 
11. [1967] Ch 302 
12. Supra n.ll @ 331-2 
13. Argyll v Argyll Supra n. 11 
Hubbard v Vosper [1972J 2 QB 84 @ 101. 
14. [1973] 2 NZLR 699. 
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would have to go to a factor which was the "essence" of the operation 
. d 14a carrl.e out. Hence His Honour further reinforces the principle 
that the conduct in question must be causative to the relief that is 
sought. 
Such causative theory is illustrated in its extreme by MCLelland J in 
15 Carlson v Sparkes • By an agreement of sale and purchase Sparkes 
agreed to sell to Carlson an old cottage for $30,000. The cottage 
was dilapidated and had not been inhabited for years. The purchaser 
was entitled to vacant possession on completion. Before settlement 
the purchaser caused its agents to enter the cottage and demolish it. 
The vendor purported to terminate the contract, claiming that the 
purchaser's conduct constituted a fundamental breach and repudiation 
of the contract. The purchaser claimed specific performance and 
damages. Not surprisingly the claim for specific performance was 
resisted on the grounds that the plaintiff's conduct in demolishing 
the cottage gave rise to a lack of clean hands precluding the grant 
of equitable relief. 
14a. Note the comments of Lord Chelmsford LC in 
Parker v Taswell (1858) Z De G & J 559 
" It must be borne in mind that this agreement 
has been partly executed by possession having 
been taken under it i and there are many 
authorities to show that in such a case the 
court will strain its power to enforce a complete 
performance. " 
15. 1981 ] ANZCR 83 
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However His Honour held that although the act of demolishing the cottage 
before completion was a tortious act infringing proprietary rights of 
the defendant it did not constitute a breach of the contract as such, 
even given that the contract did not confer any rights prior to completion 
on the plaintiff to enter the property. Therefore the defendant's 
proprietary rights as owners remained relatively unimpaired and 
specific performance was decreed. It is submitted that at first 
blush the facts of the last cited case appear to provide good grounds 
for the defence of unclean hands to succeed. The conduct strikes at 
the subject matter of the contract. But McLelland. J realising the 
practicality of the situation chooses to disregard the defence. His 
Honour goes a step further than assessing the subject matter involved 
and considers the intangible rights associated with the contract l : a 
It is ventured that the learned Judge has used a common sense rather 
l5b than a strict equitable approach to the problem at hand. 
l5a. From a purely practical point of view a purchaser 
can only make alterations or additions, or gain 
access to the premises, before completion, with the 
vendor's knowledge and consent. Without this the 
purchaser is trespassing and is liable for damages. 
l5b. Such an approach is in keeping with the trend in 
equity away from inflexibility imposed by case law 
to a reawakening of base equitable notions. 
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The Privy Council has delivered the most recent and, it is submitted, 
the best summary of this maxim in Sang Lee Investments Co Ltd v 
Wing Kwai Investment Co Ltdl~ In this case the Judicial Committee was 
considering an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong. In 
short, a company had contracted to sell land to a purchaser which 
contracted to sell it to a subpurchaser. The company failed to 
complete the sale. The subpurchaser brought an action in the High 
Court against the purchaser. The company was joined as a third 
party. The High Court ordered specific performance of the contract. 
17 The Court of Appeal dismissed the company's appeal. The only issue 
was whether there was any considerations leading to the refusal of 
a decree. The company submitted that both the purchaser and the 
subpurchaser had been guilty of misconduct. Lord Brightman stated 
that to disentitle a plaintiff to relief the alleged want of probity 
had to arise in the transaction and had to have an immediate and 
necessary relation to the equity sued upon. His Lordship then 
averted to an otherwise uncanvassed area, that being where there are 
alleged improprieties on both sides. In this instance it was held 
not to be the proper approach for a court in exercising its 
discretion to grant specific relief to compare the misconduct on 
the one side with the misconduct on the other side. His Lordship 
went on to say that the court should first decide whether there had 
been any want of faith, honesty or righteous dealing on the part of 
the person seeking relief and then decide whether as a matter of 
16. ACL [1984] 345 
Sol. J (1983) 127 410. 
17. Sol. J (1983) 127 410. 
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discretion and in all the circumstances, which might include any 
relevant misconduct on the part of the person resisting, if it was 
right to grant or refuse specific performance. There was no 
balancing exercise which fell to be performed. 
Therefore, it is submitted in summary, to disentitle the plaintiff 
to equitable relief under the maxim "he who comes to equity must 
corne with clean hands", two conditions must be satisfied. First, 
the plaintiff's conduct must be wanting in good faith and secondly, 
it must be in the "transaction" which is the basis of the suit. 
In conclusion this discretionary consideration looks at what the 
plaintiff must be prepared to do now which is right and fair, but 
also it looks to see that the plaintiff's past record in the 
. , 1 18 transact10n 1S c ean . It is to be noted that the maxim is not 
a licence for the court to require its suitors to have lead 
bl 1 I , 19 arne ess 1ves. The maxim is a flexible instrument of justice, 
but rules have been developed to limit its possible broad scope. 
It is submitted this is one area of equity where the balance of 
case law and conscience have reached a happy equilibrium. We will 
not see a case of note in this area for a number of years, this 
point being where case law has applied an excessive layer of gloss 
to the discretion. 
18. " he who has committed iniquity shall not have equity " 
Jones v Lenthal (1669) 1 Ch Cas 154 
19. Loughran v Loughran 292 US 216 @ 229 (1934) 
- 160 -
The comments of Sp~y best summarise matters : liThe general principle 
of clean hands is doubtless susceptible of fresh application in 
appropriate circumstances, but care must be taken in not applying 
it to situations where it has already been held not to apply".20 
20. Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 232. 
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I HARDSHIP 
" 
another form of oppressiveness which may prevent specific 
performance .•. " 
Halsbury's "Laws of England" Vol 44 Para 472 
The concept of hardship reflects the quality of conscience that is 
embodied in all courts of equity. Such a consideration is an appeal 
to the compassion and the humanity of the Chancellor, he being required 
to examine this form of oppressiveness which may prevent specific 
performance, such examination having to reveal great hardship to the 
defendantl , so much so that it would be unreasonable and harsh to 
grant equitable relief2 The defence of hardship concentrates principally 
on the effect of a decree of specific performance on the defendant. 
However the interests of the plaintiff, as regards the hardship 
caused by a refusal of the decree, are also examined. The defendant 
has the onus upon himself. He must show that a decree of specific 
performance would impose on him a hardship amounting to oppression 
far outweighing the inconvenience to the plaintiff if he was left to 
his remedy in damages. 3 
l. 
2. 
3. 
Falcke v Gray (1859) 4 Drew 651 @ 660 
Wedgewood v Adams (1843) 6 Beav. 600 @ 605; 
watson v Marston (1853) 4 De G and G 230; 
Eastes v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 @ 480. 
See Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 191. 
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By way of introduction hardship which arises through the defendant's 
4 
conduct or hardship which is occasioned by the defendant simply 
because the object that the defendant had in mind when he entered 
into the agreement has now failed,5 or because the defendant's 
speculation has proved unfortunate to him6 , cannot be set up by 
7 
way of defence to the award of specific performance. In short, 
the hardship to the defendant must be of substance, be non-self 
inflicted and contain that intangible quality which brings into 
play the "compassion" of the Court of Equity. 
4. Storer v Great Western Railway Co (1842) Z Y & C C 48 ; 
Hawkes v Eastern Counties Ry. Co. (1852) 1 De G & G 737. 
5. Morley v Clavering (1860) 29 Beav 84 
6. Mountford v Scott [1975) Ch 258. 
7. Note Also : Spencer v Daniljchenko [ 197 6 J QWN 10. S • C . 
where a plaintiff seeking performance delayed, forcing 
the defendant to obtain a bridging loan at a higher rate 
of interest. Held i that this was not the sort of hardship 
a court of equity would consider. 
Nicholas v Ingram [1959J NZLR Also : 
Francis v Lowcliffe [1976] The Times, March 30 
(landlord's financial inability to provide and maintain 
a lift. ) 
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Hence, there have been numerous instances in which hardship has been 
found to lie8 . The number and diversity of these cases illustrates 
the breadth of this discretionary consideration. It would be idle 
to consider every case, instead the following principles are proffered 
as arising from the array of decisions. Firstly, inadequacy of price 
may be a ground for refusing specific performance if the purchaser 
stands in a fiduciary position to the vendor, or fraud enters into 
9 
the contract . 
8. Hardship resulting from mistake; Dell v Beasley [1957J 
NZLR; threatened litigation made it impossible to 
ascertain whom ground rent payable to, and the purchaser 
would have been involved in immediate litigation ; 
Pegler v White (1864) 33 Beav. 403 hardship if 
defendant be exposed to prosecution if he forced to 
perform Pottinger v Genge (1967) 11b CLR 328 @ 337 also 
Norton v Angus (1926) 38 CLR 523 @ 534; hardship if the 
decree would cause the defendant to incura forfeiture 
Peacock v Penson (1848) 11 Beav 355, Helling v Lumley (1858) 
3 De G & J 493; hardship where a vendor cannot perform 
his contract unless he litigates, particularly if the 
proceedings would be against his wife, Wroth v Tyler [1974J 
Ch 30 i Intoxication on the part of the defendant may 
suffice Mallins v Freeman (1837) 2 Keen 25 i ignorance 
and a mental state not amounting to incapacity may be a 
defence Jacobs v Bills [1967J NZLR 972. 
9. Coles v Trecothick (1804) 9 Ves 234 i 
Sullivan v Jacobs (1828) 1 Moll 472. 
Haywood v ~ (1858) 25 Beav 140. 
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Secondly, in determining how great any such hardship or inconvenience 
to the plaintiff would be and whether an award of damages would unduly 
prejudice the plaintiff, actual events and future events as known or 
foreseen at the date of the order are taken into account, and there is 
no ad hoc limitation to events which have already taken place at the 
time the contract was createdl~ Thirdly, if a misconception on the 
part of the defendant was largely due to the defendant's own innocent 
mistake, he is estopped from setting up his mistake as preventing 
the formation of the contract, however where the mistake may have been 
mutual or induced, sufficient hardship may arise to expand the 
defence of mistakell (the defence of hardship by being a flexible 
instrument is also capable of extending the other discretionary defences). 
Fourth, if damages and other legal remedies are inadequate12 a 
plaintiff will be presumed to be entitled to specific relief. Therefore, 
the onus is upon the defendant to show that the hardship suffered by 
himself far outweighs that which would be suffered, by the plaintiff 
13 if he was compensated with damages . 
10. German v Chapman (1877) 7 Ch D. 271 ; 
Burrow v Scammell (1881) 10 Ves 470. 
11. Dell v Beasly [1959] NZLR 89; 
Keats v Wallis [1956] NZLR 563 
12. See Generally Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 58. 
13. Nicholas v Ingram [1958J NZLR 972 
Sutton v GUl::dowdg Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418. 
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The most recent case under this heading is a remarkable case of hardship 
as well as providing the latest statement as to the use of the 
discretionary concept of hardship, that case being Patel v Alil~ The 
circumstances of this case are such that they caused Goulding. J 
"some anxiety". His Honour felt that the case for the defendant 
"arouses so much sympathy that I felt for a long time that any exercise 
of the discretionary jurisdiction in her favour would probably be unfair 
to her opponents, just because of the force of such sympathy 1I~5. 
The defendant entered into a contract to sell her house to the plaintiff. 
At the date of execution of the contract, the defendant was a married 
Pakistani woman aged 23 who spoke little English, and who had one child, 
and was in good health. Completion of the contract was delayed, but 
through neither party's fault. In the interim things went disastrously 
wrong for the defendant. First her husband was adjudicated bankrupt, 
secondly she was found to have bone cancer and had to have a leg 
amputated. To make matters worse the defendant gave birth to two 
children in the space of two years and her husband was sent to prison. 
Because of her physical disability and her inability to speak English, 
the defendant relied on her friends who lived in the strong Moslem 
community in which the house was situated. Notwithstanding the foregoing 
events, the purchasers sought specific performance of the contract. 
The defendant's main ground for resisting the decree was that if she 
was forced to move to another neighbourhood she would be deprived of 
the daily assistance from her friends and relations that she needed 
to maintain her family. 
14. [1984J 1 AllER 978. 
15. Ibid 980. 
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Goulding. J first considered the hardship to the plaintiffs if the 
decree was refused and found that if the decree was refused and adequate 
pecuniary compensation were available, the hardship to the plaintiff 
would not be great. This was because there had been a long delay in 
16 pursuing the remedy . 
As to the hardship to the defendant, His Honour felt that "hardship 
which moves the court to refuse specific performance is either a 
hardship existing at the date of the contract or a hardship due in 
some way to the plaintiff". In the case at hand neither of these 
conditions was satisfied. The plaintiffs relied strongly on a statement 
17 in Fry to the effect that subsequent hardship could not be considered. 
Despite his initial statement, Goulding. J would have none of the 
plaintiffs' submissions, and refused to lock the court's discretion 
into a rigid form. 18 His Honour cited City of London v Nash and 
Webb v Direct London and Portsmouth Rly. co19 in support of his view. 
Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that in cases where hardship has 
been argued successfully, the hardship related to the subject matter 
of the contract and not personal hardship of the defendant. Goulding. 
J dismissed this argument out of hand. 
His Honour concluded by stating that the true principle was that, only 
in extraordinary and persuasive circumstances can hardship supply an 
excuse for resisting specific performance. 
16. Ibid 981. 
17. Fry "Specific Performance" (6th Ed 1921) paras 417 - 418. 
18. (1747) 3 Atk 512. 
19. (1852) 1 DeGM & G 521. 
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The latest New Zealand case involving hardship was decided by 
f ' 'h' h 11' 20 Jef er1es. J 1n t e H1g Court at We 1ngton. To put matters 
shortly, the Wellington City Council advertised a number of 
sections to be sold by ballot in the newspapers. The Council 
had grossly undervalued the properties. The Council had no 
option but to cancel the ballot. The plaintiffs entered one of 
the ballots. The plaintiffs asked for a decree of specific 
performance which, if granted, would result in a ballot being 
called. Jefferies. J weighed the competing claims, as a court 
of equity must do, and decided the detriment to the Council would 
far outweigh the compensation for the plaintiffs. Moreover, to 
attempt to revive the ballot for the original 240 odd applicants, 
although technically possible, would, if done fairly, cause further 
considerable delay. His Honour therefore decided the appropriate 
21 
remedy was damages • 
20. Markholm Construction Ltd v Wellington City Council 
H.C. Wellington A194j84. 
21. Ibid @ 19 - 21. 
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TIME OF THE HARDSHIP 
The hardship which will constitute a defence to a claim for specific 
performance must have existed at the date of the contract, save in 
exceptional circumstances. Thus the court may refuse to enforce an 
award to arbitration if the submission involves hardshipl, but not on 
the ground of mere hardship and unreasonableness in the award itself2. 
3 This approach receives its greatest support from Fry. However the 
4 
cases relied upon by Fry do not appear to support this proposition, 
and may be explained on other grounds, such as on the ground that the 
supervening events have not given rise to a sufficiently great hardship 
to warrant the refusal of reliefS. 
1. Nickles v Hancock (1855) 7 DeG & M & G 300 
2. Wood v Griffith (1818) 1 Swan 43; 
Weekes v Gallard (1869) 18 WR 331. 
3. Fry "Specific Performance" 6th Ed @ 199. 
4. Revell v Hussey (1813) 2 Ball and B 280 @ 288-9. 
5. More recently the view of Fry has been supported 
by Sholl. J in Bosaid v Andry [1963] VR 465 @ 478 
and by Hutchison. J in Nicholas v In9ram [1958lNZLR 972. 
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But assume an agreement is entered into fairly and after a period 
of time an event happens which places one party in a better position 
than another and causes great hardship to one of the parties if a 
decree is awarded. Surely such hardship should not be ignored. 
Such a subsequent event should be admissible, with the foreseeability 
of such events affecting the weight of the hardship6. 
The leading New Zealand case on this point acknowledges that there 
are exceptional situations where subsequent hardship after the 
signing of a contract would be considered7 • It is submitted that 
this is still too narrow an approach. One should not have to prove 
extraordinary hardshipB. 
6. 
7. 
B. 
Wood v Griffith (IBIB) 1 Swan 43. 
Nicholas v Ingram [195B] NZLR Supra n.5 
The defendant contemplated at the time of entering 
into the contract that the transaction would be 
financed by her husband and son-in-law. However 
the husband and son-in-law did not yield up the 
finance. Held: that there was nothing unusual 
about entering into the contract relying on contingent 
finance. Hutchison. J considered that mere "financial 
inability" was not a great hardship. 
City of London v Nash (1747) 3 Atk 512 
Where a covenant to rebuild houses in good condition 
and repair was not enforced; 
Costigan v HastIer (lB04) Sch & Lef 159 ; 
Webb v Direct London and Portsmouth Rly Co (lB52) 
1 DeG M & G 521; 
Ch 337. 
Cf : Price v Strange [197B] 
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This requirement is particularly unjust if the change in conditions 
involving hardship to the defendant has resulted from the act of the 
plaintiff9 , especially if the plaintiff's conduct operated as something 
in the nature of a trap.10 
9. Davis v Horne (1805) 2 Sch & Lef 341; 
Shrewsbury and Birmingham Rly Co v Stour Valley Rly Co 
(1852) 2 De G M & G 866 
Sayers v Collyer (1884) 28 Ch D 103; 
Chatsworth Estates Co v [1931] 1 Ch 224 ; 
---
Duke of Bedford v Trustees of British Museum (1822) 
2 My & K 552. 
10. Dowson v Solomon (1859) 1 Drew & Sm 1 
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I (ii) HARDSHIP TO THIRD PARTIES 
In some circumstances a court may refuse to grant specific performance 
on the ground that it would cause hardship to the third person, for 
example, if it would compel the third person to join in a sale when 
1 he had no wish to do so i or would lead to the eviction of the defendant's 
2 
children from the family home . 
A court may take account of the fact that there are "third persons so 
connected with the defendant, that, by reason of some legal or moral 
duty which he owes them, it would be highly unreasonable for the court 
3 
actively to prevent the defendant from discharging his duty". Isaac 
J in the same case went on to consider the position of a third party 
who was not in a special relationship with the defendant. His Honour 
concluded that "hardships of third persons entirely unconnected with 
the property are immaterial,,4. It is submitted, in light of recent 
authorities, that the decision in the above case would not stand if 
it was reassessed today. 5 In that case a father entered into a contract 
1. Watts v Spence [1976J Ch 165 
Cedar Holdings v Green [1979] 3 AllER 117 
Williams and GlynIs Bank Ltd v Boland (1980] 2 AllER 408. 
2. Wroth v ~ (1973] 1 AllER 897. 
3. Gall v Mitchell (1924) 35 CLR 222 @ 230-1. 
4. Supra n. 3 @ 230-1. 
5. Gall v Mitchell Supra n. 3 
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to dispose of land which was partly his own and partly his childrens. 
Specific performance was awarded against the father in respect of the 
land which he was competent in convey, with compensation in respect of 
the children's land which he had no authority to transfer. 
The defence of hardship to a third party (the children) was rejected. 
it being argued that the children's land could not be worked as 
profitably as it had been unless it was worked in conjunction with the 
father's land. It is submitted with respect that the court should have 
adverted to the fact that the two types of land (i.e. the children's land 
and the father's land) formed a single unit and by splitting the land 
in two the court may have taken the fairest yet the least practical 
solution. Possibly either the plaintiff should have obtained all the 
land, or the plaintiff should have received damages in lieu. 
spry6 finds the principle in Gall v Mitchel17 untenable. The author 
argues that a court of equity should not close its eyes to hardship 
or injury, merely because the person who may be injured is not a party 
to the proceedings. Spry feels that even the existence of a special 
duty should not be required as a pre-requisite before considering 
hardship to third parties8 • 
What amounts to a special duty? The most common "special duty" arises 
where one of the parties to the contract is a trustee. Hardship to 
any beneficiary of such trust may be taken into account, especially if 
6. Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed 192. 
7. Supra n. 3 
8. Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966. 
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a breach of a fiduciary duty is involved9 • It is clear, therefore, 
that hardship to third parties, who are in a fiduciary relationship 
to the defendant, is a consideration. Assuming this is the strict 
principle of law, which is denied, the increased breadth of trustslO 
will increase the third parties who are to be considered. Moreover 
by finding a casual link between the defendant and the third party 
by reason of a duty of utmost good faithll, the scope of the 
consideration may be extended. Unfortunately this link is of a 
contractual nature as demonstrated by Goulding. J in Patel v Ali12, 
In this case the defendant's counsel used an obiter passage from 
Gall v Mitchell13 to stress that the defendant's three children were 
interested third parties and that such hardship to them should not 
be overlooked. However His Honour did not take into account the 
welfare of the defendant's children. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Colyton Investments Pty Ltd v McSorley (1962) 
107 CLR 177 @ 185 .. as against a person selling in 
a fiduciary capacity specific performance will not be 
decreed bf a contract which the beneficiary may be 
entitled to complain. See generally Spry, "Equitable 
Remedies" 2nd Ed 146 ff. 
Hayward v Giordani [1983] NZLR 247 
Uberri mae fidei. 
[1984] 1 AllER 978. 
Supra n. 3. 
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The authors of "Equity Doctrines and Remedies,,14, while sympathising 
15 
with the abovestated view of Spry t that all third parties interested 
in the property should be taken account of, consider that this is an 
extreme view. Reliance is placed on the statements of Lord Langdale 
in Thomas v Dering16 In that case Sir Edward Dering contracted to 
sell a piece of land. However he had only a life interest in the 
land and there were ultimate remainder men alive. Specific performance 
was refused, one of the grounds being that there was hardship to the 
third parties. Lord Langdale put it in the following terms: "I 
apprehend that, upon the general principle that the court will not 
execute a contract, the performance of which .••. would be prejudicial 
to persons interested in the property, but not parties to the contract, 
the court, before directing the partial execution of the contract by 
ordering the limited interest of the vendor to be conveyed, ought to 
consider how that proceeding may affect the interests of those who are 
"17 
entitled to the estate, subject to the limited interest of the vendor • 
While this line of principle brings one back into the sphere of "special 
duties or relationships", a defendant is still left wondering what an 
"interest in the property" is. It is ventured that if there is a 
14. Gumm ow Meagher and Lehane "Equity Doctr ines and Remedies" 
@ para 2022. 
15. Supra @ P. 
16. (1837) 1 Keen 729. 
17. Supra n. 16 @ 747. 
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fiduciary duty to account for the property then hardship is to be 
considered. However if the fiduciary duty does not extend to the 
actual property, by reason of the abovestated cases, the hardship 
is not to be explored. Possibly a fairer approach would, in the 
last instance, be to consider the hardship but attach less significance 
to it. 
As to weight, it does not follow that the position of third parties 
will always be found to be of decisive weight i questions of weight 
depend upon the special circumstances of each case, in particular 
upon the probable nature and extent of the hardship which is in 
. 18 quest10n Moreover it is also clear that courts of equity will, 
if necessary, mould their orders or render them conditional, in order 
that third parties may not be unduly prejudiced. ies 
pty Ltd v R.A. Wenham 
As with the other equitable defences if the hardship to the plaintiff, 
generated by the refusal of specific performance, is equal to or 
outweighs that of the third party, the defence will not stand. 
It is submitted that hardship to third parties manifests itself most 
realistically in the "matrimonial cases,,20. Assume that a husband 
is on the title of the matrimonial home by himself. There are domestic 
difficulties and the wife's solicitor for some unknown reason does not 
place a Matrimonial Property Act Notice on the title2l • Prima Facia the 
wife is entitled to a half share of the matrimonial home upon division22 
18. Raphael v Thames Valley Railway Co (1867) LR 2 Ch 147 
19. [1965 J NSWR 581. 
20. Watts v Spence [1975] 2 All ER 528; 
Cedar Holdings v Green [1979] 3 AllER 117 
Williams and Glyns Bank v Boland [1980] 2 AllER 408. 
21. Section 42 Matrimonial Property Act 1976. 
22. Section 8 Matrimonial Property Act 1976. 
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Further assume the husband sells the house to a bona fide purchaser 
23 for value who does not realise the wife's interest in the house . 
Given then greatly increased likelihood that the share of the wife 
24 
will be fifty percent , and given that the innocent party has little 
25 
redress under the Act , it is submitted that the transferring of a 
spouse's interest against his or her will is a hardship on a third 
party which would operate to avoid a decree of specific performance. 
It could be argued that this is not a true third party situation, as 
the "innocent" spouse "owns" the property co-jointly with the spouse 
who is attempting to dispose of it. 
In New Zealand, while there have been no reported cases, involving 
these facts, the scope and breadth of the Matrimonial Property Act 
1976 as a piece of social legislation suggests that unless sufficient 
compensation can be guaranteed the third party, the very fundamentals 
of the Act will dictate that hardship is abundant and that specific 
performance should not be granted. Further to this, it has recently 
23. Thereby excluding the operation of the "claw back 
sections of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 i.e. 
Sections 44, 45. 
24. By reason of the 1963 Matrimonial Property Act a 
wife's share would normally be far below fifty percent 
because of the type of contribution examined. 
25. Possibly compensation for the disposal of matrimonial 
property after separation by reason of Section 9 (4) of 
the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 1 on an adjustment in 
the valuation date under Section 2 (2) to take account 
of post separation decreases in value. 
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been re-emphasised by the legislature that the interests of the 
children of a marriage are a singly weighty factor with regard to 
26 
matrimonial matters • The children of a marriage, while not having 
a vested interest in the property, are therefore in a true third 
party situation. It is submitted that the view taken by Goulding. J 
, 1 1,27 d h' t f h h'ld f h ln Pate v A 1 , as regar s t e lnteres sot e c 1 ren 0 t e 
marriage, reflects without direct consideration the enlightened 
matrimonial laws which New Zealand is governed by. This statement 
must be qualified by acknowledging that Patel v Ali 28 was not a 
matrimonial case as such. 
26. 1983 Matrimonial Property Amendment Act. 
27. [1984] 1 All ER 978. 
28. Ibid. 
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J UNFAIRNESS 
" The court's discretion to grant specific performance is not 
exercised if the contract is not equal and fair. " 
Halsbury's "Laws of England" Vol 44 Para 466. 
On many occasions, though there are no circumstances that amount 
to fraud, there is nevertheless a want of equality and fairness l 
in the contract or in the situation surrounding it2 , such qualities 
being essential in order that the court may exercise its discretionary 
3 jurisdiction in specific performance. If a decree for specific 
relief is refused on the ground of unfairness, a plaintiff will still 
4 have the opportunity to claim damages. 
1. "Equal and Fair" Lord Walpole v Lord Oxford (1797) 3 Ves 402 
v Marquis of Bute [1916J 2 Ch 64 
2. Oral evidence is admissible to show unfairness 
depending not on the terms of the contract but on 
extrinsic circumstances : Davis v Symonds (1787) 
1 Cox Eq Cas 402. 
3. ______ ~ v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 @ 401-2 per Fullagar. J: 
" Equity traditionally looked at the matter rather 
from the point of view of the party seeking to enforce 
the contract and was minded to enquire whether, having 
regard to all the circumstances, it was consistent with 
equity and good conscience that he should be allowed to 
enforce it. " 
4. Twini v Morrice (1788) 2 BroCC 326 
Wilan v Wilan (1810) 16 Ves 72 
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The rationale behind the defence of unfairness does not rest on the 
proposition that the contract about to be enforced on the defendant 
will go hard and be unfair on the defendant, in the colloquial sense. 
Hence by establishing inadequacy of consideration4a , a defendant 
will not have made out a case for the consideration of unfairness to 
be invoked. Moreover in businesslike terms, as with inadequacy of 
consideration, while not of itself a ground for resisting enforcement, 
may be a factor contributing to a final finding of unfairness. 
A court of equity will not decree specific performance of an agreement 
more favourable to the plaintiff than the defendant, involving hardship 
upon the defendant and damage to his property if he entered into it 
without advice or assistance, and there is reasonable ground for 
doubting whether he entered into it with a knowledge and understanding 
4a. Early authorities considered that inadequacy of consideration 
was in itself a defence to specific performance. Savile 
v Squile (1721) 1 P WSM 745; Day v Newman (1788) 2 Cox Eq 
Cas 77; Tilly v Peers (1791) cited 10 Ves @ 301; 
Vaughan v Thomas (1783) 1 Bro C.C. 556. Only if the 
inadequacy is so gross as to amount to fraud or there are 
other circumstances which combined with the inadequacy, 
will induce the court not to enforce the contract, will 
the court refuse specific performance : ~~~= V 0' ien 
(1949) 80 CLR 219: Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 
Cf: Abbott v Sworder (1852) 4 DeG & Sm 448, the excessive 
price to be paid by the purchaser ( 5,000 for an estate of 
3,500) was held to be no defence to an action by the vendor. 
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5 
of its natur.e and its consequences. A similar fact situation arose 
6 in Richardson v Otto in which the Queensland Supreme Court went so 
far as to say that there was an unconscionable bargain? 
Moreover absence of legal advice where the vendors sign a contract 
for sale, without professional advice and assistance, and the purchaser 
is a solicitor, circumstances of evidence, generally leading to the 
notion of surprise, mistake or sharp practise, will be sufficient to 
8 induce the court to withold a decree. However there have been 
situations where specific performance was decreed in favour of a 
plaintiff though no solicitor acted for the defendant, and though the 
contract was executed under circumstances which might easily have 
9 led to fraud . 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Vivers v Tuck (1863) 1 Moo P.C. Ns 516. 
[1938 ] QWN 15 • 
See Weily v Williams (1895) 16 LR (NSW) Eq 190; 
paralytic entering into a contract at a great overvalue 
decree refused ~ Jericho v Guglielmin [1938] 
SASR 292, foreigner at disadvantage decree refused. 
Deardon v Bamford (1841) 10 LJ Eq 54 
Blackney v Bagott (1829) 3 Bl NS 237 
Lightfoot v Heron (1839) 3 Y & C Ex 586 
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underlying the consideration of fairness is the principle that there is 
a great difference between the right to bring an action for breach 
of contract, and the right to bring a suit for specific performance. 
In the latter case the plaintiff must show a fair, clear, and 
conscientious case, and not attempt to get the benefit of a contract 
snatched by surprise. l 
Inadequacy of consideration, while never of itself a gound for 
resisting enforcement2 , will often be a critical element in cases 
of this type. It may be important in two ways, first, as supporting 
the inference that a position of disadvantage existed, and secondly 
as tending to show that an unfair use was made of the occasion. Lord 
Eldon in 1804 stated that "unless the inadequacy of price is such as 
shocks the conscience, and amounts in itself to conclusive and 
decisive evidence of fraud in the transaction, it is not itself a 
3 
sufficient ground for refusing a specific performance ". 
1. Rawlings v Hislop (1883) 9 VLR (Eq) 25 
2. Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 
Unfairness is unfair, or unconscionable conduct on the 
part of the plaintiff; inadequate consideration or 
unbusinesslike terms may be evidence of, but do not 
constitute, unfairness. 
3. Coles v Trecothick (1804) 9 Ves 234 @ 246 
See also Abbott v Sworder (1852) 4 DeG & Sm 488, 
Goldsbrough Mort v Quinn (19l0) 10 CLR 674. 
- 182 -
There is a well developed jurisdiction in equity, independent of the 
principles as to undue influence, to set aside unconscientious bargains. l 
This jurisdiction is a branch of the general equitable jurisdiction in 
fraud. It is raised whenever one party to a transaction is at a special 
disadvantage in dealing with the other party because distress,2 lack 
f d · 3. 11 4. 5.. t . 6. . d fl' o a vlce, 1 ness, 19norance, lntoxlca lon, lmpalre acu tles or 
1. Mortlock v Buller (1804) 10 Ves 292; 
Pateman v (1974) 232 Estate Gazette 457; 
Harrop v Thompson [1975] 1 WLR 545 
2. Johnson v Nott (1684) 1 Vern 271; 
Kemeys v Hansard (1815) CoopG 125 
3. Helsham v Langley (1841) 1 Y and C Ch Cas 175; 
Vivers v (1863) 1 Moo PCCNS 516; 
See however Lightfoot v Heron (1839) 3 Y and C Ex 586 
which notes that mere want of legal advice is not enough. 
4. Gartside v Isherwood (1873) 1 BroCC 558; 
Broughton v Snook [1938] 1 All ER 411 
5. Clark v Malpas (1862) 4 De G F & J 401; 
Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113. 
6. Nagle v Baylor (1842) 3 Dr &War60 
Cox v Smith (1868) 19 LT 517; 
Lightfoot v Heron (1839) 37 and C Ex 586. 
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financial need or other circumstances7 affect his ability to conserve 
his own interests, and the other party unconscientiously takes advantage 
8 
of the opportunity thus placed in his hands. The essence of these 
situations is (i) parties who meet on unequal terms (ii) the stronger 
party takes advantage of this (iii) to obtain a beneficial bargain. 
If such a bargain is evidenced the contract may be set aside. Therefore 
there is no need to pursue a defence to specific performance as there 
is nothing to perform. However, if the evidence is not conclusive 
enough to support the full-blown concept of unconscionable bargain, 
therefore there is a contract which is capable of performance. A 
different category is entered into with regard to the unconscionableness 
of a transaction in relation to the defence of fairness. One obvious 
question arises between the two classes, is the test or standard of 
unconscionableness any lower than that applied at the first level of 
investigation? 
7. with regard to the circumstances, the burden of proof 
lies on the party against whom specific performance is 
sought, to establish the circumstances. 
Broughton v Snook [1938] Ch 505. 
8. Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 
The court will not grant specific performance if the 
plaintiff knew of the defendant's incapacity 
Denny v Hancock (1870) 6 Ch App 1; It need not be shown 
that the plaintiff was guilty of intentional fairness 
Mortlock v Buller (1804) 10 Ves 292. 
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In partial answer to this question McMullin. J in Archer v Cutler 9 
had cause to state the law applicable to unconscionable bargain as 
it stands in New Zealand. His Honour felt that the following factors 
while not being singularly determinative of an issue were in various 
combinations good evidence of an unconscionable bargain. Those 
factors being i the plaintiff's knowledge of the defendant's 
unsoundness of mind or eccentricity, the defendant's lack of 
advice, the defendant's disadvantageous bargaining position, the 
sale was at an undervalue. 
McMullin. J indirectly alluded to a major importance of having a 
contract set aside by the equitable principles of unconscionable 
bargain rather than having to rely on the discretion to refuse 
specific performance when he said "I uphold the defence .•.. of 
unconscionable bargain. Accordingly the plaintiff cannot succeed 
in his claim for specific performance or damages. " The point 
being, that if the contract is overturned completely there is 
no right to damages. 
In light of this, it is ventured that the test for unconscionability 
of bargain with regard to the discretion is a less rigorous standard, 
as a plaintiff is always left with his remedy in damages, if the 
court so decides. 
9. [1980] 1 NZLR 386 
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. . 'c 10 McMullin. J echoes h~s above comments ~n 0 onnor v Hart 
"Unconscionability as a separate ground for avoiding a contract is 
a somewhat amorphous concept. Its metes and bounds are not 
defined. nIl Possibly the case which crystallizes the standard of 
d d · . ' C' f' d12 unconscionable bargain as regar s the ~scret~on ~s a~n v Lay ~el , 
a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Mr Layfield was 
92 years old. He grazed 1,619 acres of land. At 92 he felt he was 
too old to work and so decided to sell the property and retire. A 
real estate agent interested three purchasers in the property, who 
would buy a third each. Instructions for the preparation of contracts 
were given to Mr Layfield's solicitor who also acted for the purchasers. 
Mr Layfield signed the contracts which contained some blanks, which 
the solicitor filled out later. Mr Layfield suddenly decided not 
to sell because he said "he was sick at the time and did not know 
that the contracts that he was signing were binding contracts of 
sale. n Rath. J extensively reviewed the evidence, and held that 
Mr Layfield had sufficient mental capacity and that the sale was 
at a gross undervalue. It is submitted, that in light of the 
solicitor's compromising position, the age of the vendor and the 
sickness of the vendor (sickness given his age) that Rath. J should 
have refused specific performance. Moreover His Honour appears to 
have applied the general standard of unconscionable bargain to this 
case rather than considering all the factors at hand and doing so 
on a lesser scale in view of the fact that 
10. [1983] NZLR 280 
11. per McMullin. J Ibid 290. 
Archer v Cutler Supra is expressly approved on this point. 
12. ANZCR [1983] 180 
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His Honour was asked to decide upon specific performance. 
In support of this view, specific performance was refused in 
13 Galloway v Pedersen where an agent acted on behalf of both 
parties, albeit without the full knowledge of one of the 
parties. 
u. Gallowa~ v Pedersen (1915) 34 NZLR 513 
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J (i) THE TIME AT WHICH UNFAIRNESS MUST BE DETERMINED 
As a general rule, the question of unfairness must be determined as 
1 
at the date of the making of the contract, and matters which occurred 
before such date may be considered. 2 Subsequent events are, in 
general, irrelevant, for the fact that events uncertain at the time of 
entering the contract, may afterwards proceed in a direction as 
3 
contemplated by one or both of the parties is no reason for 
holding the contract to be unfair. Thus, for example, a family 
arrangement or other compromise is fair if entered into by both 
parties who have equal knowledge, and who contract in view of some 
future and uncertain event or the future ascertainment of facts 
4 past but unknown. 
1. Revell v (1813) 2 Ball & B 280. 
Lawder v Blanchford (1815) Beat 522 
2. Gurnrnow Meagher & Lehane "Equity Doctrines & Remedies" 
@ Para 2020. 
3. If the deviation from the terms of the contract is of 
the correct magnitude the contract may be absolutely 
frustrated. Moreover frustration and impossibility are 
equitable defences to a decree for specific performance. 
It is trite that one of the underlying rationale behind 
these defences is that it would be unfair to enforce a 
contract where performance was impossible or frustrated. 
Generally see Spry "Equitable Remedies" @ 117 ff. 
4. Lawton v Campion (1854) 18 Beav 87 i 
Pickering v Pickering (1839) 2 Beav 31; 
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Subsequent events will be a ground for specific relief, 
but in these cases they will fall under the discretionary headings 
of illegality, impossibility or hardship, for example. 
The authority for the above propositions is dated. Given the movement, 
during the last eighty years towards the use of discretions and a 
breaking away from the slavish following of precedent coupled with the 
, d 5 d' 'h 6 emergence, 1n New Zealan, of the octr1ne of unjust enr1C ment, 
it is ventured that subsequent unfairness should be considered when 
considering the discretionary defence of unfairness. Such post 
contractual unfairness could be envisaged in a situation where the 
actual facts are such as to render what is sold worthless, and are 
known to one party but not to the other, the contract will not be 
enforced, even if it expressly deals with uncertainty.7 There is 
5. Hayward v [1983] NZLR 247 
6. A plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if he was 
allowed to enforce a contract which subsequently 
had become advantageous to him and disadvantageous 
to the defendant, if such advantage had been 
contrived by the plaintiff or if the plaintiff 
had of turned a blind eye to factors leading to such 
an advantage (there could well be an overlap with the 
discretionary consideration of non-disclosure here) • 
7. 
-----
v (1857) 26 LJCh 412. 
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also authority for the proposition that if the contingency is outside 
the contemplation of the parties, and different in kind and degree from 
. 7a h' 1 d h f such uncerta1nty as t e part1es contemp ate , t e court may re use 
specific performance even though the contract is not discharged at law. 8 
7a. with regard to this term "uncertainty" it should be 
remembered that questions of hardship or unfairness 
must be judged with close attention not only to the 
knowledge of the parties .•.• but also with reference 
to their intentions, for it may appear from the terms 
of the contract that it was deliberately entered into 
in order to settle some doubtful or uncertain question. 
In some instances a misapprehension may arise which is 
outside the uncertainty which the contract was intended 
to resolve : 
See Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 178. As to 
uncertainty being a ground for refusing specific 
performance see the judgment of Sinclair. J in 
Healey v Jacobson (H/C Auckland A216/85) where the 
contract was so uncertain, incomplete and obscure that 
a decree was refused. 
8. Baxendale v Seale (1855) 19 Beav 601 
Davis v Shepherd (1866) 1 Ch App 410. 
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Price v strange9 provides a recent illustration of subsequent unfairness 
being considered. In that case unfairness and impropriety in the 
valuation of a third person, where under the contract the price was to 
be fixed by that person, was alluded to. However it was noted that 
such instances would be rare. 
In summary it is felt that while subsequent events may prima facia not 
appear to be relevant to the investigation of unfairness, depending on 
the facts of any given case, a court has a discretion whether to consider 
such events or not. The degree of surprise and the actions of the 
plaintiff determining the weight to be given to the unfairness. 
9. (1978) Ch 338 
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FAIRNESS AND THIRD PARTIES 
A species of unfairness which may stay the hand of the court is that 
the contract, if enforced would be injurious to third persons,l 
including members of the public,2 or would involve a breach of trust,3 
or a breach of a prior contract with a third person,4 or would compel 
the defendant to do an act which he is not lawfully competent to do, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Thomas v Dering (1837) 1 Keen 729 
McKewan v Sanderson (1875) L R 20 Eq 65 
Miller v Jackson [1977] 3 All ER 338 
(in this case an injunction was refused due to 
public interest in the protection of the 
environment.) 
Verrall v Great Yarmouth Borough Council [1980] 
1 All ER 839, where specific performance of a 
licence to occupy a hall was granted to a 
controversial political group. 
Byrne v Acton (1721) 1 Bro Parl Cas 186; 
Br v Parsole [1937] 3 All ER 831 i 
where there is an innocent breach of trust which has 
been committed as the result of a contract, the court 
may nevertheless enforce the contract by making the 
other party carry out his part of the bargain. 
willmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96; 
Manchester Ship Canal Co v Manchester Racecourse Co 
[1900] 2 Ch 352. 
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or would involve a gross breach of duty as between principal and 
agent. Of value in this area is the case of Philegan & Co pty Ltd 
1 . . 1 C '15 v B acktown Munlclpa ounCl which considers not only third parties 
but also inadequacy of consideration. Blacktown Municipal Council 
entered into a contract to sell land to a company by accepting its 
offer of $5,000. There was evidence that the value of the land was 
$30,000. It was claimed that the land had been sold at such a 
gross undervalue that the ratepayers would suffer a substantial 
financial loss, if the contract were enforced against the council. 
The purchaser dealt with the council at arms length and there was no 
evidence that it was aware or had reason to suppose that the Council 
would be acting under any disadvantage in considering the offer. 
Holland. J averted to the principle that inadequacy of price is not 
of itself, apart from considerations of fraud, a sufficient ground 
for refusal of specific performance of a contract for the sale of 
land. Secondly His Honour felt that the relationship between a 
Municipal Council and its ratepayers is not one of those relationships 
between a contracting party and third persons such that the hardship 
occasioned to the third person by reason of the inadequacy of the 
price payable for the land is a matter to be taken into account in 
favour of refusing a decree. And finally as it had not been shown 
that the purchaser was aware of or had good grounds for suspecting 
that the council had been at a disadvantage in considering the matter, 
the inadequacy of the price in the present case coupled with the 
disadvantage and unequal bargaining position of the council in 
concluding the contract was not a ground for refusing the decree. 
5. (1974) 29 LGRA 231. 
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In conclusion, fairness along with "clean hands" and hardship is 
still decided given the circumstances of each individual case. This 
defence provides the purest form of "conscience justice". While 
instances of decrees being refused for unfairness alone are in the 
minority, the concept will often be the straw that breaks the 
Chancellor's back, when considered in addition to other defences. 
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K MISTAKE 
It may be found that although there is a valid and enforceable 
contract at law, one or both of the parties has a right in equity 
to have it rescinded or cancelled, due to circumstances ar out 
of a mistake. In such cases there is sometimes said to be equitable 
. k 1 m~sta e. The principles on which relief of this nature is granted 
have for some years been unsettled with conflict existing between the 
h .. la aut or~t~es. To some extent these difficulties are due to the fact 
that for many years there was confusion as to the effect of " 
mistake" or mistake such as to prevent the existence of an agreement 
Ib 
enforceable at common law. 
The mistake may be of such a nature to preclude the consensus ad idem 
which is required in every contract, and so render the seeming 
contract no contract at all. Such a mistake is now regulated by the 
lc Contractual Mistakes Act 1977. Where such a "mistake" exists 
1. Generally Williston on Contracts 3rd Ed (1970) @ 1537. 
lao The subjective theory: v 
-""'--
(1871) LR 6 QB 597; 
Williams "Vendor and Purchaser" 4th Ed (1936) 748; 
Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161 
SolIe v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671 
McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377 
Svanios v McNamara (1956) 96 CLR 186. 
lb. See n. la above. 
lc. Generally see: McCullough v McGrath's Stock & Poultry 
[1981] 2 NZLR 428; note that this case as to its ratio 
was overuled by the Court of Appeal in Ozzolins v Conlon 
CA 16/83. 
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there is no contract, and there can be no damages and no specific 
performance~ 
The court in certain circumstances will refuse specific performance 
in which there has been a mistake on the part of the defendant, even 
where the error is that of the defendant only and even when it has 
not been contributed to by the plaintiff. So in Clarke v Byrneld 
a vendor was refused specific performance, although there was no deception 
by him, as there was a mistake by the purchaser as to the land purchased. 2 
Where a mistake is entirely that of the defendant, the courts are much 
more reluctant to refuse specific performance, and have done so generally 
only in cases "where a hardship amounting to injustice would have been 
inflicted upon the defendant by holding him to his bargain and it was 
not reasonable to hold him to it.,,3 In Slee v k4 the High Court of 
Id. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
(1872) 3 VR (E) 56, 19 Aus D 39. 
Also: Neild v Davidson (1890) LR 11 209. 
Tamplin v James (1879) 15 Ch D 215 @ 221 
per James LJ. This case 2 blocks of land; on one, a 
parcel of 20 perches, there stood a hotel and the 
other block adjoined it and had for some years been 
occupied by the proprietors of the hotel. The only 
land sold under the contract was the parcel on which 
the hotel stood. The purchaser, however, thought that 
he was buying both parcels and sought to resist 
specific performance on the ground of that mistake. 
The Court rejected the defence and granted the decree. 
(1949) 86 CLR 271. 
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Australia said that where there was a unilateral mistake on the part 
of the defendant not contributed to by the plaintiff, the question 
whether the court should decree specific performance or leave the 
plaintiff to sue for damages must depend on the circumstances of the 
particular case i but the general rule governing the exercise of that 
Sa discretion was laid down by James L.J. in Tamplin v James. 
5b Lord McNaughton in Stewart v Kennedy has said that it cannot be 
disputed that a unilateral mistake by the defendant may be a good 
defence to a specific performance action, though most of such cases 
have been cases where a hardship amounting to injustice would have 
5c been inflicted upon the defendant. " 1"" 6 In Fragomen1 v Fog 1an1 
the High Court of Australia upheld a decree of specific performance 
in a case where the vendor alleged by way of defence that he had made 
a mistake as to the price to which he was committing himself. 
Sa. (1879) 15 Ch D 215. 
5b. (1890) 15 App Cas 75. 
5c. Wycombe Rly Co v Donnington Hospital (1866) 1 Ch App 268; 
Tamplin v James (1880) 15 Ch D 215; 
Burrow v Scammell (1881) 19 Ch D 175 
contrast Riverplate properties Ltd v Paul [1974] 2 All ER 656. 
6. (1968) 42 ALJR 263 @ 263. 
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Barwick C.J said at 263 : " ... there has been no finding by the trial 
judge that to order specific performance would be a hardship upon the 
defendant and for my part I can see no material in the case upon which 
it ought to be found that there would be any such hardship. Accordingly, 
at best it is a case of a unilateral mistake not precluding the formation 
of a contract and no hardship in ordering specific performance as 
II 
distinct from merely awarding damages. 
Mistake may be a defence to specific performance even where there has 
been a mistake in a popular rather than a technical sense. This does 
not allow a man to be careless in entering into a contract, and then 
avoid liability simply by alleging or even proving that he did so 
under a mistake,7 for to allow this would open the door for perjury 
and fraud. If, however, the defendant can establish that he made a 
bona fide mistake, it may well be thought inequitable to grant a 
decree. Obviously, this is likely to be the case where the plaintiff has 
contributed to the defendant's mistake,S even though unintentionally.9 
It has been judicially suggested that some of these cases have gone 
f I , 10 too ar. Ma lns v Freeman may perhaps be one of those cases, where 
7. Swaisland v Dearsley (1861) 29 Beav 430; 
Goddard v 
----"'--
(lS81) 51 LJ Ch 57. 
S. Moxey v Bigwood (1862) 4 DeG F & J 351 
9. (1872) 26 LT S17. 
10. (1837) 2 Ke 25. 
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specific performance was refused against a purchaser, whose agent 
had mistakenly bid for the wrong property, the mistake being an 
unreasonable one not in any way contributed to by the vendor. 
Mistakes have been held to be reasonable and specific performance 
refused, where it was caused by some ambiguity, even though the 
d f d t th h f h b ' , 11 e en an was e aut or 0 team 19u1ty. 
Where there is no error in the terms of the contract or in the 
contractual intention, and there is no difficulty in the way of the 
vendor performing the contract, according to its terms, or where 
such performance does not involve the conveyance of the property, 
which the defendant did not intend to sell, the court in the exercise 
of its discretion in considering hardship will consider hardship to 
both sides. 12 In Keats v wallis13 the vendor believed that the land, 
11. Douglas v Baynes [1908] AC 477 
Webster v Cecil (1861) 30 Beav 62 
Moreover a case may also arise for refusing specific 
performance where through the ignorance, neglect or 
error of the vendor's agent, property not intended 
to be sold is included in the sale: 
Re Hare and O'More's Contract [1901] 1 Ch 93 
12. Keats v Wallis 1953 NZLR 563 
13. Contrast this with Watson v Burton (1957) 1 WLR 19. 
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intended to be sold had less acreage than its true acreage, and the 
purchaser believed it to have the true acreage, but did not know that 
the vendor believed it contained less and did not in any way contribute 
to the vendor's mistake. It was held by Cooke. J that a court of 
equity, in its discretion, will not refuse specific performance in 
the case of a mistake such as occured in the case at hand, except 
perhaps hardship would be caused by holding the defendant to his 
bargain i and in such cases it is necessary to consider the hardship 
to the plaintiff as well. 14 
14. Contrast this approach with Watson v Burton (1957) 1 WLR 19 
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K (i) MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS 
Parol evidence is admissible to prove the mistake despite the 
statutory requirement l of evidence in writing, for the statute 
does not make a written agreement more binding than it was before 
the passing of the statute. 2 It does not say that a written agree-
ment shall bind, but that an unwritten agreement shall not bind. 3 
This parol evidence rule is in keeping with the flexible 
discretionary approach applied by the courts of equity when 
considering specific performance. Where the mistake occurs 
not in the formation of the contract but in its reduction into 
writing, the defendant can always set up the error as a defence; 
he must produce evidence to show that on account of the mistake the 
agreement as written does not represent the real agreement between 
himself and the plaintiff. 4 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Statute of Frauds (1677) S. 4. 
Craddock Brothers v Hunt [1923] 2 Ch 136 
United States of America v Motor Trucks Ltd [1924J AC 196. 
Clinan v Cooke (1802) 1 Sch & Lef 22 @ 39 
per Lord Redesdale L.C. 
Clark v Barnes [1929] 2 Ch 368 
Joynes v Statham (1746) 3 Atk 388; where an action 
was brought for the specific performance of an agreement 
to grant a least at a rent of 9 per annum, evidence 
was admitted to prove that it ought to have been a term 
of the agreement as recorded that the plaintiff should 
pay all taxes. 
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Where a mistake in the writing is proved, the court may either 
dismiss the plaintiff's action or grant specific performance, taking 
care that the real contract is carried into effect. 5 
Before the Judicature Act 1873 it appears to have been settled 
that except in a few cases the plaintiff in an action for specific 
performance could not allege that the written memorandum of the 
contract did not represent the true agreement, and claim to have 
6 
specific performance of the true agreement. But the court is 
now required to grant to the parties in one action all the relief 
to which they are entitled, hence there is jurisdiction to rectify 
an agreement and in the same action or specific performance of 
h d 'f' d 7 t e ocument as rect~ ~e • 
5. Which course the court will adopt depends upon the 
particular circumstances of each case; 
London and Birmingham Rly v Winter (1840) Ci and Ph 57, 
Smith v Wheatcroft (1878) 9 Ch D 223. 
6. See Woallam v Hearn (1802) 7 Ves 211, 
Martin v Pycroft (1852) 2 DeG M & G 785 
Marquis Townsend v Strangegroom (1801) 6 Ves 328. 
7. Nolan v Graves (1946] IR 376 
Craddock Brothers v Hunt (1923]2 Ch 136 
U.S.A. v Motor Trucks Ltd (1924] AC 196 following 
Olley v Fisher (1886) 34 Ch D 347. 
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Where the error or misunderstanding has been brought about or induced 
by the plaintiff, the plaintiff may sometimes, through an estoppel, 
be prevented from denying the terms of the agreement are the terms 
which were understood by the defendant. In such circumstances the 
defendant himself may be entitled, in appropriate circumstances, to 
obtain specific performance of the contract as understood by him. 8 
Also of note is the fact that a vendor who claims specific performance 
of a written contract for sale and insists upon a mistaken interpretation 
of the contract down to and at the trial, does not thereby forfeit his 
right to elect to have specific performance of the contract as rightly 
interpreted, the purchaser's offer, contained in his defence, to 
complete on those terms not having been withdrawn. 
Accordingly, it is too late for a purchaser, who in his defence to an 
action by the vendor for specific performance has pleaded that he was 
willing to complete on the right interpretation of the contract, to 
seek at the trial to amend that offer and ask for rescission and 
recovery of his deposit, on the ground that the vendor by his conduct 
in insisting upon a wrong interpretation had repudiated the contract 
and had thereby given the defendant purchaser the option to accept 
d . . 9 the repu 1at10n. 
In considering the defence the courts will take account of any error 
or misapprehension on the part of the defendant as to the nature of 
his contractual obligations on the effect of their performance. But 
it should be noted that it is necessary, rather than to regard the 
8. Fife v Clayton (1807) 13 Ves 546. 
Smith v Hughes (1871) LR LR6 QB 
9. Bernes v Fleming [1925 1 All ER 557 
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making of an error or misapprehension as an independent discretionary 
consideration in itself, to treat it as a matter which, together with 
additional circumstances, may affect or give rise to other discretionary 
considerations, such as hardship of performance or unfairness. 
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K (E) EQUITABLE MISTAKE 
There is a clear distinction between common-law mistake and equitable 
1 
mistake since the High Court of Australia's judgment in Taylor v Johnson. 
However where an order is sought for specific performance, it is not 
necessary to pursue an analysis of the nature of the right to equitable 
rescission through the mistake of one of the parties. 
what are here being considered are the circumstances in which a court 
of equity will decree the specific performance of contractual obligations. 
Specific performance is a discretionary remedy, and it is well established 
that the discretionary considerations on which relief is refused may 
include matters arising through mistake or error of one or both of the 
parties. 
Specific performance may indeed be refused in many cases where there 
is neither legal nor equitable mistake. However, where there is legal 
or equitable mistake proved, specific performance will necessarily be 
refused. Therefore it will often be found that the party wishing to 
enforce the performance of the material agreement will not be prevented 
from establishing such legal rights as he may be found to have; but he 
will simply be refused special assistance in equity.2 
3 The case of Taylor v Johnson cannot be overlooked even though it 
does not directly consider specific performance. The case provides 
an insight into the "modern" approach to mistake in Australia and 
adds fuel to the fire of flexibility and width which now pervades 
equitable remedies. 
1. 45 ALR 265 
2. Malins v Freeman (1837) 2 Ke 25; 
Webster v Cecil (1861) 30 Beav 62. 
3. 45 ALR 265. 
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Taylor v Johnson involved a "unilateral" mistake, sometimes known as 
a "mutual" mistake. In this case it refers to the situation where 
one party to a contract proceeds under a mistaken assumption. Mrs 
Johnson granted Mr Taylor an option to purchase ten acres of land 
for $15,000. The option was exercised and Mrs Johnson entered into 
a written contract with Mr Taylor's nominees. Subsequently, Mrs 
Johnson declined to perform the contract. She had mistakenly believed 
the price in the option and the contract to be $15,000 per acre. 
Specific performance was sought against Mrs Johnson. At first instance 
specific performance was ordered on the basis that Mrs Johnson was 
mistaken as to the price. It was found that Mr Taylor was unaware 
of the mistake. In the Court of Appeal their Honours substituted 
their own conclusion that Mr Taylor did believe Mrs Johnson was 
mistaken and set aside the contract. The High Court found it 
unnecessary to go beyond drawing a general inference from the evidence 
that Mr Taylor and Mrs Johnson each believed that the other was acting 
under a mistake or misapprehension either as to price or value in agreeing 
to a sale at the purchase price which he or she believed the other had 
accepted. 
Initially their Honours considered mistake at common law, they then 
progressed to consider the scope of the basis upon which relief in 
equity was available from the contractual consequences of unilateral 
mistake. Their Honours quoted a passage from the judgment of Dixon C.J. 
and Fullagar. J in . 4 Svan~os v McNamara 
4. (1956) 96 CLR 186. 
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" Mistake might, of course, afford a ground on which equity would 
refuse specific performance of a contract and there may be cases of 
mistake in which it would be so inequitable that a party should be 
held to his contract that equity would set it aside. No rule can 
be laid down a priori as to such cases but .•. it is difficult 
to conceive any circumstances in which equity could properly give 
relief by setting aside the contract unless there has been fraud 
or misrepresentation or a condition can be found expressed or implied 
in the contract. " 
In relation to this passage the majority stated "Presumably their 
Honours were referring to "fraud" in the wide equitable sense 
which includes unconscionable dealing. If they are not, we do not 
share the difficulty to which they referred. To the contrary, it 
seems to us that the reported cases, including Solle v ButcherS 
itself readily provide concrete examples of such circumstances. 
5. [1950] 1 KB 671 
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The primary authority which their Honours employed in support of 
their view of the equitable jurisdiction was Torrance v Bolton. 6 
The following proposition of law was formulated by Mason A.C.J, 
Murphy and Deane J.J " a party who has entered into a written 
contract under a serious mistake about its contents in relation to 
a fundamental term will be entitled in equity to an order rescinding 
the contract if the other party is aware that circumstances exist 
which indicate that the first party is entering the contract under 
some serious mistake or misapprehension about either the content or 
subject matter of that term and deliberately sets out to ensure that 
the first party does not become aware of the existence of his mistake 
or misapprehension. ,,7 
6. 
7. 
(1872) 8 Ch. App 118. This case "explained the 
basis upon which a contract for sale was set aside in 
a case of unilateral mistake as being the ordinary 
jurisdiction of equity to deal with any instrument or 
transaction in which the court is of the opinion that 
it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself 
of the legal advantage which he has obtained. Special 
circumstances will ordinarily need to be shown before 
it would be unconscientious for one party to a written 
contract to 
--------
it against another party who was 
under a mistake as to its terms or subject matter. 
45 ALR 265 @ 272. 
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It is conceded the above statement is directed towards rescission 
of a contract. However, justification for the investigation of this 
case with respect to specific performance is gleaned from the general 
attitude of the court towards matters equitable. Further Taylor v 
Johnson illustrates the Australian High Court's most recent attitude 
towards equitable mistake and equitable notions generally. 
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K (iii) HARDSHIP ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT 
Where a mistake or error is relied upon by the defendant as giving 
rise to hardship, it is not sufficient that he can merely show that 
performance of the agreement would cause him greater inconvenience 
than he had expected, he must be able to show that any such incon-
venience or hardship would be so oppressive that it would be unjust 
in all the circumstances - regard being had especially to prejudices 
to the plaintiff if performance in specie does not take place - to 
. . 1 
order speclflc performance. 
In deciding whether enforcement would be unjust the court will take 
into account both any right of the plaintiff to obtain damages at 
law and of any power to award damages at equity or compensation. 
All the circumstances of a mistake must be taken into account in 
determining whether it would be just to grant relief. Therefore, 
it is material to enquire whether the error of the defendant was, 
or was not, negligently conceived on his part. As to the 
reasonableness element of a supposedly negligent mistake, Watson v 
Marston2 points out that "what is more or less reasonable is not a 
thing that you can define, it must depend on the circumstances of 
each particular case " 3 
L Slee v Warke (1949) 86 CLR 271 
2. (1853) 4 DeG M & G 230. 
3. Ibid 234. 
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In some situations, difficulties of hardship can be overcome and 
enforcement of material obligations obtained, if the plaintiff is 
prepared to accept limited relief. These are cases where, although 
specific performance would not otherwise have been ordered, the 
plaintiff is willing to contend himself with performance as understood 
by the defendant, or to waive the objectionable terms in question, 
so that it cannot be said that the grant of relief is unjust and 
4 
unreasonable. 
4. Spry "Equitable Remedies" 2nd Ed @ 155 citing 
Baskcomb v Beckwith (1869) LR 8 Eq. 100 @ 109 and 
Preston v Luck (1884) 27 Ch D 497. 
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K (iv) CONTRACTUAL MISTAKES ACT 1977 
Section 5 (3) of the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 provides 
"Nothing in this Act shall deprive a court or an arbitrator of the 
power to exercise its or his discretion to withhold a decree of 
specific performance in any case. " 
The principal application of the Act involves a court in 
considering if the mistake postulated fits the statutory criteria 
of mistake and secondly the court is then to have regard to its 
powers under Section 7, such powers allowing a court to entertain 
a number of options including inter alia cancellation and validation 
on terms. 
There will still be many instances where a mistake does not fall 
within the criteria of the act the normal common law and equitable 
rules apply. Hence if specific performance of the particular contract 
is sought the equitable defence of mistake comes into play. 
A third situation arises, which it is submitted explains the enactment 
of Section 7.5(3) of the Act. In this instance, the Act applies, however 
a court under Section 7 may refuse to cancel the contract and allow 
partial or complete performance of the contract. It is ventured that 
in this situation, because Section 5 (3) preserves the equitable power 
to withold specific performance on the ground of mistake, a court must 
consider whether on equitable grounds performance of the contract should 
be refused. If such an investigation proves that no equitable defence 
can be made out, then the court may proceed to order such relief under 
Section 7 as it sees fit. 
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It is conceded when a court is required to consider the validity of 
the contract when assessing specific performance, the fact that the 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 is a code necessitates the rules of 
common law have been superseded. 
However, the whole matter is shrouded by the all-embracing discretion 
with regard to relief that a court is invested with under Section 7. 
Before the enactment of the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 a mistake would 
lead to the complete breakdown of the consensus ad idem and therefore 
the contract. By virtue of Section 7 of the Act a court may not only 
cancel a contract but also "declare the contract to be valid and sub-
stituting in whole or in part or for any particular purpose" or 
"grant relief by way of variation of the contract" or " grant relief 
by way of restitution or compensation " and " any order made under 
this section •.• may be made upon and subject to such terms and 
conditions as the court thinks fit". It is ventured that such a 
discretion is tantamount to conveying to the court a general "equitable" 
jurisdiction to decide matters upon the circumstances of each individual 
case basing its decision of justice of "conscience" rather than being 
ensnared with the rigidity of common-law principles. A court of equity 
also has the power to vary a contract or award compensation. It is 
ventured that Section 7 is a codification of the equitable discretion 
to refuse specific performance on the grounds of mistake coupled with 
ancilliary provisions. 
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ILLUMINATING THE TREND - CONLON V OZOLINS 
In 1984 the Court of Appeal decided Conlon v ozolinsl , arguably the 
most significant case on mistake decided by a New Zealand court. 
The judgment of the majority continues with that courts underlying 
recent intention of deciding matters upon the ground of what is fair 
in the circumstances. 
Woodhouse P. opens his judgment with a line which sets the tone for 
the following pages .•• II Mrs Ozolins is an elderly widow who made 
a mistake".2 Mrs Ozolins contracted to sell a large area of land 
which abutted her back garden. A contract was signed, but the legal 
description in the contract encompassed not only the sections but also 
Mrs Ozolins' back garden. In that situation Mrs Ozolins refused to go 
through with the sale, and the plaintiff brought proceedings in the 
High Court for specific performance. The High Court3 decreed specific 
performance, and the case at hand is the appeal from such decision. 
with respect to this paper the judgment of Woodhouse P. begins 
promisingly with the following comment .. " Has the court jurisdiction 
in terms of 5.6(1) (a) [of the Contractual Mistakes Act) in a factual 
situation of the kind outlined to examine the question of discretionary 
relief? ,,4 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
[1984J 1 NZLR 489 @ 496 
Ibid 496. 
Reported [1984] 1 NZLR 489 
Ibid @ 497 
--_._-. ---------
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It was accepted by the appellant that to gain relief under the Act 
it must be in terms of Section (1) (a) (iii), such section intimating 
that the vendor on the one side and the purchaser on the other were 
"influenced in their respective decisions to enter into the contract 
by a different mistake about the same matter of fact ••• " 
Woodhouse P. analysed the facts and found that the respective decisions 
of the parties to proceed and finally to enter into the written 
contract influenced by a mistaken belief on the one side that 
was different from the mistaken belief on the other side and moreover, 
each mistake was about the size of the land to be bought and sold. 
Finding that Section 6 applied and there was a mistake, it was necessary 
for the court to make an assessment of damages under Section 7 seeing 
as the claim for specific performance would fail. 
The second judgment in the case was delivered by McMullin. J . 
His Honour expressly overruled the case of McCullough v MCGrath5 
(a decision of Mahon. J) which held that a person could not by reason 
of execution of an agreement invoke the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977, 
because of an estoppel. However McMullin. J considered that "this 
would severely restrict the operation of the Act itself. " 
Somers. J delivered a dissenting judgment. His Honour, while not 
expressly referring to McCullough v McGrath6 , upheld the doctrine 
of estoppel by conduct with regard to assent to a contract. His Honour 
went on to hold that Mrs Ozolins intention "was discoverable from the 
7 
words of the contract". And that her mistake was truly "unilateral", 
it was unknown to the purchaser. In short, the purchaser made no 
5. [1981] 2 NZLR 428. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid @ 507. 
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mistake at all. "He intended to buy the four lots described to and 
inspected by him, and that, according to the agreement, is what he 
did. Having decided that the Contractual Mistakes Act did not apply 
His Honour dealt finally with the relief to be ordered .•. " Commonly 
where specific performance is resisted in the case of mistake which 
does not prevent the existence of a contract and does not afford 
grounds for rescission some ambiguity in the agreement or some, albeit 
innocent, misrepresentation by the plaintiff must be shown - see 
, 8 'ld 1 9 Tamp11n v James ; Swa1S an v Dears y. But it has been said and may 
be accepted for the present case that a decree may be refused even 
where the mistake is that of the defendant alone and has not been 
induced or contributed to by the plaintiff if to order specific 
performance would be "highly unreasonable" - Stewart v Kennedy.10 
Despite the fact that this is a dissenting judgment we have a condensed 
commentary on mistake as a discretionary defence to a decree in New 
Zealand, in that last quote of Somers. J. His Honour then applied this 
statement of the law. Such application Somers. J considered, involved 
a balancing of the interests and conduct of the parties. In this case 
the vendor was genuinely mistaken, a price less than the value of the 
four lots was received, she would lose her home and garden and her lifestyle. 
8. (1880) 15 Ch D 215. 
9. (1861) 29 Beav 430 
10. (1890) 15 App Cas 75 
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Balanced against this, the responsibility for the mistake rested with 
Mrs Ozolins and to refuse the decree would be a hardship to the plaintiff 
who entered other transactions relying upon his ability to purchase the 
four lots. Hence His Honour found that the contract should be specifically 
performed. 
It is a pity that the other members of the court did not have to comment 
upon the 
mistake. 
table discretion to refuse specific performance because of 
Putting aside the reasoning which Woodhouse P. and McMullin. J used to 
bring the "mistake" within the Act their decisions with regard to 
specific performance illustrate a difficulty that was not properly 
considered by their Honours, that being that if a mistake falls within 
the definition of mistake under the Act and under Section 7, the contract 
is validated in part or in whole, it may be that performance would have 
been refused under the equitable discretionary principle of mistake 
remembering that such principles are preserved by Section 5(3) of the 
Act. 
It is considered that the most important feature of this landmark case 
to the overall scheme of this paper is the overruling of the decision of 
His Honour Mr Justice Mahan in McCullough v MCGrath. ll Here we 
have, with respect, a "black letter judge" an advocate of the old school 
and of the law as it stood at the turn of the century in its rigidity. 
Such Judge, in the wake of the resurgence of fairness and the broadening 
of discretions has not only been overturned on a fundamental point on 
mistake, but recently his decision in Avondale Printers v Haggie12 was 
11. Supra n.5 
12. [1979] 2 NZLR 124 
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d b k b h f 1 ' d G' d ,13 rendere a ac water y t e Court 0 Appea 1n Haywar v 10r an1 , 
14 
and it is humbly ventured that the decision in Carly v Farrelly 
given the trend expounded will not last. 
In summary, while the decisions of Woodhouse P and McMullin. J may 
not be applauded by many for their reasoning, their purpose is striking 
and clearly stated. They intend not to fetter the Act, they intend 
to allow its growth. Not uncultivated growth, but growth that will 
be checked from time to time by decisions of that court as to cases 
which arise close to the elasticised boundaries of the law created 
by the court. 
13. [1983] NZLR 
14. [1975] 1 NZLR 356 
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L MISREPRESENTATION 
At common law any misrepresentation, whether fraudulent, innocent 
or negligent could be a bar to the enforcement of the contract by 
the party responsible for the misrepresentation. Hence if the defendant 
can establish a misrepresentation he has a right to cancel, and it 
follows as a matter of course that specific performance will not be 
ordered against him, as there will be no contract in existence to 
1 perform. 
Once again we have a distinction, this time being drawn between 
misrepresentations capable of leading to cancellation and on the 
other hand misrepresentations not capable of giving ground for rescission 
but being able to defeat an application for specific performance. la 
A vital point being that rescission has the drastic effect of avoiding 
the contract for all purposes, while refusing specific performance leaves 
it open to the plaintiff to seek other remedies, such as damages. 2 
1. 
lao 
2. 
Electronic Industries Ltd v Harrison & Crossfield ANZ Ltd 
[1966] 2 NSWR 336. Re Bannister (1879) 12 Ch D 131: 
Hope v Walters [1900] 1 Ch 257: Cadman v Horner 
(1810) 18 Ves 10 ; Clermont v Tasburgh (1819) 1 Jac&W 112; 
Re Terrey and White's Contract (1886) 32 Ch D 14. 
See Cadman v Horner (Supra n. 1) and Re Bannister (Supra n.l) 
also Caballero v Henty (1874) 9 Ch App 447; 
Redgrave v Heard (1881) 20 Ch D Ii 
Jacobs v Revell [1900] 2 Ch 858. 
Fenn v Craig (1838) 3 Y & C Ex 216. 
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f ' . 2a Aaron's Ree s v Tw~ss establishes that it is commonly good 
practice to seek rescission if possible, rather than to wait and 
raise the defence of misrepresentation if a specific performance 
action is brought, particular as in the latter case the burden 
of proof rests on the defendant to show that he repudiated the 
contract upon, or at least within a reasonable time after, discovery 
3 
of the truth. Moreover a right of rescission may have arisen 
but may also have ceased by the time at which the court proposes 
to make its order. It also must be borne in mind that merely 
because a right of rescission has been lost through laches or 
waiver, for example, it does not necessarily mean that the 
considerations which formerly would have been taken into account 
as founding a right to rescind may not be taken into account 
subsequently where a court of equity is asked to exercise its 
4 discretion by ordering specific performance. 
2a. [1896J AC 273 @ 293. 
3. united Machinery Co of Canada v Brunett [1909] AC 330; 
Dawes v Harners (1875) LR 10 CP: 
First National Reinsurance Co v Greenfield [192lJ 2 KB 260 
4. The nature of the misrepresentation may not enable the 
representee to rescind the contract but its existence will 
be a sufficient defence to an action for specific performance; 
Holliday v Lockwood [19l7J 2 Ch 47, where a representation 
induced the plaintiff to buy only one of two adjoining lots 
and specific performance of the sale of both was denied; 
Peacock v Penson (1848) 11 Beav 355; 
Myers v watson (1851) 1 Sim NS 523. 
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The principles must be used with caution in cases where there 
has not at any time existed a right to rescind because, for 
example, the misrepresentations 5 relate to matters of opinion 
or of the likelihood of the occurrence of particular future events. 6 
If in such a case proceedings for specific performance are brought, 
in principle it is difficult to see why misrepresentations as to 
future events or matters of law should not be investigated. Even 
if such misrepresentations do not fit within the discretionary 
category of "misrepresentations" they may still be considered in 
part with regard to the all-embracing categories of defence, 
those being hardship and fairness. 
In general, in each situation where a court must decide whether a 
decree should lie or not, a court looks to all matters which may 
render it more or less just and reasonable to grant relief and it 
is not inclined to accept restrictions or limitations based upon 
what would be appropriate in the course of proceedings for rescission. 
5. Oral evidence is admissible to prove such misrepresentations: 
Flood v Finlay (1811) Z Ball & B 9; 
Winch v Winchester (1812) 1 Bes & B 375. 
6. Lamare v Dixon (1873) LR 6 HL 414; 
Re Bannister (1879) 12 Ch D 131 
Hence a representation of a less serious nature than 
that required to rescind a contract it may be sufficient 
to resist performance. Note: Specific performance may 
be denied because rescission is no longer possible 
Hope v Walters [1900]1 Ch 257 - where a vendor innocently 
misrepresented that the property was an investment and 
the tenant actually used it as a brothel. 
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While an innocent misrepresentation may not provide sufficient 
grounds for rescission, with regard to specific performance such 
a representation may avoid the decree. For instance a vendor's 
solicitor innocently represented to a purchaser that the vendor 
had not executed a deed in favour of the local council waiving 
certain compensatory rights in Electronic Industries Ltd v 
7 Harrisons & Crossfields (ANZ) Ltd. The court found as a fact 
that the representation was a material one and even though it was 
made innocently it was a ground to refuse a decree of specific 
performance. 
The Supreme Court of Ireland provides the most recent overview 
of this defence in Smelter Corporation of Ireland Ltd v Abing 
. 1 8 O'Dr1sco 1 . Mrs O'Driscoll contracted to sell her lands to the 
plaintiff company. Mrs O'Driscoll had been reluctant to sell 
her lands, and during the course of the plaintiff's efforts to 
persuade her to sell, an agent for the plaintiff had stated to her 
that, if she did not agree to sell her lands to the plaintiffs, 
the local authority would exercise its statutory powers so as to 
acquire the lands compulsorily. Although the agent believed his 
statement to be true, there was no foundation for it. Mrs O'Driscoll 
believed this statement to be true. In the course of events the 
sale was not completed and the plaintiff company sought a decree 
of specific performance. The court noted that specific performance 
was a discretionary remedy. Moreover, that by reason of the 
plaintiff's misrepresentation, Mrs O'Driscoll had been under a 
fundamental misapprehension about the true facts, and that it 
would be unjust to grant a decree in the circumstances. Hence we 
7. [1966] 2 NSWLR 336. 
8. [1977] 1 IR 305 
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see the court having regard to the facts at hand and considering 
these in light of the concepts of fairness and justice. In short, 
precedents are not slavishly followed, and as is the present trend 
in things equitable, a flexible and just approach is taken. 
An unusual difficulty arises when a contract for the sale of land 
is sought to be enforced. Here it is often found that there is a 
misrepresentation or misdescription of either the title of the 
vendor to the land or of its dimensions or characteristics, and 
yet, as has been alluded to earlier, the purchaser will in many 
cases be forced to accept, or the vendor forced to convey, the 
material land with compensation in respect of the error. Such a 
.. . 1 d d 9 sltuatlon arose ln New Zea an Trust an Loan Co v Coe. In this 
instance an agreement for sale and purchase provided that the survey 
to be made of the area sold should follow as closely as possible the 
boundaries shown on the plan. However the surveyor did not follow 
these exactly. It was found that the defendant had materially 
misled the purchaser as to what he was purchasing. The purchaser 
understood he was purchasing upward of 500 acres of ploughable land, 
and from 160 to 200 acres of rough land. The survey resulted in the 
purchaser obtaining 300 to 400 acres of rough land. Sim. J felt 
this was clearly a case where specific performance would be refused. 
However this case was unusual in that the purchaser was not disputing 
specific performance, on the contrary he was very keen to acquire the 
land. All he wished was to have the contract varied to take account 
of the rough land. His Honour felt that the discrepencies were so 
large that if he did this he was as good as writing a new contract, 
9. (1910) 12 GLR 550 
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and he could not do this. Therefore he awarded specific performance, 
subject to an inquiry as to abatement. It is submitted that this is 
a classic example of a court of equity at work in its purest form. 
By adopting a more rigid approach, the contract may have set aside 
even though the parties were both still intent on a sale. 
As has been noted the question of whether specific performance shall 
be refused given a misrepresentation is present, depends largely on 
the circumstances at hand. No area is more subject to this principle 
that the consideration of whether a representation is a mere puff 
or is worthy of examination. 10 For instance in Bramley v Parrott 
A and B agreed to exchange leases. A represented the land comprised 
in his lease to be well timbered. There was evidence to the fact 
that A's land had a considerable quantity of timber on it fit for 
the purpose required. B was a sawmiller and refused to complete 
the contract on the grounds that A's land was not well timbered. 
A sued for specific performance. Holroyd. J in the Victorian Supreme 
Court held that A's representations were within the class of vague 
and indefinite commendations which amounted to mere puffs and which 
ought to put a purchaser on inquiry. If there had been little or no 
timber, A's statement to that effect would have been enough to refuse 
the decree, so commented Holroyd. J. However, given the circumstances 
performance was decreed. To highlight this principle the case of 
h . 11 Learmoat v Morr~s provides a useful contrast. In that case 
the defendants offered their mining claim for sale to the plaintiffs 
10. (1869) 2 Ch 379 
11. (1869) 6 WW & AS 74. 
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by their agent B, who made some mis-statements disparaging the 
value of the defendant's claim. It was found that the agent had 
mis-stated his view and generally untruly and even fraudulently 
disparaged the property and that he had used some artifice to 
mislead the vendors on the subject. It was held that the plaintiffs 
were not misled or induced to enter into the contract by them and 
hence the matter was a fit matter for an equity suit. Therefore 
the decree was affirmed. 
A further distinction arises between misrepresentations of fact 
and law. Do these have the same effect when considering refusal 
of a decree? Kaye. J turned his mind to this problem in Public 
12 Trustee v Taylor . Land for sale was advertised as "zoned: 
special use 10, subject to road widening." It was in fact not 
zoned as stated, but it was reserved for the purposes of a 
proposed main road. The purchaser purported to rescind the contract 
for misrepresentation, and the vendor sued for specific performance. 
Kaye. J was of the opinion that it would have been necessary, for 
the purpose of deciding whether the land was zoned as represented, 
to consider the relevant town planning legislation and instruments 
involving applying the law to the location of the property, the 
statement in the advertisement was a misrepresentation of law. His 
Honour went to conclude that equally with a mis-statement of fact, 
a mis-statement of law knowingly made will support an action for 
deceit and give the innocent party a right of rescission of a contract 
12. [1978] VR 289 
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13 induced thereby and a defence to an action for specific performance. 
If an agreement is in part performed by one of the parties, it is 
too late for the others to complain of fraud, surprise or 
misrepresentation i for a court of equity will decree a specific 
h . . f' 14 enforcement of t e remalnlng part 0 It. 
15 A gloss on this principle arises through Holliday v Lockwood. 
Here a purchaser separately acquired two lots of property at an 
auction in reliance on an innocent misrepresentation which pertained 
to the second lot. It was clear that rescission would be granted 
with respect to the second lot. However there would have to be some 
element of interdependence if rescission was to be effective against 
the first lot. Moreover, if the court was satisfied that, apart 
from the misrepresentation, the particular purchaser would not have 
brought either lot, it will refuse the vendor specific performance 
as to the first lot. 
A party obtaining an agreement by a partial misrepresentation, is 
not entitled to specific performance, on waiving the part affected 
by the misrepresentation. The effect of partial misrepresentation 
is not to alter or modify the agreement pro tanto, but to destroy 
13. Brereton v Cowper (1724) 1 ER 241 
Wall v Stubbs (1815) 1 Madd 80 
14. Anglesey v Anglesey (1741) 1 Bro ParI Cas 289 
15. [1917] 2 Ch 47. 
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it entirely and to operate as a personal bar to the party who 
. d' 16 has pract1se 1t. 
17 Colby v Gadsen considers the effect of an agreement for sale 
to a third party after the initial sale had been induced by 
misrepresentation. In this case a purchaser agreed to buy an estate, 
in reliance upon a statement in the particulars of sale that the 
property lay upon a valuable vein of coal, which vein afterwards 
proved to have been mostly worked out. Subsequently, in an effort 
to cut his losses, the purchaser entered into an agreement with a 
third party to sell the colliery at a price implying the existence 
of a considerable quantity of coal. It was held that the transaction 
between the purchaser and the third party did not invalidate the 
purchaser's defence of misrepresentation to a bill by the initial 
vendor for specific performance, although it might have been an 
answer to a claim by the purchaser for an abatement of the purchase 
money. 
The law as regards misrepresentation in New Zealand underwent a 
fundamental change with the passing of the Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979. As with the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 the former 
Act contemplates the law relating to specific performance by providing 
in Section 15 "Except as provided in Section 4(3), 6(2) and 14 
of this Act nothing in this Act shall affect (a) the law relating 
to specific performance or injunction." Sections 4(3), 6(2) and 
Section 14 purtain to the Sale of Goods Act. 
16. Bartlett v Salmon (1855) 6 DeG M & G 33; 
Clermont v Tasburgh (1819) 37 ER 318. 
17. (1867) 17 LT 97. 
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Assuming a misrepresentation is found, there is no longer rescission 
available at equity as Section 7 of the Act replaces the existing rules 
both at equity and common law governing discharge for breach and 
repudiation. The scheme of Section 7 is to allow parties to cancel 
a contract in certain cases but not otherwise. Therefore a 
misrepresentation may lead to a cancellation of the contract and 
necessarily specific performance is excluded. Alternatively Section 
7 may allow the contract to stand. In this instance performance of 
the contract is possible, but because of the savings provision in 
Section 14, such performance will still be subject to the equitable 
discretionary defence of misrepresentation. Hence the terms of the 
Act may not allow cancellation, but an examination of the equitable 
defence may effectively obtain this objective. 
In support of the above proposition, one should note that specific 
performance is an equitable remedy and for this reason it has a 
special nature. If parliament intended to change the conscience 
based nature of the remedy, they would surely have done what countless 
legal systems have not done for centuries and codify the power of a 
plaintiff to seek enforcement of his contractual rights. 
If a plaintiff preys in his statement of claim for specific 
performance, could a defendant specifically plead the contractual 
remedies act as a defence and pointedly claim cancellation of the 
contract? There is as yet no answer to this question. It would 
appear prudent for a solicitor in a situation where a decree was 
being sought to first plead the Contractual Remedies Act and apply 
for cancellation and then in the alternative plead that there was 
a representation amounting to an "equitable misrepresentation" . 
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(This assumes that there are no facts supportive of a direct 
claim for cancellation.) 
However there remains the difficulty of Section 15. It is likely 
that prima facia the first abovestated ground of defence is in 
operative, as Section 15 is clear that the Act does not apply to 
specific performance. But could not a defendant claim that he was 
not setting the Act up as a defence to Specific Performance, but 
rather as a completely separate remedy? 
In summary, misrepresentation as a discretionary defence would 
appear not to be effected by the Contractual Remedies Act 1979. 
The substantial difference arises in the ability of a court to 
bring to an end a contract as a whole and thereby preclude any 
thought of specific performance. Such cancellation is presently 
governed solely by the terms of Section 7, but as case law develops 
as a result of the Act, the bounds of cancellation may draw closer 
to the old common law and equitable grounds of rescission. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having viewed some selected aspects of specific performance, 
it is worth considering the general comments of Fry with regard to the 
performance of contracts ; "When we consider how large a part in the 
affairs of modern society is played by contracts and the resulting 
rights and obligations, and how plainly the right to insist on the 
actual execution of contracts flows from their very nature, it is at 
first sight a remarkable circumstance that many systems of jurisprudence 
seem to make no direct provision for it .... it seems probable that 
no such elaborate attempt to enforce the actual performance of contracts 
as that made by the Courts of Equity in this country exists in any 
other system of jurisprudence " 1 
Given that the above statement is of some sixty years' 
vintage, it is ventured that the place of the contract in society 
nowdays has assumed a greater importance, hence the method of enforce-
ment also must have moved with the times. 
Is the enforcement of contracts by equitable means elaborate? 
On the face of it the remedy is governed by a labyrinth of rules 
and exceptions. Constantly subject to change as new cases are decided. 
But how deeply do these new .cases penetrate the underlying principles? 
Are they not merely particular fact situations which are still governed 
by the common criteria of conscience? Further, is not the actual 
seeking of a decree quite uncomplicated? That is, one either obtains 
performance or fails to because of counterveiling common-law or equitable 
circumstances. The elaboration and confusion only arising once it is 
1. Fry "Specific Performance" 6th Ed @ 3-4. 
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realised that a decree is not to be granted, and the vexing question 
of damages entering the fray. 
It is submitted that the House of Lords have isolated 
and successfully grappled with this difficulty. 
clarifies not only the difficulty as to the awarding and quantification 
of damages but it also goes a distance towards crystallising the 
highly technical area concerning election of remedies (i.e. election 
between specific performance and damages). In short this aspect 
of specific performance relating to damages has been "a mess"l 
and Fry was correct in considering it prolix. 
Has the method of enforcement moved with the times? 
Here is the reason why equity is designated the responsibility of 
administering the sanctity of contracts. The cornerstones of the 
remedy, fairness, conscience and justice have never changed. 
However the morals that determine what is fair and just at any given 
time have and hence the remedy has been able to keep abreast of 
social and commercial standards. For example, there was some 
judicial reluctance at the turn of the century to enforce testamentary 
dispositions as were considered to be an appropriate remedy. 
As noted this has been clarified in line with the general policy 
view that a testator not only owes a duty to his (Family 
Protection Act 1959) but also that the grave will not allow him 
. to escape his contractual obligations (Law Reform Testamentary 
Promises Act 1949). 
If Fry is correct as to the elaborateness of equity's 
system and given that the common law does not provide for the 
enforcement of contracts, why has Parliament not intervened and 
codified the remedy? Having sought an insight into specific 
performance in this paper, the answer to the last stated question 
1. Madden v (1983) 1 NSWLR 305 @ 306 per Helsham C.J. 
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is clear. Because of the infinite variety of contractual situations 
in which performance is sought, and given the large number of common 
law and equitable considerations which come to bear on the question 
of whether performance is to be awarded or otherwise, a statute is 
too inflexible to provide for a comprehensive consideration of the 
factors which effect a decree (if that is what it would be 
by the statute). Further, concepts such as hardship and fairness, 
which are still much to the fore in determining the suitabi of 
performance as illustrated by Patel v Ali, are intangibles, closely 
linked to the conscience of a court of equity. 
Moreover the legislature itself has realised and 
acknowledged that specific performance is an extraordinary remedy 
and has allowed it to continue unimpeded (Contractual Remedies Act 
1979, Contractual Mistakes Act 1976) while cod much of the 
law surrounding it. It is ventured the wide judicial discretions 
embodied in the abovementioned statutes well as the Contracts 
Privity Act 1983 and the Illegal Contracts Act) add to the trend 
towards simplification and a retreat to the facts of each case. 
The underlying theme of conscience coming to the fore. 
The origins of specific performance for arguments 
sake appear to be rooted in the Court of Chancery. The doctrine 
began as an ideal, that a contracting party could not avoid his 
obligations to perform a contract without also breaching a moral 
duty he owed to the other involved in the contract. The 
principle was based on conscience, and its application was purely 
discretionary. with the passage of time a body of law has 
evolved over the doctrine. Initially, Lord Eldon 
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did much to circumscribe the limits of this "judicial" discretion 
by prescribing many of the defences to an action for specific 
performance. Latterly these parameters have been examined and 
adopted in the myriad of cases before the courts concerning 
specific performance. Over the years, it is submitted, the 
underlying rationale of the doctrine has become glossed over by 
a veneer of case-law, and in certain areas the idea of conscience 
has been lost from sight (of inter alia damages, third parties) • 
It is submitted that the veneer is presently being stripped 
away, not only with respect to specific performance but also with 
regard to all matters equitable, as is highlighted by the High Court 
of Australia in Taylor v Johnson. There can be no doubt that there 
are members of the judiciary who are breaking through the gloss -
who are taking each case on its own facts and merits as opposed to 
being "blinkered" by precedent. This "melt-down" and re-emergence 
of first-principle is best illustrated by Johnson v Agnew. In this 
case the distinct and parallel courses of equitable and common law 
damages have been significantly altered and now aline as they did 
some two hundred years earlier. 
The approach adopted in the more recent cases (notably 
inter alia Johnson v Agnew, Taylor v MacLachlan, Colon v Ozolins) 
is not one which allows equitable defences and considerations to 
be made out more readily, but that a broader attitude is being 
taken to their all round application. That is not only are extended 
considerations as to the refusal of a decree being examined but also 
counterveiling factors as to why the contract should be enforced from 
-- ------~-------------------------
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the point of view of the plaintiff are receiv~ng increased investigation. 
This investigation as to the position of the plaintiff prevents the 
equitable defences being more easily made out. 
Several of the equitable defences (inter alia Mutuality 
and Impossibility) still proceed in strict accordance with the case 
law built up around them. However even these areas are subject to 
review as Price v Strange demonstrates with regard to mutuality. 
What can be drawn from the facts involved in specific 
performance cases generally? Few cases involve straightforward 
sale-and-purchase of dwelling houses between the average man. It 
is submitted this is because a vendor (unless of substantial means) 
stands to lose more than he will gain by commencing an action for 
specific performance. Not only will the financial cost be high, 
even if a decree is obtained, but also his property will be off 
the market, this point being relevant in the event of the court 
refusing a decree, refusal being quite possibly given the numerous 
hurdles to a decree particularly in harsh economic times where the 
defences of hardship and impossibility (due to lack of finance) are 
prevalent. While damages can repair some of the loss involved, 
considerations such as inconvenience, expenses incurred if the vendor 
had to settle a purchase, legal fees, difficulty in obtaining a 
fixture date, and generally stress and emotional worry (factors 
the average man is affected by more so than a company), are 
difficult to compensate for. 
Couple this inaccessibility of the remedy to the lot of 
a busy conveyancing solicitor who must be constantly on guard against 
making an election or waiving a course of action which will prejudice 
his client's right to the remedy in the future, and the difficulties 
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associated with the practical application of the remedy become evident. 
It is submitted that one of two alternatives could be 
used to diminish the abovestated problem. On the one hand the 
legislature could provide the High Court with a Chancery Division, 
much the same as the Federal Courts in Australia have. This Division 
would process matters apace and thereby, hopefully, limit the cost 
factor. On the other hand, and more practically, it is ventured 
that the District Court's jurisdiction could be extended as to the 
issuing of decrees. This extension should increase the upper limit 
of the District Court's jurisdiction to $100,000 with respect to 
specific performance. This figure contemplates the average price 
of residential houses in New Zealand. 
There are many defences to the court awarding a 
decree which have not been touched upon including inter alia; 
laches, waiver, part performance, contracts involving continuing 
obligations. Moreover several major aspects relating to the 
mechanism of specific performance have not been considered because 
of space constraints and the lack of case law movement in these 
areas, they being inter alia: the use of injunctions to enforce 
contracts; the adequacy of common law remedies as opposed to 
specific performance ; the enforcement of a decree for specific 
performance. 
It is suffice to close with the words of Romilly M R 
who succinctly notes the theme evidenced by this paper i that while 
specific performance is to be exercised according to a discretion 
there need still be some rules to govern the same 
" The discretion must be exercised according 
to fixed and settled rules; you cannot exercise 
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a discretion by merely considering what, 
as between the parties, would be fair to 
be done ; what one person may consider 
fair, another person may consider very 
unfair i you must have some settled rule 
and principle upon which to determine 
how that discretion is to be exercised. " 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
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